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WORLD PEACE THROUGH LAW
CHARLES RHYNE*
In view of the realities of today's world, man cannot live
in isolation if he expects to live in peace. The world situation
must be everyone's concern; each of us must act, collectively
and individually if we are to avoid the total destruction which
threatens world peace.
We live in a world all of us know more about, think more
about and worry more about than ever before. Age old bar-
riers of time and distance are gone; the lives of all peoples are
inextricably intertwined. For instance: international trade was
affected by the United States' enactment of a 10'/; surcharge on
imports; the outbreak of war between India and Pakistan in
December, 1971 affected everyone almost immediately as has the
continuation of the Middle East conflict; states and peoples will
be vastly affected by China's presence in the U.N.
Since no one nation can by itself control drugs, money, en-
vironment, pollution, weather, airplane hi-jacking, poverty,
hunger, disease and many other subjects of considerable con-
cern to the world community, transnational cooperation has be-
come, in fact, a necessity. It is obvious that the expanded Euro-
pean community with the admission of Britain and other coun-
tries and President Nixon's Peking and Moscow visits, will pro-
foundly affect the world scene. Various new power blocs are
envisioned by political pundits. Premier Kosygin's Canada visit,
Chancellor Brandt's Russia visit, Chairman Breznev's Paris Con-
ferences, Emperior Hirihito's European tour, and the recent
visits to the United States of President Tito and Prime Ministers
MacMahon of Australia, Sato of Japan, Heath of Britain and
Indira Gandhi of India are almost certain to provide impetus
and direction to a vast reorganization of the way the world
now operates. These new relationships between nations and
peoples will reshape world politics.
Today's conficts and developments among states demard
a reorganization of world politics if we are tc avoid a reversion
to isolationism or recurring wars. This reorganization must
result in the creation of machinery which will operate under
what President Eisenhower urged as: "the rule of law rather
than the rule of force". If the world continues to organize itself
* Mr. Rhyne received his A.B. from Duke University and his LL.B. in
1937 and D.C.L. in 1957 from George Washington. He is President of
the World Peace Through Law Center, general counsel for the Na-
tional Institute of Municipal Law Offices, and senior partner of
Rhyne and Rhyne in Washington, D.C.
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into power blocs of armed might as it has done before, minor
wars and conflicts seem inevitable. History has taught us that
every arms race sooner or later, by accident or design, has ex-
ploded into warfare. Arms alone cannot insure a peaceful world
with order and justice; we must instead develop new means to
prevent war. The fact that this system has not yet been brought
into existence merely underlies the imperative necessity that it
be created now. Previous failures to create this essential system
does not prove that it is impossible to create the system. The
realities of our day make its creation our most imperative
necessity.
The means of insuring that our transformed world will be
based on justice and order lies in the creation of a new under-
standing that if the disputes between nations cannot be pre-
vented, they should be resolved by means other than armed
conflict. Nations will not support a new security system as a
replacement for arms until that system provides security with
order and justice.
One system which has been tried is the U.N. Granted that
the U.N. is weak; it is often ignored by the great nations; the
Security Council often fails to act on international disputes or
it acts too late to be meaningful. But it should be noted that
although the U.N. is weak, great nations dare not ignore it.
They still use its forum. They still seek public opinion ad-
vantage there. With Mainland China as a member, (particu-
larly if all divided nations are now let in), the United Nations
can grow in stature and strength. In fact China's re-entry into
the common endeavors of nations can make the U.N.'s actions
more meaningful if the U.N. becomes a focal point of these
common endeavors.
In addition to the obvious successes achieved by the U.N.
in ending the Cyprus, Congo, and Middle East fighting, some
200 international and regional organizations have been created
within the U.N. framework to regulate the ever expanding rela-
tions among nations. These range from the specialized agencies
such as the International Aviation Organization, ILO, WHO,
WMO, etc., to broad organizations such as the EEC and the
OAU. These organizations are largely responsible for the effec-
tive prescription and enforcement of international law in the
past 25 years. In addition to their participation in the inter-
governmental organization, nations are responsibily acting to
solve their problems through discussions, conferences and nego-
tiations. They are using international law as found in conven-
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tions and treaties as their guide, thus giving agreements per-
manence and prestige. Illustrative of this developments are the
SALT talks, the Berlin agreements, the agreement worked out
between the United States and the Soviet Union, agreements to
avoid collisions at sea and a host of bilateral agreements, and
broader multilateral conventions banning weapons on the sea-
bed, in space and on Antarctica as well as nuclear test ban
treaties, and nuclear non-proliferation treaty.
Of growing significance in the search for a viable and effec-
tive system to ensure peaceful resolution of conflicts is the
accelerated pace of non-governmental effort. The goal of this
effort is to emphasize the necessity of applying the procedures
and principles of the rule of law to the search for peace. For
instance, in 1957, Winston Churchill challenged the American
Bar Association leaders to assume a leading role in implement-
ing the use of law for world peace. To this end a vast program
was designed to so strengthen law as to make it a credible re-
placement for force as the basis for international security.
This program has focusd on: (1) prescribing international
legal rules in treaties and conventions; (2) creating new inter-
national institutions such as courts and quasijudicial agencies,
and encouraging the use of existing institutions; and (3) blend-
ing the enforcement of peaceful order with justice. Enforce-
ment can, of course, be achieved by proper international action
including sanctions, a police force, or by enforcement of deci-
sions of international tribunals in national courts as is done in
the framework of the EEC.
Of special note is the World Peace Through Law Center,
which was established in Athens in 1963 at a conference at-
tended by 1000 jurists from 109 nations. Its purpose was to carry
forward the program begun by the American Bar Association,
and today it is the largest world organization of the legal pro-
fession with participants in 135 nations. The Center's recent Bel-
grade Conference was attended by 4000 lawyers and judges from
114 nations; and 60 heads of state sent messages endorsing a
world ruled by law. From August 26-31, 1973, the Center will
sponsor its Sixth World Conference in Abidjan, Ivory Coast
which will stress the 42 African nations and their 375 million
people.
The World Peace Through Law Center focuses public atten-
tion on the importance of the rule of law among nations in
the international arena. No other international organization,
including the U.N., duplicates this program.
1972
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The Center's program comprises broad plans and proposals
to strengthen and expand transnational law by persuading na-
tions of the value of law in international relations. The Center's
activities include the drafting of new treaties and conventions
as well as updating existing ones. More than one hundred inter-
national legal subjects receive constant study. Through the use
of publications, five world law conferences, World Law Day,
contacts and correspondence, and a growing world wide dia-
logue, the Center has emphasized law and its potential. The
General Principles of Law Adhered To by Civilized Nations
have been stated and the treaties and conventions previously
adopted by nations have been collected. Model treaties and con-
ventions are drafted by experts; lawyers have been asked to
urge their governments to ratify treaties prescribing interna-
tional law, such as the Hague Convention on Aircraft Hijacking.
Drafting model national laws to accompany treaties and
conventions is a new activity of the Center. The Center's re-
cently approved conventions on the environment, weather con-
trol and the seabed must be accompanied by uniform national
laws to insure effectiveness. As is illustrated by the conven-
tions on diplomatic immunity, sea use and air travel, interna-
tional law works effectively when universally accepted; self
interest of nations and the inevitable necessity of operating in
the world community are factors which constantly expand this
body of universally accepted law.
Similarly, international courts and other judicial bodies can
effectively function when universally accepted, as is illustrated
by the fact that all but one of the World Court judgments
(Corfu Channel Case) have been voluntarily compiled with.
There has been similar compliance with more than a thousand
judgments of the European Court of Justice on European Com-
mon Market disputes.
However, the Center's program does not assume that all
international disputes are appropriate for world court decision.
Nor does the Center espouse a world government. It is a pro-
gram designed for the gradual acceptance by nations of pro-
cedures by treaties and conventions that will cover the areas
of potential conflict among nations. Thus disputes could be
resolved which might otherwise culminate in armed con-
frontation.
The greatest hindrance to the evolution of such a complete
world law system is the reluctance of nations to relinguish
sovereign powers. However, the United States or any other
WORLD PEACE THROUGH LAW
'nation does not surrender its sovereignty when it becomes
party to a treaty or convention. The United States, for example,
belongs to more than 4000 treaties and benefits by each treaty.
Thus, becoming a party to a treaty is an exercise of a state's
sovereignty, not a limitation on it.
The EEC provides a model of procedural and substantive
interrelationships which makes the waging of war among its
members highly unlikely. The system of law agreed to by the
Common Market members forces them to go to court not war.
That legal system provides intermeshed relationships which
lead to the lessening of internal conflict. Traditional rivals
among the European states who once went to war to resolve
disputes, now submit to the expectations of their citizens that
the dispute be settled peacefully, through the procedural
mechanisms of the EEC.
However, we cannot eliminate our present security system
provided by arms without adding constructive replacements.
We must create new institutions adapted to current world
needs. One suggested institution is a "Peace Panel" to which
states could be urged to take disputes unresolved by existing
mechanisms. A model for such an institution can be derived
from the special arbitration panel created during the 1968
India-Pakistani dispute on the Ran of Kutch. Both sides ac-
cepted the arbitrators' decision, which at least temporarily
halted the conflicts between these states.
If such a panel existed on a permanent basis, its use to
resolve conflicts could be demanded. The U.N. or the World
Peace Through Law Center could provide the vehicle for this
permanent mechanism.
Throughout history, the rule of law has signified the rule
of reason. The operation of a system based on the rule of law
is to ensure human dignity. When the rule of law breaks down
on a city, state or national level chaos, death and destruction
are the results. The institutions which exist have not insulated
us from our disputes and the breakdown of law. The inade-
quacy of bilateral agreements has taught us that we need
third party institutions.
We live in a world all of us know more about, think more
about, and worry more about than ever before. It is my thesis
that it is a world we individually and collectively must do
more about if we are to avoid atomic holocaust. That if we are
to avoid such a fate each of us has a part to play.
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Given the realities of todays' world we cannot live in isoa-
tion if we expect to live in peace. The shape of the new world
which is evolving must be everyone's concern.
According to General Sarnoff the media can flash news
entirely around the world in one seventh of a second. Events
anywhere quickly affect peoples everywhere. Age old barriers
of time and distance, and mountains and seas are gone. The
lives of all of Earth's peoples are inextricably intertwined.
For example, the outbreak of war between India and Pakis-
tan would affect you and me almost instantly. So would a
war between Israel and the Arab world. Vietnam has literally
tortured our people beyond description.
Each of us will be vastly affected by China in the United
Nations.
England's entry into the Common Market creates new
alignments.
Seemingly every nation claims an adverse effect from the
recent ten percent surcharge on imports.
The internationalization of life today both affects our do-
mestic problems, and dictates their solutions.
Due to these facts and others of similar importance, we
cannot dismantle our alliances, denounce our 4000 treaties, drop
out of the arms race (or build a "Maginot Line" out of arms),
abandon our status as the world's greatest international trader
and traveler, forget the rest of the world and live happily
ever after.
The scurrying of leaders of nations around the world is but
evidence that they recognize that a vast reorganization of the
world is taking place to adapt to current realities.
The most important factor is the necessity that this reorgan-
ization be one which results in machinery which will operate
the world under "the rule of law rather than the rule of force".
In ultimate thrust, the question is whether the new world
reorganization is one which will lead to peace or war. This is
indeed the ultimate question before the peoples of the world.
They will get their answer in the uncertain days ahead.
POLITICAL CRIMES:
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Professor Szabo's thesis is that the definition of politi-
cal crime is dependent upon a temporal, socio-cultural
context for a specific meaning. He describes political
crimes as "those infractions committed for reasons over
and above the self-interest of their perpetrator and
which are an attempt to achieve changes of a political,
social or religious order". Following a historical out-
line of political crime, the author concludes with a dis-
cussion of political crimes on the international level. ED.
M. DENIS SZABO*
The repression of political crimes was originally used to
protect the person of the tribal chief who was the first embodi-
ment of collective public authority. This repression was severe
because in ancient primitive societies and the theocentric
Middle Ages the chief was believed to have divine power on
earth.
An initial investigation of political crime shows that it is
a complex phenomenon involving psychological, social, moral,
legal and judicial aspects, all of which should be carefully dis-
tinguished. It is also evident that each civilization engenders
political crimes deriving from its own particular values; be-
cause of the contemporary nature of civilizations, the concept
of political crimes is essentially contingent upon and varies
from one epoch and civilization to another.
For these reasons we shall start with a definition of politi-
cal crime from the socio-cultural, legal, and judicial viewpoints.
An historical outline will permit us to examine the various
concepts of political crime during the Greco-Roman period, the
Christian Middle Ages and modern times. The essay will con-
clude with the incidence of political crime in international law.
Definition of Political Crime
From a strictly judicial point of view the political crime
is impossible to define as it is contingent upon the meaning of
"political". How can one follow the rule of legality if the mean-
*Prcfessor Szabo is Director of the Department of Criminology and Pro-
fessor of Criminal Law and Criminology at the University of Montreal
(Canada).
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ing of the term "political" can be constantly changed? The
only clear answer is in the restrictive enumeration of all acts
known as "criminal". Among all the large countries of today
only Great Britain makes use of this solution. The others pat-
tern their laws on definitions much less precise, sources which
could be arbitrary and should the occasion arise, could be a
threat to public liberties. The political crime is in essence an
exceptional offense, causing a defensive reaction on the part of
society against internal attack, and menacing freedom by the
threat of despotism which it inevitably carries with it.
From a practical point of view, the particularly dangerous
character of political crime is obvious. Since the role of penal
law is to enable the state to regulate the repression of acts
contrary to its interests, the law maker is confronted with the
problem of having to define this particular type of crime.
If we consider the motivation or the goal of the so-called
political crime - its subjective elements - we see that its per-
petrators are generally motivated by drives over and above
their own personal interest. To a large extent their aims are
unselfish. Because of this, certain preferential treatment is
accorded them, such as the right of foreign asylum. Some
people even believe this crime is not an infamous one at all,
but rather an honorable one, since it is motivated by altruism.
Those taking this factor into account, however, are careful to
exclude anyone from this category who has acted for selfish
reasons, such as greed or spite. They consider socio-political
delinquents to be political offenders -persons whose aim is to
take action in a general way without physically interfering
with the existence or the organization of the state.
Judicial doctrine also makes a distinction in the case of re-
lated 'offenses. According to the definition of the Institute of
International Law, complex infractions or those connected with
political crimes are considered political offenses as long as they
do not involve the most serious crimes from the point of view
of morals or common law.' These would include assassination,
murder, poisoning, mutilation, grave wounds, all of which are
voluntary and premeditated; attempts to commit crimes of this
nature; attempts against property by fire, explosion or flood;
and robbery, particularly armed robbery and robbery with
violence.
I RESOLUTIONS OF THE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 103 (J. Scott ed.
1916).
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The Contingent Character of the Political Crime
As a result of these brief considerations concerning the
definition of political crime, it would seem to be an essentially
conditional concept which requires an examination of the con-
ditions of civilization under which the political offense takes
place. We shall do this by examining the various forms of
political crime in history as well as their place in contemporary
restrictive laws. It seems appropriate here to recall the ob-
servation of a great moralist of our times, Albert Camus. When
confronted by the frightening spectacle of ideological fanati-
cism, he questioned the conscience of the honest man. For the
man disoriented by warring gods, deceived by absolutes, and
who accepts the absurdity of existence, the one and only mani-
festation of liberty is rebellion; a rebellion born of an irration-
ality which results from an unjust and incomprehensible situa-
tion. But his spirit blindly insists on order in the midst of
chaos and cohesion in a changing world. Rebellion seeks to
change, but to change is to act and to act may be to kill. Rebel-
lion therefore engenders that very act we ask it to justify.
It must find its own justification for it can never find it
elsewhere.
These thoughts of Camus strikingly reflect the profound
doubt which seized men of the western world after the holo-
caust of the Second World War. The basic morals of the estab-
lished order are now giving way under the fire of adverse ide-
ologies, and the sense of duty is becoming more and more
ambiguous in this era of crisis. Certain groups and individuals
who were accused of shaking the very foundations of the estab-
lished order have ended up by representing the established
order. In many countries, the monarchists were replaced by
republicans, the liberals by socialists or the colonialists by the
colonized and their power is already being threatened by other
groups.
Before examining the forms which political crime has as-
sumed throughout the course of history, let us sum up with
some observations on the contingent character of political
crime. First, the word "political" is a poor description of these
crimes because it is too narrow. Many infractions of religious
laws are devoid of selfish motives; for examples, sacrilege,
heresy, and blasphemy. These infractions have been considered
the gravest of crimes for a very long time. Some socio-political
crimes such as union fights and political demonstrations also
belong in the same category. That is why some authorities
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have suggested the term "ideological crime". Secondly, more
than all the others, state crimes are contingent upon the cur-
rent views and the dominant principles in any society. Thirdly,
since political delinquents are usually moved by unselfish mo-
tives, they often receive special treatment in democracies.
Their situation, however, is still complicated in regard to the
law. The law distinguishes between complex infractions and
related infractions. In the case of a complex infraction, the
crime is political in its aims and general in its result, for ex-
ample, the assassination of a chief of state. In the case of the
related crime, a common law crime is committed for political
reasons, for example, the looting of an armory. Fourthly, the
lenient attitude towards political crime is relative; the moment
the deed stirs up public indignation even slightly, the favorable
situation of the offender no longer obtains.
As a definition, then, we may state that political crimes
are those infractions committed for reasons over and above the
self-interest of their perpetrator and which are an attempt to
achieve changes of a political, social or religious order, When
they run counter to public opinion because of the methods
used, they are always deprived of their special character and
become common law infractions.
Ancient History
We know that before the French Revolution, no distinction
was ever made between political crime and common law crime.
The interests of the state and public order were one with those
of the monarchy. Moreover, the most dreadful forms of tor-
ture were reserved for persons charged with lese majesty. It
was for these offenders that the principle of punishing only the
culprit was waived in favor of confiscation of goods and ban-
ishment of the next of kin as well. Later, extradition was intro-
duced into the state laws to regain jurisdiction over political
offenders.
It is not surprising then, that in the ancient city, in Rome
as in Athens, there were on special laws for political crimes.
They were punished with the utmost severity. We read in the
Decree of Demophante in 410 B.C. that if any person over-
threw the democratic government of Athens he would be con-
sidered an enemy of the Athenians. He might be killed with
impunity and his goods confiscated. Whoever killed him, or
advised that he be killed, would be deemed innocent and pure.
We also know that penal law during this period showed
humanity in its punitive measures by the possibility of escap-
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ing death by exile, the protection of life and decency for the
slave as well as the free man. As opposed to the retaliatory
law practiced by other states, Athens recognized to a certain
extent the principle of the legality of suppression. That is, no
person could be punished for acts which were not punishable
under the provisions of a law.
But all this humanity disappeared where crimes against
the state were concerned. Those in power could incriminate
any act which seemed to endanger the rule of the City. Crim-
inal intent was enough to incriminate a person. In effect, for
other crimes the punishment should follow th misdeed, but in
attempts against the government it should precede it.
Among the Romans, the one guilty of crimen majestatis
immunitae was considered in a class with the foreign enemy.
The provisions made for him, as in Greece, were marginal to
the legal system: the suppression of these crimes, especially
in the Early Empire, was a manifestation of either the violence
of popular reaction or the despotism of Caesar. The Romans
considered the political offender synonymous with a foreign
enemy and treated him as such. As in Greece, a hostile inten-
tion was enough to incriminate a person and during the later
Roman Empire the worst vengeance took place under the guise
of repression of crimen majestatis immunitae. Capital punish-
ment was most often used and banishment was evolving
towards deportation, which entailed the confiscation of inher-
itance and loss of civil rights. The Les Quisquis under Arcadius
in 397 even made provision for the punishment of descendents
of criminals guilty of crimen majestatis immunitae. Included
among this crime were treason, the overthrow of the constitu-
tion or any attack upon the authority of the most insignificant
functionary representing the state or the Emperor. Infidelity
to the national religion was punished by death, as was a decla-
ration before a court that one belonged to the Christian
religion. The confusion between the profane and the sacred is
as much in evidence here as it was in Greece.
The Middle Ages
We have seen in ancient law how often the legal regula-
tions and the religious laws were intermingled. It is interest-
ing to note that both Christ and Socrates were accused of want-
ing to introduce new gods into the City. We still find traces
of Roman law in the Christianity of the Middle Ages; crimes of
divine lese majesty fell under ecclesiastic jurisdiction, and
crimes of human lese majesty fell under royal jurisdiction.
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They were usually judged by special commissions and set
apart from the common law.
Beginning with the Carolinian period the responsibilities
stemming from the oath of fidelity were considerably broad-
ened and any interference with them were submitted to
arbitrary royal power. Ties of fidelity, strengthened by an
oath of allegiance which was the basis of the feudal political
system, were protected against traitors by severe punishment.
In 1351 England instituted the Treason Act to punish any
breach of allegiance with the lords, and above all, with the
King. The death penalty was usually called upon for this
crime, as well as "blood taint" which stipulated that an offender
disinherit all his issue. In Germany, rebellion and riot against
the royal authority were dealt with by death and confisca-
tion of goods.
In French law the main political crimes were breach of
feudal allegiance, failure to protect the King, serve in the
army or serve the cause of justice. A crime against the state
as represented by the Prince was a breach of vassal bondage
and resulted in death or exile as well as the loss of fief and
the confiscation of goods. Should a vassal lift a hand against
his lord he was deprived of his sword; if he escaped by flight
he was banished from the baronial domain; if he did not come
to his lord's assistance in time of danger his goods were
confiscated.
The church, which was a secular as well as religious power,
exercised its jurisdiction within the political confines of the
Christian states. The principle crimes punished by the church
were heresy and blasphemy, and both soon became integrated
in the temporal penal law. Considering the close ties between
political and religious authority, during the Middle Ages, the
main political crimes were considered religious crimes even
though they were punished by the public authorities. Thus
sacrilege covered both crimes against the church and crimes
against the sovereign. Excommunication, often used by the
church for purely temporal reasons, had serious consequences
in civil law. The secular power strongly supported the church,
and during this era to be excommunicated was paramount to
being placed outside the law.
In conclusion we see that in the Middle Ages the influence
of Roman law was predominant, with the use of extreme
severity and arbitrary action in the suppression of crimes
against the state and above all its representatives. The guaran-
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tees of justice, legality and leniency which were being grad-
ually introduced in other sectors of the law were absent in
those dealing with political crime.
An important evolution was taking place, however, with
regard to the completely arbitrary character of the old society.
In political philosophy, and in a parallel way in positive law,
the distinction between king and tyrant permitted the introduc-
tion of the right to rebel against a usuper. This right to rebel
is expressly recognized in the Magna Carta of England in 1215,
in the Golden Bull of Hungary in 1222, in the Peace of Fexhe
of the Principality of Liege, and in the Joyeuses Entre6s of
Brabant in 1356.
This evolution is exemplified by a change in English law.
In England the traditional feudal context continued to char-
acterize political crimes, but in 1351 the barons imposed "stat-
utes" upon the king limiting high treason t3 seven categories.
These statutes constituted the first attempt to guarantee the
independence of the individual before the power of the state
in criminal matters. This strengthening of the distinction be-
tween treason and protesting against a tyrant, first made in the
Middle Ages and developing here, will be seen to serve as the
basis of the public law concept in modern times.
Modern Times
The secular aspects of power were more fully developed
after the sixteenth century. The kings became increasingly
independent of the church and central power took precedence
over that of the great barons. La raison d'ftat, or the good of
the state, was substituted for the ties of feudal allegiance and
the most outrageous acts of political vengeance were com-
mitted in its name. Alleged political crimes were removed from
the regular courts and submitted to the legal principle of
nullum crimen, nullum poenasine lege. These courts them-
selves qualified the crime and determined the punishment.
Richelieu defended these special courts by saying that in the
regular courts justice required knowledge and evidence of
proof, but that this was not the case in the affairs of state
since conjecture must often take the place of proof.
It was the century before the French Revolution that the
English people put an end to royal absolutism and this benefi-
cent evolution owes much to the influence of the philosopher
John Locke. He defines the principle of the social compact as
follows. What gave birth to the society politic is the agree-
ment of a certain number of free men, represented by the
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greatest number among them. This gives birth to a legitimate
government. Thereafter, liberty constitutes the fundamental
welfare of man, for which the state must be responsible. Its
role is limited from this time on; it must protect the liberty of
its citizens. Crimes of state lessen in importance as absolutism
of the state decreases. Whoever is accused of treason from this
time forward has legal guarantees. Among these are: first, the
right to know who constitutes his panel of jurors before enter-
ing into proceedings; second, the right to be informed of the
act charged; third, the right to be assisted by a lawyer; fourth,
the right to propose and to name witnesses for his defense;
fifth, the right not to be condemned without a minimum proof
of his guilt. Finally, treason cannot be prosecuted except within
a period of three years from the date of the infraction.2
Thus, during the eighteenth century we note a certain "de-
personalization" of the crime of state which was becoming an
abstract entity detached from the person of the Prince. The
concept of public law was being developed and the characteris-
tics of feudalism diminished in importance.
The French Revolution
During the French Revolution a Declaration of Rights ap-
peared in the constitutions of most of the North American
states, and the French Declaration of Human Rights and the
Rights of the Citizen which followed established the liberal
ideas which were to spread throughout the world. The om-
nipotence of the law superceded that of the judge and the ad-
ministrator. The concept of the liberal state was born; it be-
came the guardian and trustee of public and private liberty.
Political crime may be severely punished, but it is punished
according to laws instituted by legislation. Through the medium
of the revolution sovereign power has decidedly changed hands.
The person of the Prince has been replaced by the abstract
entity of the state, the absolute power of the King by human
rights. This is the great legacy of the French Revolution.
In the new public law, the moral entity of the state is
clearly distinguished from its agents. Crime against the state
is conceived in two ways. The first views crime against the
state as treason; an external attack against the state, its very
existence and its laws. The second views crime against the
state as an internal attack against the agents of the state, its
government and its political institutions. This distinction is
2 Two TRACTS OF GOVERNMENTS OF GOVERNMENT - JOHN LOCKE 230 (P.
Abrams ed. 1967).
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essential: the first offense endangers the very existence of the
state, whereas the second has less serious consequences. Their
suppression differs accordingly, being much more harsh in the
case of the first type of offense.
Liberty of conscience, one of the fundamental principles
of the new system, implies liberty of expression in politics and
religion. The Christian religion, then, ceases to be a basis of
public order, and becomes a private affair. To maintain public
order, the power to prohibit acts harmful to society without
compromising the liberty of the individual falls to legislators
elected by the people. Herein lies the famous principle of the
legality of crime and punishment. Punishment becomes fixed
by the elimination of arbitrary decisions by the judge, and it
becomes personal by excluding punishment of the family and
confiscation of the criminal's property. To sum up, the om-
nipotence of the law has been substituted for that of the judge
and the administrator.
Political Crime in the Liberal Democracies
In the liberal democracies the idea prevails that political
crimes are less serious than common law crimes and should be
punished less strictly. The origin of this idea lies in the gradual
separation between temporal power and religious power, in the
secularization of the state whereby an attack against the politi-
cal order is divested of all sacreligious connotation. A profound
political skepticism is born, however, because of the alternating
of the parties in power, and political delinquents very often
appear to be unlucky gamblers rather than criminals.
Under the old system political crimes were the acts of
oligarchs plotting against the sovereign; in modern times they
are expression of a protest or a popular demand which can be
made legal in due time by an electoral majority. In this way
they attain the stamp of legitimacy. The great jurist Guizot
was one of the theoreticians of this new concept of political
crime.
The immorality of the political crime is not as clear or as im-
mutable as that of the common law crime; constantly modified
and observed according to the vicissitudes of life, it varies
with the times, the events, the laws and the quality of power;
it changes from one moment to the next under the force of
circumstance, which claims to fashion it according to its needs.
In the realm of politics, it is hard to find innocent or deserving
acts which did not receive legal indictment in some part of the
world.3
3 M. GuIzoT, ASPECTS OF FRENcH HISTORY 1789-1874, (D. Johnson transl.
1963).
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Thus, whereas no one wants to legitimize crimes against the
person or property, there is always a sizeable portion of the
population which approves of political crime within certain
limits.
Therefore, in the liberal democracies inspired by the ideas
of Locke the political crime tends to be tempered by justice.
The general trend is toward the gradual disappearance of politi-
cal courts, or where they do exist, toward their gradual sub-
mission to/the common law.
Attacks Against the Established Order:
Backlash in the Liberal Democracies
This evolution has not been without difficulties and marked
regression. Subversive propaganda, influencing militant ele-
ments and attacking the foundation of the political and social
order put the liberal state on the defensive.
At the end of nineteenth century and the beginning of the
twentieth, sporadic outbreaks of anarchy proved to be a turn-
ing point in social reaction. These outbreaks provoked a new
stringency in sentencing and the re-introduction of laws pro-
viding for the protection of the state against subversive in-
trigue. Only England resisted this development; the crime of
sedition still exists but since 1832 prosecutions have been rare
and acquittal has become the general rule.
In the United States the legal basis of anti-subversive law
rests upon the Smith Act (1940) as well as upon the judgment
by the Supreme Court in Dennis v. United States.4 This judg-
ment condemned the leaders of the Communist Party for hav-
ing organized the American Party, the goal of which was to
overthrow the legal government of the country. This legisla-
tion and judgment were violently criticized by liberal opinion
in the United States as a serious attack on freedom of thought.
The Algerian War and the state of quasi-civil war which
it created in the metropolis gave rise to a new French jurisdic-
tion: a special court called the Court of State Security. Events
revealed that the means of subversion had changed and that
the most modern techniques of psychological warfare were
being put to use by those seeking to take power. The rebel
movement was relying on bases situated outside the country
and benefitting from secret assistance from foreign powers. It
used terror to maintain its hold over the population and com-
mon law crimes were committed to maintain an atmosphere of
4 Dennis v. United States, 341 U. S. 494 (1951); Smith Act, 18 U. S. C.
§ 2385 (1940).
1972 POLITICAL CRIME: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 17
violence. The favorable bias which the political offender once
enjoyed because of his altruistic motivation began to disappear
almost completely.
French liberal opinion, like that of the United States, was
roused because such rigid legislation posed a threat to public
liberty and freedom of thought. In addition to the re-imposition
in 1939 of the death penalty for treason, the extension of the
jurisdiction of the Court constituted a real and constant threat
to those in opposition to the authorities. Articles in the Crimi-
nal Code5 refer the following crimes to this special court:
crimes of treason and espionage; attempts, plots and other in-
fractions against the authority of the state; crimes intended to
,iisturb the state by massacres or devastation; mutinous move-
ments; harboring of things or persons; and non-denunciation of
crimes against the safety of the state. The power of the Court
is extended to include minors of 16 to 18 years and preventive
detention has become unlimited. These and other stipulations
indicate the gravity of the setback suffered by the law and
the liberal tradition developed during the nineteenth century.
Within the realm of actual law one of the oldest problems
raised by political crime is that of extradition. In ancient times
and during the Middle Ages the right of asylum was accorded
all criminals coming under this law, provided they were
accused of a crime against the state on religious grounds. Lib-
eral theories on political crime emanating from the French
Revolution brought certain privileges and the purpose of ex-
tradition was to bring the accused before judges best qualified
to render him justice. This was because in political matters an
accused had but a slim guarantee of impartiality if he were
judged by an authority under the influence of his political
enemies. The right of asylum thus played a benevolent role
in protecting the offender from the vengeance of his adver-
saries. Certain limitations, however, soon became apparent in
the practice of extradition within international law. Under
pressure from the Holy Alliance and state governments, and
because of the alarm engendered by the social ills of the nine-
teenth century, regicides and anarchists were denied the benefit
of the right of asylum.'
5 See AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES, THE FRENCH PENAL CODE
43-54 (1960).
6 It should be noted, however, that England and, the Scandinavian coun-
tries, in spite of great foreign pressure, maintained the tradition of
asylum.
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Complement to the Definition of Political Crime
By means of this historical sketch, we begin to see the es-
sential outlines of political crime as they emerge through the
evolution of customs and legal systems. The attitude of toler-
ance in the suppression of crimes against the state is of recent
date; it is the product of the period from the end of the seven-
teenth century in England to the middle of the nineteenth
century in the countries of Western Europe. During the nine-
teenth century popular sentiment and the law underwent a
change prejudicial to the interests of the "political offender".
Manifestations of anarchy and flare-ups of social unrest such as
the Paris Commune and violent strikes provoked a harsh social
and penal reaction with regard to this type of crime.
We distinguish the pure political crime from the relative
political crime. The first is exclusively an attack against the
state; the second also attacks the legal benefits of every individ-
ual. In the definition of pure political crime there is a con-
frontation of two theories. The subjective theorists see the in-
tention of the offender as the only criterion of political infrac-
tion. The objective theorists believe that it is the nature of the
law violated that is the decisive factor.
The subjective theories find their origin in the ideas of
liberals for whom the model of the political offender is the
revolutionary of noble ideas and unselfish motives. But if the
motive is an important element is assessing the degree of crim-
inality of an accused, it is in no way sufficient that it should
be the sole criterion of the infraction. If this were so, all crimes
motivated by political considerations would become political
offenses.
In the objective theory, it is the nature of the law violated
which is important. Crimes are political when they are crimes
committed intentionally against the security of the state or of
a foreign state, as well as when directed against the head of a
government and the political rights of citizens. The state is the
passive object of all political crime, the latter attacking the
interests and rights of the state in its capacity as public author-
ity. Crimes against the administration and other rights and
prerogatives of the state are not included in this qualification
of "political crimes". A simple violation of the political order
is not in itself sufficient to constitute a political crime; there
must be an intention to totally or partially destroy the political
order.
We see that in strict legal terms it is exceedingly difficult,
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if not impossible, to give a satisfactory answer to the problems
posed by "political crimes". The qualification "political" defies
all attempts a reasonable definition, but in other respects, it
serves as a basis for legal codification. The arbitrary element
in the fate reserved for political delinquents by various legisla-
tions and state powers is great and without doubt will remain
SO.
Political Crime at the International Level
The advent of powerful nationalistic states resulted in
weakening the church's control over the state. The theory of
"just wars" as developed by the theologians and canon law be-
came obsolete. The raison d'etat alone became the prime con-
sideration. A new stage in the development of international
relations began with the establishment of the League of Na-
tions shortly after the First World War and the United Nations
Organization after the Second World War. The Kellogg-
Briand Pact denounced wars of aggression and recourse to vio-
lence as a means of settling disputes between states.' The juris-
diction of the International Court at The Hague was theore-
tically recognized to settle these matters.
The rise of the totalitarian states between the two wars
cut short this development, but their defeat gave the United
Nations Organization a chance to continue the earlier develop-
ments. Its charter condemned wars of aggression and crimes
against humanity. However, its field of jurisdiction is still very
limited because of the deep-seated ideological differences which
exist between the great powers. The rule of law which guaran-
tees safety and justice to citizens in the liberal democracies
seemingly has a long way to go before it can be extended to
the international field.
The problem of the legal responsibility of individuals on an
international scale dates back to the First World War. The ques-
tion arose of bringing German Emperor William II to trial
before an international court of law made up of representatives
of the Allied countries, and charging him with offenses against
international morality and the inviolability of treaties. This
project was never carried out.
The same problem arose in '1945 after the capitulation of
Germany. The perpetrators of the war of aggression and the
accompanying crimes committed in the occupied territories,
against religious minorities in particular, had to be tried in
7 Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, T.S. No. 796
(1928).
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courts of law. The difficulty lay in finding an appropriate
jurisdiction. Some authorities thought the most suitable courts
would be those of the countries of origin of the accused. How-
ever, the complete subjugation of German sovereignty after its
unconditional surrender necessitated another solution.
This solution found expression in the London Statute which
was concluded on August 8, 1945, between the governments of
the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the Union
Soviet Socialist Republics. 8 An international military tribunal
was set up to judge the leading war criminals. About twenty
such war criminals were tried by the Nuremberg Tribunal. It
was a military tribunal similar to the courts set up in each
state to handle similar crimes within its own borders. But it
was also international, representing the joint interests of those
nations who had come under German aggression. Those tried
were holders of responsibility - governors, diplomats, finan-
ciers and generals - whose criminal acts were committed
throughout the entire theatre of the war. The procedure was
based on prosecutionary law, and the customary guarantees
of Anglo-Saxon law were accorded the accused throughout the
trial. The trial was made public and every detail of the for-
malities in the presentation of proof by the prosecution was
observed.
The most important aspect of the London Statute is the
recognition of the individual as a subject of international law.
The Statute also recognized the criminal responsibility of any
individual for crimes committed on behalf of the state, its
agents or representatives.
The main criticisms of the London Statute were that it dis-
torted the principle of the legality of crime and punishment
owing to the absence of positive international penal legislation;
the retroactive character of the crimes and the refusal to ac-
cept the lack of responsibility of the agent. This last criticism
was due to the fact that all the power was concentrated in the
hands of the Fuhrer and according to German law those who
were tried were merely his agents.
Current attitudes towards political crime on the interna-
tional level may be seen in the problem of extradition. Tradi-
tionally, one accused of political crime was accorded the right
of asylum. With the development of the liberal theories of the
French Revolution and the resulting extension of legal pro-
tection to political criminals, extradition served the useful pur-
8 The London Statute, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544 (1945), E.A.S. No. 472.
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pose of bringing the accused before judges best qualified to
judge him.
With the gradual restriction of the protection of the politi-
cal offender which was seen to be the result of social develop-
ments of the nineteenth century, limitations of the validity of
extradition as a means of protecting the offender began to
develop. On July 2, 1968, a London court decided that James
Earl Ray should be returned to the United States to stand
trial as the accused assassin of Dr. Martin Luther King. The
principal argument of Ray's attorney was that since Dr. King
was a "political figure", his murder was a political crime and
consequently not an extradictable offense. This defense was
based on the provision of the British-United States Extradition
Treaty of 1931 which provides that "a fugitive criminal shall
not be surrendered if the crime or the offense in respect of
which his surrender is demanded is one of a political char-
acter". 9 The argument of David Calcutt, the barrister who
represented the United States was decisive:
A lone murder of a politican, still less of a mere political fig-
ure, cannot satisfy the definition of an offense of political
character.... There is not one shred of evidence here to show
that the killing took place to further a larger enterprise. There
is no evidence of a conspiracy....
The chief metropolitan magistrate agreed and the decision was
not appealed.'0
This unwillingness of the international community to ex-
pand the definition of political crime is further illustrated by
the Tokyo Convention in Article 2.11 While admitting that
certain instances of aircraft hijacking may be political crimes,
such crimes were not to be granted the traditional immunity
from extradition treaties that other political crimes were given.
Conclusions
This brief outline has shown that the idea of political crime,
or more appropriately, ideological crime, has undergone pro-
found changes throughout the course of history. From a highly
arbitrary reaction on the part of the City in self-defense, the
concept of political crime has evolved toward a set of rules
intended to ensure the security of the international community.
While those rules have evolved under different circumstances
9 Extradition Treaty with Great Britain, Dec. 22, 1931, art. VI, para. 1, 47
Stat. 2122, T.S. No. 849 (1931).
10 N.Y. Times, July 3, 1968, § 6, at 1, col. 1.
11 The Tokyo Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed
on Board Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963, [1970] 20 U. S. T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No.
6768 (effective Dec. 4, 1969).
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as witnessed by the evolution of French and English law, gen-
eral tendences are apparent. Most states apply such rules more
stringently in time of war, and more freely in time of peace.
However, more subtle variations are apparent regarding the
application of such law against political crime when connected
with internal security. Liberal traditions with specifically ennu-
merated charges of indictment have less fluctuation than other
more structured traditions.
The concepts of the nation-state and of territorial jurisdic-
tion have impeded the development of a truly international
penal law concerning both states and individuals. The Nurem-
berg Tribunal stands as a solitary and unfollowed example.
The slowly emerging criminal definitions of political crimes,
such as genocide by the United Nations, have not been easily
duplicated. Thus on the international level the prevalent insti-
tutions and attitude will have to undergo a radical transforma-
tion if the establishment of an international criminal legal
system 12 were to become a reality.
12 For a study of the various problem areas associated with such an estab-
lishment see, e.g., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (C. Bassioni & V.
Nanda eds. 1972).
THE SOCIAL SCIENCE STUDY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW: REVIEW OF
W. GOULD & M. BARKUN, INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
STUART S. MALAWER*
This study, sponsored by the American Society of Inter-
national Law and published by Princeton University Press,
describes the promises and problems of applying social science
techniques to the field of international law. The authors main-
tain that a systems analysis using communications theory is the
most advantageous approach towards fostering an understand-
ing of international law. Techniques of simulation analysis and
case studies involving both historical-sociological and cultural
anthropological concepts and methods are meaningful ap-
proaches. They are capable of generating medium range theories
concerning the international law system. The goal of the authors
is to convince both the international legal scholar and practi-
tioner of the benefits of a non-legalistic approach to the study
and practice of international law.
Review and Evaluation
Gould and Barkun essentially review the contending con-
cepts and methodologies of the social sciences as they relate
to international relations and as they may be applied to interna-
tional law. This includes factor analysis, structural-functional
analysis, theory-building, decision-making and content analysis.
The authors correctly emphasize that there is no adequate
application of systems theory or techniques of simulation in the
study of international law.'
Systems theory should find a ready welcome among inter-
national lawyers . . . . It does not seem unreasonable that
the study of international law might extend its venture into
simulation, beyond the teaching device of the moot court ....
We know of no simulation structured to permit focus upon the
role of legal norms in the conduct of relations between states
* Director, Atlantic International Law Center & Assistant Professor of
International Law, University of Baltimore Law School Member of the
Bars of the State of New York and the District of Columbia. J.D. Cornell
Law School; Ph.D. Candidate, University of Pennsylvania; Special Stu-
dent, Princeton University, Poltics Department, 1968-69. Also studied
at the Parker School of Foreign & Comparative Law at Columbia Uni-
versity and the Europa Instituut at the University of Amsterdam.
1 W. GOULD & M. BARKUN, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
27 (1970) [hereinafter cited as GOULD].
2 Id.
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... or for national legal advisors .... 3 There have as yet been
no simulations directly focused upon the role of norms in
international behavior. But pilot studies involving simulated
situations in domestic law indicate that simulation studies may
ultimately become a major tool for the examinaticn of the in-
ternational arena.4
In the development of laboratory exercises to investigate
the process of generating legal norms, the authors contend it is
necessary to concentrate on:
What happened before international agreement took form, and
before revised interpertations were articulated .... [I]t may
be said that the laboratory even permits investigation of what
precedes the negotiation stages. And it is to antecedent stages
... that one must turn if the process of norm generation is
to receive scientific exposition.5
The point is made that researchers ought to analyze the ver-
batim records involved in multilateral treaty formation.6 Not
only would such an analysis lend insight to the process of norm
formulation, but it would also show how international law
enters into the complex calculus of decision-making as informa-
tion concerning the substance of decisions.7 "Besides the con-
tribution made by lawyers in the form of briefs and oral pres-
entations to courts . . . their contribution to development of law
itself and to their nations' acceptance of international law are
essentially unknown." The authors argue that an "international
law subculture transcending political boundaries allows states
to make useful and verifiable predictions of the behavior of
others."9
Unfortunately, the authors do not develop guidelines for
the structuring of an international law simulation. They do
suggest two areas that they believe exercises ought to simulate:
treaty negotiations, and legal advice to foreign offices. These
areas are cited as "bridge topics" that could use the skills of
individuals trained in international relations and law.10 A re-
3 Id. at 36.
4Id. at 98. See W. COPLIN, SIMULATION IN THE STUDY OF PoLrrcs 2
(1968). "Simulation as an approach is also characterized by a concern
with the operation of systems. It is directly related to system, analysis
not only in its use of terminology but also in its striving to present an
integrated view of a set of processes. . . . [A] 11 simulation efforts are
interested in the investigation of a set of processes pictured in a systems
framework."
5 Id. at 178, 179.
6Id. at 236.
7Id. at 230.
8 Id. at 205.
9 Id. at 230.
10 Id. at 22. The authors suggest that there was no work on the topic of
legal advice to foreign offices, but see the recent dissertation completed
at Syracuse University discussing the role of lawyers and international
FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS
finement of the topic of treaty negotiations could well be the
development of a simulation exercise based on the "commission-
conference codification process of international law". Such a
simulation exercise could use as its empirical referant the
Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties of 1968-69 and the
prior work of the International Law Commission. An example
of such structuring will be developed later in this essay.
The authors' application of systems analy.is to the study of
international law is based explicitly on biologist James G.
Miller's concept of "living systems" to the exclusion of other
systems. For example, they accept this organismic view of
systems analysis in contrast to the biologist, Anatol Rapoport's
mathematical approach.1 1 The authors adopt an organismic
definition of systems despite their argument that there is no
good reason why properly equipped scholars could not mathe-
matize models of the international legal system.12 They empha-
sized that mathematics may be more revealing than verbaliza-
tion, but that jurimetrics ought not to accept poorly conceived
concepts as a substitute for well developed verbal symbols.1 3
The authors would have presented a stronger argument for
systems analysis if they had demonstrated the relevance of other
definitions of systems to the study of international law, instead
of promulgating a definition that is not well known, not well
accepted, and not well developed.
It is disappointing that the authors did not posit a set of
hypotheses that could be subject to testing by simulation studies
or otherwise. Charles F. Hermann has suggested a set of possible
hypotheses of related variables in his recent work.14 Hypotheses
discussing international law and politics are: if a one party
state exists, then it adhei s to a positivist view of international
obligations; if a parliamentary form of government with a weak
executive exists, it adheres to a dualist view of international
law; and if a totalitarian state exists, then it relies on treaty law
as the source of its obligation and in the conduct of its foreign
relations. It is also disappointing that the authors did not want
system analysis to generate medium range theories in the nature
of policy recommendations in addition to theories concerning
law in the functioning of the State Department. J. Outland, Law and
the Lawyer in the State Department's Administration of Foreign Policy,
(unpublished Ph.D. thesis in Syracuse University Library) 1969.
11 A. RAPOPORT, OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY (1969) and 15 INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 452 at 457 (1968).
12 GoULD 30.
Is Id. at 29.
14 C. HERMANN, CRISIS-DECISION MAKING: A SIwULATION ANALYSIS (1969).
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international law.15 However, they subsequently violate this
stricture .everal times. For example, when discussing state
responsibility they contend that it is a topic ". . . in which
systems analysis can be put to the service of policy". 16
One of the most promising aspects of applying systems
analysis is the possibility of identifying fundamental interna-
tional law rules in the context of historical international politi-
cal systems (intertemporal) and to identify legal rules that
have remained as a system changed over a period of time. 17 The
authors' attempts to approximate this aspect is more closely re-
lated to legal strategy than to basic and unchanging rules of
international law. For example, they suggest that there was a
change from a balance-of-power system in the interwar period
to a loose bipolar system exemplified by the post-World War II
era. This is a development from a reliance on a "minorities
treaties approach", to a reliance on a "human rights approach"
-a change of group protection to individual protection.' The
authors also avoid an analytical inquiry into comparative inter-
national legal systems and theories (not intertemporal) which
would be equally rewarding, e.g. Classical Greek, Ancient
Roman, Ancient Indian, and Ancient Chinese.19
The role of the lawyer is viewed as one who merely defines
the content of rules. The authors' low opinion of traditional
legal scholarship becomes all too apparent when they state:
[W]e doubt that legal skills, even though necessary, are suf-
ficient to adapt international law to technological change as to
the complex social change represented by the advent of new
African and Asian states. 20
This attitude is especially startling in light of the successfully
concluded treaties on the Law of the Sea,' 1 the Law of Outer
Space 22 and the Law of Treaties.
23
15 GouLD 41.
16Id. at 115.
17 This approach is to identify legal rules and correlate them with various
historical systems, perhaps, such as those in A. ROSECPANSE, AcTION AND
REACTION IN WORLD POLITICS (1963).
18 GouLD 213.
19Id. at 75.
20 Id. at 190. "It is data that can hardly be tapped ... either by legalis-
tically formal treatment or by social service approaches that do not
incorporate the rich insights of legal scholarships." Id. at 93.
21 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (1958),
15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 519 U.N.T.S. 205.
22 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Explora-
tion and Use cf Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies (1967), 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347.
23 Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/27 (1969).
See Malawer, Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties. 4 VANDERBILT
INT'L 1 (1971).
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While lamenting the quality of legal scholarship, the authors
emphasize the potential role of legal analysis.
[Liaw enters the policy process not simply as a set of norms
useful in dealing with choice situations but as a way of con-
ceiving problems and determining the range of alternatives
available. Snyder, Bruck and Sapin see the policy-maker as
,carving out' of the total range of phenomena before him some-
thing he conceives to be the problem at hand.24
It is the authors' contention that international law provides
ways of interpreting events; it provides a structure for process-
ing information. The international law specialist weds law to
policy; he couches policy proposals in the language of his pro-
fession. This interaction of law and government provides a mass
of raw material for legal analysis.2 5 The authors quite ade-
quately identify the subject of the lawyer in the foreign policy
decision-making process as a subject for future research.
The subject of legal advice has many intriguing facets to be
examined. In this endeavor to determine the parts played by
law and lawyers in the foreign policy decision process, the tech-
niques used by the student of decision-making . . . as well as
those used by the international law specialist, are forces that
could profitably be combined .... 26
This discussion of the lawyer's role leads to a general an-
alysis of a communications system. International law as a com-
munications system is a more fully developed topic than the
argument for a systems approach to international law. They
state that:
[F]rom the point of view of the scholar, if not from that of the
practitioner of law . . . methods of communication research
may reveal a great deal about legal processes and functions in
domestic and international societies that presently lies hidden
under the traditional legal language and concepts. A com-
munications approach seems particularly relevant to the study
of international law in view of the paucity of authoritative
third parties .... 27
The communication function of international law, specifically
its relationship to the area of foreign policy analysis, is empha-
sized. "In any case the interaction of international law and the
formation of foreign policy involves the intersection of various
kinds of expertise. It is a matter not only of content- the
24 GOULD 120. See FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING: AN APPROACH TO
THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (Snyder, Bruck & Sapin eds.
1962).
25 Id. at 122. For a discussion of "international law and foreign policy" as
a viable field of inquiry, see Malawer, A Juridical Paradigm for Clas-
sifying International Law in the Foreign Policy Process: The Middle
East War, 1967, 10 VA. J. INT'L L. 348 (1970) and Malawer, The Rele-
vance of International Law, 8 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 343 (1969).
26 Id. at 125.
27 Id. at 35.
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norms themselves- but of the cast of thought, the way of ap-
proaching a problem, that is important. '28
The discussion of communication theory is broad in the
sense of describing the communication function of international
law and the impact of communications on the related topics of
integration and socialization. The impact of traditional inter-
national legal scholarship on contemporary international rela-
tions theorizing is identified as providing "symbolic representa-
tion" and concepts to diversified phenomena.
The concepts taken for granted in international law . . . are
in fact symbolic representations of certain events and facts in
the world of international relations. Law is a system of sym-
bolic representation, a shorthand for taking in the panoply of
events and making some sense of it.2 9
The authors identify the communication and socialization
aspects of international law in the context of investigating the
nature and foundations of the international legal system. They
emphasize that international law is "sometimes sanctioned rules,
but they are always something more ".30 "As instruments for
socialization, communication and ordering of events, the rules
perform functions irrespective of the existence of a sanction
apparatus.
3 1
This analysis was informative, especially the description of
international law as "symbolic representation". 32 What really
needs to be commented upon is what was largely omitted: the
restraint function of international law in conflict situations.
Gould and Barkun contend that international law, by function-
ing as a communication system, implicitly functions as a re-
straining factor in state behavior.
The general omission of international law as an overt re-
straint system renders this book less relevant for those con-
cerned with the crux of the international system, namely, con-
flict between states. While international law as an "overt"
restraint system is not discussed, it is identified as an "implicit"
restraint system, derived from the communication function of
international law. "[I]n terms of a communication model of
law, stored legal messages announce consequences intended to
follow certain precedent actions.
33
Louis Henkin contends that conflict management is the
28 Id. at 119.
29 Id. at 127.
30 Id. at 130.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 127.
33 Id. at 171.
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foundation of the international legal system, rather than a mere
derivative of the communication function. 34 One is startled by
the failure of the authors to discuss international law in terms
of war and peace as does Henkin. All parties interested in the
future of the international legal system must be taken aback
by this deliberate omission. Even Falk, cited by the authors
as a law trained scholar who applies social science techniques
and concepts, has written extensively on the problems of war
and peace.3 5
The Treaty Law Development Simulation: Towards a
Framework of an International Law Simulation Exercise
Gould and Barkun suggest that a simulation exercise depict-
ing the multilateral treaty-making process needs to be de-
veloped.36 However, they do not suggest a set of parameters
for such a simulation exercise. The need for such a simulation
exercise is paramount. The international community in the
1960's concluded many multilateral treaties codifying or creating
new laws. They covered such areas as diplomatic and consular
relations, lawv of the sea, rules of treaty law, air piracy and the
arbitration of international investment disputes. The forthcom-
ing U.N. Conference on the Environment to be held in Stock-
holm this year further evidences the international community's
realization that the multilateral treaty process is the primary
means of generating new law which allows a diversified world
to manage common global problems. The following suggests
a framework for constructing such an international simulation.
Ahmed Sheikh posits parameters for a model codification
process.3 7 The model developed is one of
the intricate process of international negotiations and bargain-
ing leading up to consensus formation prior to development
of new international laws. It assumes that most international
laws of the future will be consensual norms developed as a
result of international treaties agreed through the process of
negotiation and bargaining 38
Sheikh argues that the development of a model of treaty forma-
tion needs to be the "first step" in a social science approach to
the study of international legal development. This could lead to
the development of a "single global perspective" of the process
that culminates in treaty formation.39
34 L. HENKIN, How NATIONs BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY (1968).
: I, II VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (R. Falk ed. 1968-69).
36 GOULD 37.
37 A. Sheikh, Analysis of Contemporary International Law Development
-A Social Psychological Perspective, 4 INT'L L. 785 (1970).
38 Id. at 794.
39 Id. at 786.
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Sheikh studies state behavior as it is related to "the process
of international law-making".41, He wants to develop "new
conceptualizations, approaches and models . . . which play a
significant part in the process of law-making". 41 A social-
psychological approach is used to determine the parameters of
his model. He emphasizes such variables as ideological prefer-
ences, value hierarchies, and cultural and social factors. A
model of international negotiations or of decision-making in an
international conference needs to encompass these variables,
he argues.
Unfortunately, Sheikh limits his model to the international
negotiation process conducted only by government representa-
tives. It is necessary to develop the parameters of a model
and a simulation exercise with validating historical case studies
that uses both government delegates and non-government rep-
resentatives (private experts) engaged in developing treaty law.
It is very meaningful in constructing a model of the treaty law
formation process to use the International Law Commission and
its role in the treaty law formation process as an empirical
referent. This commission-conference process has been, in
reality, the method used by the international community to
foster many significant multilateral law-making treaties.
42
A two-phase model of the treaty law formation process
needs to be developed emphasizing the role of private experts
in a small group situation and the subsequent role of state dele-
gates in a large multilateral conference situation.
INTERNATIONAL LAW CODIFICATION PROCESS
Phase One Phase Two
Small Group of Experts Large Group of Delegates
(Commission) Phase (Conference) Phase
I. Inputs I. Inputs
1. Personal (important) 1. Personal (less important)
2. National Systemic 2. National Systemic
(less important) (important)
3. International Systemic 3. International Systemic
II. Negotiation Process I. Negotiation Process
1. Strategies 1. Strategies
2. Tactics 2. Tactics
3. Bargaining 3. Bargaining
III. Outputs III. Outputs
1. Formal 1. Formal
a. Draft Treaty a. Signed Treaty
2. Informal 2. Informal
a. Impact on customary a. Impact on customary
international law international law
b. Policy Epectation b. Policy expectations
4o Id. at 787.
41 Id.
42 Id. See also Malawer, supra note 25.
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The first phase is the small group of experts that produce
certain outputs. The second phase is the large international
conference which utilizes the output of the prior phase as inter-
national systemic inputs. The grouping of variables as to both
phases needs to be categorized as inputs, negotiation process
and outputs. The input variables need to be classified as: (1)
personal (values and perception); (2) national systemic (prob-
lems facing the expert's nation); and (3) international systemic
(problems facing the international community). The negotiation
process variables are those of strategies, tactics and bargaining
techniques.
Examples of variables to be considered in the first phase
of the model are ideology and value preferences of the private
expert. The influence of the national government on the expert
needs to be considered as a national systemic input. The secu-
rity problems confronting the system and the expert's own
country need to be considered as international systemic inputs.
It is also important to note that inputs are subject to inter-
vening variables of the negotiation process, e.g., bargaining tech-
niques, strategies and tactics. This requires a determination of
the factors in the negotiation process (strategies and tactics)
and the utility of the desired outcomes. Outcomes are of high or
low utility relative to either the international system or the
particular national system.
At both stages of the codification process the outputs are
either formal or informal. A draft treaty is the formal output
of the experts. The impact of the draft treaty on existing cus-
tomary international law is the informal output of this small
group situation. Additional informal outputs are policy expecta-
tions generated on part of a particular state due to the formal
outputs of the commission process. A signed treaty, an unrati-
fied treaty, or a treaty not yet in force, is the formal output
of the multilateral conference. The impact on customary inter-
national law of a signed treaty not yet in force is the informal
output of the large group situation.
Variables in addition to those considered in the commission
phase need to be included when considering the conference
phase. Policy objectives and state directives to delegates should
be national systemic inputs of the conference phase. The in-
dividual actor is no longer the private expert but an official
delegate of a state. This is true even though the state delegate
may be, and often is, the same individual who serves as the
private expert in the commission phase. Policy expectations
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generated as informal output of the commission phase are vari-
ables under the category of national systemic inputs.
National systemic input is of more importance in the con-
ference phase than in the commission phase. This is because
the negotiator is officially acting as an agent of his own gov-
ernment. The delegate puts less emphasis on the problems con-
fronting other states than does the private expert in the com-
mission process. For the state delegate, the problems confront-
ing other states are international systemic inputs.
Unlike the draft treaty produced in the commission phase,
the output of the conference process is not of an interim nature.
The signed treaty produced by the conference, as well as related
resolutions, are generally intended to become effective as treaty
obligations upon ratification by the necessary amount of sig-
natory states. Informal outputs of the conference phase are the
impact of the yet unratified treaty on existing international law
and policy expectations generated by the conference on the part
of the participating states.
The preceding is a tentative framework to establish a model
of the multilateral treaty-making process. By indicating how
legal, political, and psychological factors ought to be conceived,
the model furthers the study of international law and foreign
policy. It allows for a more systematic and systemic investiga-
tion of the development process of treaty law and is capable
of attempting to partially answer the often debated question of
the nature of obligation in treaty law. The framework is in-
tended to be used by both scholars and policy-makers using
either traditional techniques of legal research or methods
favored by the social scientist.
Conclusion
This study presents in summary form the contending
methods and concepts of the social sciences that have probable
applicability to the study of international law. Despite the in-
troductory comments by Harold Lasswell,43 for the practicing
lawyer and the traditionally trained legal scholar the concepts
and the general presentation appear to be needlessly obscure
and too abstruse.
While the book is addressed both to legal scholars and prac-
titioners of international law, its ultimate value concerns the
international law student in a social science program. It can
provoke further research and hopefully lay the foundation for
revitalizing an essential and very old discipline of learning
4 3 GOULD at xx.
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that is vital for the study and regulation of the behavior of
international actors.
This reviewer's proposed framework for a treaty law de-
velopment simulation is intended to be relevant for both the
academician and the policy-maker. The emphasis on policy
relevance is intentional. For it is in the area of international
law and foreign policy analysis that the application of social
science methods and concepts for the researcher and the practi-
tioner is both necessary and promising. It is with the aim of
furthering the study of international law and increasing the
relevance of international law in the current crisis-ridden inter-
national system that this essay is devoted.
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INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF
RIVER WATER POLLUTION
FpR V. WITASCHEK*
This article presents technical and administrative sug-
gestions for controlling the pollution of international
rivers. It is the author's contention that current tech-
nological developments will enable the doctrine of
equitable utilization to be more accurately imple-
mented. He concludes that once technology demon-
strates the capability of coping with pollution, cur-
rent criticism of administration will be replaced by
active support. ED.
Reduced to simplest terms the word "pollute" means to
make unclean or impure. When referring to water, pollution
implies visible evidence of debris floating in the current. Fur-
ther study reveals that volumes are required to define the many
types and sources of physical and chemical water pollution and
to delineate the physical, chemical and biological tests which
scientifically catalogue and measure the degree of pollution.
"Control" means to exercise authority over; to restrain or
curb; to regulate. This implies the need for a legal entity which
authority to regulate and curtail river pollution. The benefits of
a river are manifold in nature and these benefits have been
multiplied by man's creativeness. Conflicts of authority are in-
herent in the control of pollution due to man's urge to devise
multiple use projects which are often contrary to efforts to con-
trol pollution. Consequently, the annals document countless ad-
judications, scientific experiments, and economic studies con-
ducted in search of equitable and optimum use solutions for
water resources.
Our subject, as cursorily defined above, is complex. When
we add the term "'international", meaning existing or con-
ducted among nations, two salient issues arise. Foremost is the
handicap on the authority to control stemming from the basic
* Mr. Witaschek is a recent graduate of the University of Denver College
of Law. He received his B.S. degree from Colorado State University
in 1948. Mr. Witaschek was Project Engineer for Design of the Link
Canals of the Indus Basin Project as a member of the firm of Tipton &
Kalmbach, Inc.. He is a member of the United States Committee of the
International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage.
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U.N. policy (art. 27) which precludes intervention in the
internal affairs of a member state. How can we interfere with
anything so basic as the right to modulate, use and control
nature's rivers within a nation's boundaries? Secondly, we are
confronted by the differences in the degree of development
among nations. Where one nation's desire is to abate river pol-
lution, another nation's desire is to develop means to use rivers
to rid their cities of wastes.
Despite the complexity and high cost of river pollution con-
trol, clean water is within our grasp. This possibility is condi-
tioned upon efforts being carefully correlated to a "time-loca-
tion" priority concept designed to achieve optimum use of water
resources within environmental boundaries and compatible with
each nation's stage of development. The challenge posed by our
title is addressed in stages:
I. River Water Resources: optimum use related to the time-
location concept.
II. River Water Pollution: a new dimension added to a com-
plex problem.
III. River Water Pollution Controls:
A. Functional overview.
B. Cost
C. Legal and administrative elements.
IV. International Control of River Water Pollution: summary
and conclusion.
I. RivER WATER RESOURCES: OPTIMUM USE
RELATED TO THE TIiIE-LOCATION CONCEPT
Mankind began coping with water resource problems in his
earliest history. Efforts toward use of a central water supply
made by man are documented by archeological records of 5,000
years ago. These early efforts were multiplied as mankind's in-
genuity enabled him to discover the many other beneficial uses
which could be made of flowing waters. The evidence of early
(312 B.C.) Roman aqueducts and works to permit storage and
conveyance of waters for domestic use, for stock watering, and
for irrigation are still visible. Men have increasingly used the
rivers for navigation, transportation of goods, for conveyance of
wastes and for power for milling and mining. In recent years
man has designed increasingly larger dams, often located and
spaced within a drainage basin so as to provide virtually com-
plete control of river flow. These multipurpose installations
provide electric power, water for irrigation or other controlled
water supply purposes, and artifically created lakes for
recreation.
While today, in industrially developed nations, substantial
control of most river basins has been achieved, many of the
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rivers of South America and other developing areas flow vir-
tually unchanged by man. Efforts to develop and utilize rivers
for other than the basic natural benefits are rare, and it is likely
that it will be a considerable time before multipurpose facilities
within their boundaries are achieved. Thus the spectrum of
river control and development towards optimum use varies
among nations over a wide range of time.
The location variable also has material significance in
river development. Generally, a river will traverse many states
and nations before emptying into the sea. Obviously the goals of
a downstream user with respect to river development and con-
trol may be directly opposed to the goals of a user located up-
stream. The downstream nation may desire the upstream nation
to divert a large measure of the river's flows to alleviate a po-
tential flood danger; at other times the downstream user may
desire an increased flow of water for some special purpose. The
upstream nation's desire to utilize the river to convey industrial
wastes to the sea may conflict with the downstream nation's
desire to utilize the river for irrigation water.
In summary, two factors stemming from the time variable
confront optimum use planners and developers of river water
resources: (1) multi-purpose utilization of water resources must
inherently vary with time just as need and opportunity for
development vary with time; and (2) equity leads us to con-
sider that the first person to develop and utilize the resource
should sustain the prior right. The location variable in river
water resources control and development adds additional di-
mensions to the problems. Both the upstream user and the
riparian owner have control of the river and could, if unchecked,
devise and construct works which would divert the river to
their own uses and completely deprive the downstream user.
Because of the discordance introduced by this time-location
dichotomy, it was inevitable that a conflict between endeavors
would arise. Accordingly, controls are required to equitably
regulate the flow and utilization of rivers by neighboring states
which are seeking to develop a share of the potential benefits
as quickly as practicable. The laws and doctrines formulated to
achieve an optimum water resource control system which is
equitable within the time-location concept are cited and de-
scribed in section IV. Before examining the legal elements of
water resource control it is necessary to review and correlate
the river water pollution aspect of the problem.
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II. WATER POLLUTION: A NEW DIMENSION ADDED
TO A COMPLEX PROBLEM
The first efforts at water purification may be traced to 2,000
B.C. Egyptian wall inscriptions depicting man's efforts to purify
water by boiling it in copper vessels.' The installation of sewers
to carry away storm runoff and domestic sewage was first ex-
perimented with in the First Century A.D. in Rome. However,
progress in sewer design and development was slow until
the Nineteenth Century when a causal connection was made be-
tween contamination of water supplies due to inadequate human
waste disposal methods and the dread diseases and plagues
which were prevalent in that century. Today, a major cities of
developed nations have underground sewage and storm-runoff
disposal systems.
On the other hand, modern day water pollution with all
its forms and ramifications was scarcely recognized until 1950.
In general terms the types and sources of river water pollution
which the major city must confront today may be described
as follows:
(1) Organic matters originating from domestic, animal in-
dustry, and other industrial wastes, including bacteria
and other organisms.
(2) Inorganic matters originating from mining or inorganic-
chemical industries.
(3) Specific toxic substances such as phenols, oils, and de-
tergents originating from industry and, to some extent,
from domestic sources.
(4) Radioactive contaminants from certain industries or intro-
duced through rain clouds contaminated by nuclear-
weapons tests.
(5) Physical pollution including suspended substances such
as silt and sludge from mining industry and extreme
temperature change influences such as coolant water from
steam power plants, all of which induce organic growth
and minimize self-purification.
The main measures of the degree of pollution (aside from such
simple, physical-sense criteria for recognizing water pollution
by smell, taste, or visible effects of turbidity, algae, or floating
debris) include:
(1) The biochemical oxygen demand (BOD): the higher the
demand for oxygen (to decompose by natural processes
and assimilate wastes deposited in the water) as deter-
mined by tests, the greater the pollution.
(2) The dissolved oxygen test: a low oxygen content indicates
a high degree of pollution.
1 See J. CLARK & W. VIESSMAN, WATER SUPPLY AND POLLUTION CONTROL
1 (1966) [hereinafter cited as CLARK].
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(3) The coliform bacteria count: a high count indicates a high
degree of pollution. Results are stated by plate count, as
the most probable number (MPN) of coliform bacteria
per hundred milliliter.
(4) The pH number test: a straight-forward chemical deter-
mination of the relative acidity of the water.
(5) Physical tests for color units, odor, temperature, and
turbidity.
The model pollution law issued by the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare in May, 1965, gave the following
definition of pollution:
"Pollution" means such contamination, or other alteration of
the physical, chemical or biological properties, of any waters
of the state, including change in temperature, taste, color, tur-
bidity, or colors of the Waters, or such discharge of any liquid,
gaseous, solid, radioactive, or other substance into any waters
of the state as will or is likely to create a nuisance or render
such waters harmful, detrimental or injurious to public health,
safety or welfare, or to domestic, commercial, industrial, agri-
cultural, recreational, or other legitimate beneficial uses, or to
livestock, wild animals, birds, fish or other aquatic life.2
The language of the model act is consistent with the modern
trend to define pollution in very broad and all-inclusive terms.
A later publication recognized five basic water use classi-
fications of concern to anti-pollution efforts and set forth cri-
teria and standards necessary to support water use in each
classification. 3 The criteria, generally couched in the terms
defined above, also listed ranges of test results recommended
as allowable under "permissible 'criteria" and under "desirable
criteria". The five basic classifications of water use addressed
in the publication, a work of a committee comprised of nearly
one hundred scientific experts and administrators from the
field of water resources, are listed below:
(1) Recreation and aesthetic uses, including general aesthetic
criteria for unique or outstanding waters and criteria for
surface water recreational use and for significant body
contact recreational use.
(2) Public water supplies, dealing with criteria for raw water
to be used for domestic water supply.
(3) Fish, other aquatic life, and wildlife.
2 Cited in J. SAX, WATER LAW, PLANNING & POLICY, CASES AND MATERIALS
390 (1968).
3 See FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ADMINISTRATION, REPORT OF
TRE COMMITTEE ON WATER QUALITY CRITERIA vii (1968) [hereinafter
cited as Committee Report]. The Committee applied the meanings
shown below to the following key words:
Standard - a plan that is established by governmental authority as
a program for water pollution prevention and abatement.
Criteria - a scientific requirement on which a decision or judgment
may be based concerning the suitability of water quality
to support a designated use.
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(4) Agricultural uses, including farmstead water supplies,
livestock supplies, and irrigation water.
(5) Industry uses, including steam generation and cooling,
textiles, lumber, paper, chemical, petroleum, coal, primary
metals, food and kindred products, and cement indus-
tries.4
The intent of the publication is to afford guidelines for
states to use in promulgating their own standards and criteria
for water quality control which are required in accordance with
the provisions of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act as
amended by the Water Quality Act of 1965.5 The publication,
however, emphasizes that the types and sources of water pollu-
tion, as well as the standards and criteria for control, will vary
widely with geographic location, geology, land use, and climate.
Further, it points out that the published water quality criteria
should be considered as tentative, and suggested that several
issues needed clarification.
Foremost among these is the lack of adequate knowledge con-
cerning many of the quality characteristics upon which cri-
teria and, hence, standards should be based. Complicating fac-
tors in setting standards are varying natural conditions affect-
ing water quality, such as climate, geography, and geology of
a specific location.6
Because the types and sources of water pollution as well
as the standards and criteria for control must be considered
as tentative and subject to wide variation among states within
this nation, it follows that the criteria and parameters for op-
timum control when the international dimension is introduced
will likely become grossly incompatible. That which may be
decreed in unlawful pollution activity in one nation may be an
essential use of water resources in another. For example, the
Water Quality Criteria publication recommends that it be made
unlawful to dispose of treated sludge solids in rivers, whereas,
in many developing nations, life in the urban areas would be-
come virtually intolerable without rivers for domestic waste
riddance. On the other hand, this example should not be
viewed with alarm. It is offered to point out that international
pollution criteria and standards must be comprehensively ad-
justed in accordance with the time-location concept discussed
above.
4 Id. at viii.
Federal Water Quality Administration, 33 U.S.C. § 1152 et seq. (1970).
6 See COMMrrrEE REPORT at vii.
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III. RIvER WATER POLLUTION CONTROLS
A. Functional Overview
Twenty years ago a student of civil engineering recognized
sanitation as being related to water supply and sewerage 7, but
no courses in his curriculum dealt with water pollution as such.
Today, major colleges offer courses which deal expressly with
water pollution. Adequate funding has been the key to advance-
ment in water pollution control, as evidenced by the large sums
currently funded for research and development.8
There are three basic procedural alternatives available to
control water pollution: (1) enjoin the offensive activity; (2)
treat the contaminants at their source to bring the effluent
within tolerable standards; and (3) isolate, convey to a central
treatment plant, and treat pollutants collectively. Prior to ex-
amining these basic procedural alternatives in more detail it is
desirable to review the facilities traditionally provided to con-
trol the predominant sources and types of water pollution.
The first contaminate for which facilities were provided
was human waste. Paradoxically, an early method of disposal
which is still utilized to a degree in certain undeveloped nations
was a network of open canals or gutters to convey untreated
human excrement to the rivers and thence to the sea. While
this practice works satisfactorily for the upstream user, it trans-
fers a serious problem to the downstream user.
Later, municipal sanitary systems were constructed to col-
lect and convey the untreated sewage through underground
pipe networks to a central plant. Commonly, central sewage
treatment plants combine screening processes, large sludge-
settling and treatment tanks, and aeration, chlorination, and
drying processes to separate the suspended solids and other pol-
lutants and decontaminate the water. Secondary and tertiary
treatments are often utilized where desirable, depending on
reuse plans for the effluent water. The drained sludge may be
disposed of by composting, burial or incineration. Most urban
areas today provide modern sewage treatment systems admin-
istered by municipal or other governmental agencies, with the
services paid for through taxes. In remote areas, however, indi-
vidual sewage systems are often provided which utilize a septic
7 See E. STEEL, WATER SUPPLY AND SEWERAGE 238-40, 341 (1947).
8 1 FEDERAL WATER QUALITY ADMINISTRATION, RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT,
AND DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS (1970). This publication lists and de-
scribes over 400 research and development projects which have been
authorized and funded under the provisions of the Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act
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tank to ingest sewage solids through bacterial action and a leech-
ing field to purify the effluent by absorption and evaporation.
Most major cities also developed means to dispose of storm
runoff. Until this development, storm runoff, carrying all
varieties of contaminates and animal wastes picked u'p from
streets and living areas, would either create stagnant ponds
within the urban areas or flow to nearby streams resulting in a
concentrated inflow of polluted waters.
While it is relatively inexpensive to provide street intakes
to city sewage disposal systems for storm runoff, a functional
problem arises because the "peak" runoff from a storm, of even
a low frequency magnitude, far exceeds the normal carrying
capacity of the typical sanitary system. This situation favors a
design providing wholly separate storm and sanitary sewer
systems. Nevertheless, many of the old, larger cities still utilize
combined systems resulting in a spill of the overflow directly
into the river.
Recent innovations resulting from the Federal Research,
Development and Demonstration Projects currently underway
show great promise toward relief of storm pollution at a com-
paratively low cost." It is possible to demonstrate that under-
water storage tanks made of rubber can be economically util-
ized to store peak-runoff until the storm had subsided, allowing
the stored pollutants to drain into the sanitary sewage treat-
ment systems at a rate compatible with normal flow capacity.10
Roof ponding and storage has also been demonstrated to be a
feasible method of reducing storm runoff peak capacity re-
quirements.
In the well-developed nations where sanitary and storm
sewage facility construction has matched the population and ur-
banization increase, the greatest river water polluter is the vast
industrial complex. The diversity of types and sources of indus-
trial river water pollution is in nearly direct proportion to
the diversity of types of industry. Nevertheless, causes of indus-
trial pollution can generally be catalogued in the following cate-
gories:
(1) Industrial production of durables (generally resulting in
inorganic pollutants) including iron and steel, nonferrous
metals, electrical machinery, machinery, autos, trucks,
aerospace, other transportaticn equipment, fabricated
metals and instruments, stone, clay, glass, and other
durables.
See id. at 14.
JO FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ADMINISTRATION, CONTROL OF POL-
LUTION BY UNDERWATER STORAGE (1969).
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(2) Industrial production of nondurables (often resulting in
organic pollutants) including chemicals, paper and pulp,
rubber, petroleum, food and beverages, textiles, and other
nondurables.
(3) Mining, milling, and other industrial production creat-
ing sediment and acid mine reduction problems.
(4) Electricity and gas production creating thermal pollution.
Of the three procedural alternatives available for control of
water pollution listed above, alternative (1), enjoining the of-
fensive activity, has been increasingly applied to curtail indus-
trial pollution. With current awareness of the threat of water
pollution, increased resort has been made to the courts to halt
offensive activities at their source. The liberalizing of require-
ments for "standing to sue" and the formation of environmental
groups seeking to curtail all activities threatening our ecology
have both contributed to this increase. Also partially re-
sponsible is the knowledge of the wide range of technological
alternatives available today. Thus, where a polluting activ-
ity has been enjoined and the cost of compliance with standards
is high, it is customary to expect industry to develop new prod-
ucts or processes to substitute for the enjoined activity.
There is a great variety of technological processes and meth-
ods applied under procedural alternative (2), wherein treatment
to remove contaminants is made at the plant to purify the ef-
fluent prior to discharge. Physical treatment processes include
screening, cooling, mixing and agitation, flocculation, sedimen-
tation, and filtration. The processes employ a variety of plants
and facilities for accomplishment. Chemical treatment processes
include water stabilization, coagulation, precipitation, and ion
exchange. Biological treatment processes include biological oxi-
dation, photosynthetic processes, and aeorbic and anaerobic di-
gestion. However, despite the wide variety of treatment facili-
ties and methods available, it is of interest to note that the cur-
rent contaminant removal efficiency of the total inorganic chem-
ical industry in the United States has been estimated to be only
27%. This is less than half of the efficiency of municipal waste
plants."
There is a growing propensity for factories to connect to
public systems for collective waste treatment, parallel with pro-
cedural alternative (3). This has been proven to afford benefits
in efficiency and economy.
11 FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ADMINISTRATION, THE ECONOMICS
OF CLEAN WATER SUMMARY REPORT 9 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Eco-
NOMICS OF CLEAN WATER].
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There is no question that in a majority of cases public treat-
ment of industrial wastes is more efficient than separate treat-
ment of municipal and industrial wastes, in that it commonly
costs less per gallon of water processed or per unit of pollutant
removed to treat waste from several sources at a single point.
There are two reasons for the cost advantage. On the one
hand, economies of scale are attained by construction and
utilization of larger plants that are required when a number
of independent waste sources are collected at one point for
treatment; on the other, staging capabilities and complimen-
tary characteristics of sewage and industrial wastes often per-
mit operational economies. 12
While this trend seemingly shifts private costs to the public
sector, a number of municipal plants have created user fees pro-
portionate to the amount of wastes collected and treated to com-
pensate for this apparent inequity. It should also be noted that
the terminology "public treatment of private industrial waste"
has a very flexible meaning. It is common practice for munici-
pal sewage plants to accept, on the same basis as domestic sew-
age, the waste of restaurants, hotels, laundries, and so on, all
of which are private commercial endeavors and all of which
place a much greater burden on municipal sewage treatment
plants than the typical single-dwelling effluent.
Perhaps the major impediment to inaugurating effective ad-
ministration and control of industrial wastes has been the de-
velopment of industry. It is natural to locate industry near
rivers where possible to provide convenient waterway transpor-
tation for handling materials and supplies and convenient water
supply for production, water power, and cooling facilities. It has
accordingly become a common practice to allow utilization of
the waterway for diret discharge of wastes.13 Paradoxically, the
natural location of industry by major waterways may be most
advantageous in facilitating future cleanup of our rivers and cur-
tailment of water pollution.
Figure 1 illustrates graphically. a proposed, optimum de-
velopment for cleanup of a polluted waterway. This would re-
sult from isolating the polluted wastes as they enter the water-
way and conveying them separately from the normal, clean,
river flow, while simultaneously preserving the natural advan-
tage of the waterway for embodying and transporting the iso-
lated wastes. Large central waste treatment plants would then
be located at the outskirts of the industrial areas to treat the
contaminated waters prior to allowing the purified waters to
12 I FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ADMINISTRATION, THE ECONOMICS
OF CLEAN WATER 130 (1970).
13 See FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ADMINISTRATION, CHESAPEAKE
BAY IN LEGAL PERSPECTIVE (1970).
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re-enter the main stream beyond the industrialized area. The
aesthetic value of the clean water stream, the berms and banks
of such a channel improvement, contrasted to present-day pol-
luted rivers, would be tremendous. It is envisioned that the
waste conveyance conduits would be comprised of pre-cast, pre-
stressed, thin wall concrete members within the industrialized
reaches of the river. These conduits would be graduated in size
to afford flexible capacity yet standardized in shape and design
to provide easy city and state wide maintenance and expansion.
Heavy vinyl or plastic tubing would be used as a single conduit,
designed to flow-full, beyond the reaches of industrial inlets. By
maintaining an equivalent water pressure within the enclosing
conduit, as illustrated by. Detail B on Figure 1, the need for
structural integrity of the enclosing tubing would be reduced
as required to permit use of flexible and less expensive mater-
ials. Automatic control and check structures, underground stor-
age and pumping facilities, and metering and flood safety de-
vices could all be practicably built into the system to facilitate
maintenance of both uniform, low-velocity, clean-water flow in
the channel and modular flow in the isolation conduits. The con-
cept illustrated by Figure 1 is readily amenable to further study
and development under a grant such as the Research, Develop-
ment and Demonstration Projects. The initial study should be
in the form of an investigative feasibility report engineered for
a typical prototype city and industrial waterway. The concept
illustrated is particularly well suited for developing nations
wherein comprehensive plans and facilities for isolation of pol-
luted water wastes within the normal waterway flow can be
initiated as the necessities of industrial progress dictate.
B. Cost of Pollution Controls
A study was recently made of the cost of treating municipal,
industrial and other effluents to determine the effort which
would be required to achieve acceptable water pollution control
standards. 14 The report concludes that on January 1, 1970, the
nation's municipal waste-handling systems presented the need
for the investment of $4.4 billion, and were generating addi-
tional needs at the rate of over $800 million a year. With ex-
pected growth of the systems, inflation, and considering that all
existing deficiencies would be remedied and no new deficiencies
allowed to occur, the total investment required over the five-year
period 1970-1974 was estimated to be somewhat over $10 billion.
The estimate included public waste treatment, transmission, and
14 See ECONOMICS OF CLEAN WATER, supra note 11.
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disposal facility requirements, new waste treatment plants, ex-
pansion, upgrading, and replacement of existing plants, inter-
ceptors, outfalls, collecting sewers, and industrial waste treat-
ment needs; all as required to comply with water quality stand-
ards as set forth and patterned by the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act. The yearly and five-year costs derived in the esti-
mate are shown in Figure 2. It should be noted that independent
estimates made by individual states of their intended expendi-
tures for water pollution control closely coincide with the fed-
eral estimate. 15
Figure 2 also shows for comparison a number of other cost
statistics relating to existing facilities in the United States and
other nations, including water resources developments and other
public expenditures.1" These statistics are offered to provide a
significant comparison between the sum required to provide
"clean water" and typical sums expended for other public needs.
An estimation of the costs involved for providing clean wa-
ter on an international basis is impractical. However, the range
of cost for European and other nations that have developed to
a degree roughly equivalent to the United States may be esti-
mated by the comparison of population, area and other geogra-
phical influence factors. As shown earlier, the costs for clean-up
of industrial pollution for undeveloped nations would be far less,
but the costs to provide or modernize sanitary and storm sewer-
age collection systems and treatment plants would be consider-
ably higher than for a developed nation.
C. The Legal and Administrative Elements of River Water
Pollution Control
Just as functional efforts to provide and construct proper
water resource facilities date far back in history, so also do legal
and administrative control efforts. In a report dated 98 A.D.,
Sextus Julius Frontinus, Water Commissioner of Rome stated:
I desire that nobody shall conduct away any excess water
without having received my permission or that of my repre-
sentatives, for it is necessary that a part of the supply flowing
from the water-castles shall be utilized not only for cleaning
our city but also for flushing the sewers. 17
It is of interest at this point to explore in a cursory manner the
basic principles and doctrines evolved for legal and administra-
tive control of water resources; first in the United States and
1 5 Id. at 25.
1 See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTI-
CAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 412, 687 (1969).
17 CLARK, supra note 1, at 4.
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then on an international basis.
In the United States two basic legal regimes exist for gov-
erning the use of water resources. Their derivation on the basis
of the "time-location" concept discussed in Section II is evident.
The "riparian rule" provides that rights to the use of water in
a stream are created by ownership of land which is riparian
(under or adjoining the bed or banks) to that stream. The water
right is an incident of land ownership and it cannot be lost by
mere disuse; neither may water be sold for use from the riparian
land nor may it be used unreasonably. The "appropriation doc-
trine" was developed in the arid west where water was a pre-
cious commodity; in fact, the key to development of the frontier
lands. This doctrine allows establishment of a right to water,
irrespective of land ownership on a stream, by taking the water
first in time and placing it to beneficial use.
Pollution is considered an unreasonable use under riparian
law and a non-beneficial use under appropriation law, and dam-
ages as well as injunctions are available remedies. However, the
field of pollution control has been recently pre-empted by fed-
eral and state statutory schemes. While there are still isolated
cases dealing with individual controversies involving pollution,
it has become increasingly clear that litigation instigated by pri-
vate parties cannot cope with the water pollution problems cre-
ated by large industrial and municipal complexes.
In the United States water resources are almost totally ad-
ministered by municipal or other governmental agencies which
are generally headed by a board of commissioners. River basin
commissions and interstate compacts to administer water prob-
lems among the several states embodied in a single drainage
basin are common.
Prior to setting forth the basic legal history and doctrine
developed for regulation of international river drainage basins
it is desirable to review certain fundamental definitions. An in-
ternational drainage basin may be defined as a geographical
area, extending over the territory of two or more nations, bound
by the watershed extremities of the surface and underground
waters which gravitate into a common terminus. All nations en-
compassed within the drainage basin or bounded by a portion
of the river are said to be coriparian and the nation located up-
permost in the drainage basin is said to be an upper-basin state.
All others are said to be lower-basin states. It has only been re-
cently that the entire drainage basin including all of its tribu-
taries, as opposed to only particular rivers forming part of the
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basin, has been viewed as the proper basis for international reg-
ulation.'8
Four basic theories concerning the rights of coriparians to
utilize the waters of an international river have been promul-
gated as follows:
(1) The "territorial integrity" theory wherein the down-
stream riparian is considered to have the right to demand
the continuation of the natural flow of the river.
(2) The "absolute territorial sovereignty" theory wherein a
riparian state can dispose freely of waters of the drain-
age basin flowing through its territory but has no right
to demand the continued flow from other states.
(3) The "community" theory whereby the basin is regarded
as an economic unit, and the waters are either vested
in the community or divided among the coriparian states
by agreement.
(4) The "limited territorial sovereignty" theory which re-
stricts the principle of "absolute sovereignty" to the ex-
tent necessary to insure each coriparian a reasonable use
of the basin's waters. 19
There has been no application of the "territorial integrity"
theory in international practice. Neither has the "absolute ter-
ritorial sovereignty" theory had significant application in inter-
national river control, although this doctrine was widely quoted
near the end of the nineteenth century. The so-called Harmon
Doctrine arose at this time as an outgrowth of the "absolute ter-
ritorial sovereignty" theory in an opinion by Attorney General
Harmon of the United States in connection with a complaint by
Mexico concerning the waters of the Rio Grande in which he
said:
Whether the circumstances make it possible or proper to take
any action from considerations of comity is a question which
does not pertain to this Department; but that question should
be decided as one of policy only, because in my opinion the
rules, principles, and precedents of international law impose
no liability or obligation upon the United States. 20
Of the theories listed above only the latter two have current
significance. Treaties, the most common method of controlling
international waters, are an application of the "community"
theory. The "limited territorial sovereignty" or reasonable use
theory is also widely accepted. This principle is the forerunner
of, and inherent in, the "equitable utilization" doctrine applied
to arbitrate today's conflicts and disputes.
1 8 See INTERNATIONAL LAW ASS'N, HELSINKI RULES ON THE USES OF THE
WATERS OF INTERNATIONAL RIVERS 7 (1967).
19 See Lipper, Equitable Utilization, in THE LAw OF INTERNATIONAL DRAIN-
AGE BASINS 18 (1967).
20 Id. at 20; see also 21 OP. ATT'Y GEN. 274, 283 (1895).
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The equitable utilization doctrine purports to weigh the
benefit to one state in use of water against the injury which
might result to another because of such use through evaluation
of the following factors:
(1) The inherent right of each to a reasonable use of the
water. Equality of right is the cornerstone to equitable
utilization.
(2) The extent of the dependence of each state upon the
waters of the disputed river.
(3) The comparative social and economic gains accruing to
each and to the entire river community.
(4) Pre-existent agreements among the states concerned.
(5) Pre-existent appropriation of water by one state. (It
should be noted, however, in international law there is no
doctrine applying inflexibly the "prior in time, prior in
right" concept as applied internally by many of the United
State's States). 21
Theoretically, in the settlement of international water dis-
putes the doctrine of equitable utilization should be applied by
first examining the economic and social needs of the coriparian
states by an objective review of the various factors and conflict-
ing elements relevant to their proposed use of the waters. Sec-
ondly, the planned distribution of the waters among the cori-
parians must be shown to satisfy the needs of each to the great-
est extent possible. Lastly, the planned distribution must be
shown to achieve maximum benefit for each coriparian con-
sistent with minimum detriment to each.
The doctrine of equitable utilization also conforms well in
theory with the aims of controlling pollution, because it curtails
use by a state which would result in a material detriment to a
coriparian. While there is a paucity of cases dealing with river
pollution before the International Court of Justice or any other
international tribunal, there are cases in analagous areas which
in general appear to establish that:
(a) A state has the right to use the waters of an international
drainage basin located within its territory, subject, how-
ever, to a duty not thereby to cause injury to a coriparian
state.
(b) A state may be restrained from a use or may become
liable to pay damages for such use if causing serious in-
jury to a coriparian state.22
The obvious administrative mechanism for planning of de-
velopment and for control of international river basin resources
21 Id. at 43; see also REPORT OF THE 48th (NEW YORK) CONF., INT'L LAW
Ass'N Res. II, at ix (1959).
22 Lester, Pollution, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE BASINS 102
(1967).
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is through agencies and commissions created by international
agreements. The rather limited number of such agencies now in
existence include The European Commission of the Danube, The
Central Commission for Navigation on the Rhine, The Commit-
tee for Co-ordination of Investigations of the Lower Mekong
Basin, The River Niger Commission and The Permanent Indus
Commission. While such existing international commissions have
all performed the important function of bringing nations to-
gether to cooperate in planning for comprehensive river devel-
opment, their decisions have generally been limited to an ad-
visory or recommendatory level. On the other hand it is com-
monly accepted that the formation of an agency or commission
which is staffed with men of diverse nationalities and competi-
tive interests is a major step in proper river basin management.
The accomplishments of the Indus Basin Advisory Board and the
many other interested world agencies and entities who were re-
sponsible for the successful recent development of the Indus
Basin, which resulted in the solution of a most serious interna-
tional conflict, is testimony of the great potential of such inter-
national commissions.23
It should be recognized that the laws governing water use
and control of international drainage basins are somewhat vague
and theoretical. Further, member nations of an international
drainage basin must generally rely on comity as their sole au-
thority to solve problems and to enforce the equitable doctrines
concerning water rights among their fellow coriparian member
states. Also, that formulation of international commissions with
administrative authority to properly plan and provide for com-
prehensive development of international waters has been de-
cidedly limited.
It is anticipated that the problems of establishing proper
controls for international drainage basin management and the
sharing of rights and responsibilities among member nations will
become increasingly acute as the present population explosion
continues to accelerate. Considering normal industrial expansion,
the world-wide consumption of water is expected to double in
the next twenty years.24 International legal and adminstrative
problems concerning water will multiply accordingly.
The ever-present and growing problem of water pollution
23 Address by Field Marshall Mohammad Ayub Khan, President of Pakis-
tan, Presidents' House, Karachi, Oct. 15, 1967; see also Baxter, The
Indus Basin, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE BASINS 443-85
(1967).24 O1mstead, Introduction, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE BASINS
5 (1967).
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further endangers the chances of harminous use of international
drainage basin waters among all users. While technological
means are available to prevent essentially all known forms of
pollution, the financial requirements for pollution control are
higher than some nations consider themselves able to afford.
Many nations which have used international rivers as open
sewers for centuries are adverse to giving up that which they
consider an established beneficial use.
On the other hand, the growing scarcity of water and the in-
crease of types and amounts of recognized pollution activities
has resulted in a recent impetus towards creation of joint basin
administrative agencies and formal treaties among co-basin na-
tions. The very essence of the inducement toward formulation
and adherence to an international rule of law governing the
use of water has been recent awareness of the dire need for co-
operative beneficial use of this valued resource. Advances in in-
ternational cooperation in control and use of water are aptly
demonstrated by recent treaties governing the Indus,
2 5 the Nile, 26
and the Columbia River 27 basins. Also the interest of scholarly
and professional organizations in the subject of international
river law has greatly increased in recent years. Several im-
portant international law conferences and the subjects which
they studied and discussed are enumerated below:
(1) The Hamburg Conference, 1960, devoted its attention to
the rights of coriparian states to the use of waters of an
international drainage basin.
(2) The Brussels Conference, 1962, was concerned with the
subject of pollution of waters of an international drain-
age basin.
(3) The Tokyo Conference, 1964, considered the subjects of
navigational uses, timber floating, pollution and the set-
tlement of disputes.
(4) The United Nations sponsored committee meetings held in
London, 1970, considered the formulation and imple-
mentation of policies affecting the management of river
basins.
A review of a number of the papers submitted at the above
and other conferences has revealed the following generally ac-
cepted conclusions regarding the status of law and authority
concerning international river water control:
(1) While there is no established law or authority other than
international comity to govern water use, the view that a
25 Treaty Between India and Pakistan (Indus Water Treaty), Sept. 19,
1960, 419 U.N.T.S. 125.
26 Treaty Between the United Arab Republic and Sudan, Nov. 8, 1959, 453
U.N.T.S. 51.
27 Treaty with Canada (Columbia River Basin), Jan. 17, 1961, [1965] 2
U.S.T. 1555., T.I.A.S. No. 5638.
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state is under a general obligation to refrain from using
its water resources in a way which may cause substantial
injury to the territory of a neighboring state is generally
accepted. This inherent obligation is also generally, but
not universally, considered to preclude practices causing
pollution of waters.
(2) Growing water demand and threatening pollution require
the creation or strengthening of river basin authorities re-
sponsible for rational water resources management, in-
cluding integrated water quality planning, implementa-
tion of the plans, and operation.
(3) Planning of integrated basin wide water resources de-
velopment should, as much as possible, involve measures
for the rational development of other natural resources,
their conservation, and the improvement of the human
environment.
(4) There is a need for greater efforts to combat the consid-
erable lag of water management techniques behind scien-
tific and technological progress in water resources use and
control. 28
IV. INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF RIVER WATER POLLUTION:
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
As stressed previously, the problems confronting interna-
tional efforts to regulate and control river water pollution are
complex. Because of this complexity, coupled with the broad
spectrum of interests generated by recent environmental aware-
ness, reports and discussions concerning this subject often in-
cline towards vague one-dimensional recognitions of the prob-
lems. There is a tendency towards a pessimistic view that com-
prehensive remedies can not be formulated. Attention is deliber-
ately directed herein to the fundamental components comprising
the functional legal and administrative challenges facing ade-
quate international water pollution control in order to demon-
strate that the problem is not as difficult as might initially be
presumed. It has been illustrated that while the cost required
to overcome the problem in this country is high, it is not an
insurmountable sum.
It can be predicted that the many new ideas and concepts
currently being generated through world-wide research will
serve as the cornerstone bringing the task increasingly nearer
to fruition. The legal and administrative problems will be solved
as a natural outgrowth of the research and development efforts.
After sufficient publicity illustrates the feasibility of comprehen-
sive water pollution controls and the mutual benefits to be at-
28 See ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEMINAR
ORGANIZED BY THE COMMITTEE ON WATER PROBLEMS OF THE U.N. Eco-
NOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE, (London on June 15-22, 1970).
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tained through international cooperation, each involved entity
will naturally desire to cooperate and to contribute their own
skills and efforts towards accomplishment.
We should dispel any concern that elements may be in-
volved in achieving pollution control, or in the realization of
clean water, that could be cause for what Alvin Toffler de-
scribes as "future shock". 29 Scientific and technological develop-
ment is on the threshold of mastering water pollution controls
and can accomplish the task with no more public awareness
or disturbance that that caused by the construction of the vast
system of interstate highways. Once specific and comprehen-
sive efforts are undertaken to overcome water pollution, man-
kind will gravitate towards becoming involved in the overall
program of enhancing the environment.
29 A. TOFFLER, FUTURE SHOCK (1970).
POLITICIDE: THE NECESSITY OF AN
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
Luis KUTNE*
Professor Kutner's contention is that a major contribu-
tion to the possibilities of peace could be made by an
international criminal court. While such a court should
avoid the inadequacies of the Nuremberg experience, it
should be structured so that it is able to adjudicate
crimes of politicide. ED.
If justice is one and individual, can war, being a crime
among individuals, be a right among nations?
One God, one man as a species, one law as a rule of the
human race!
John Baptist Alberdi, LL.D.**
Let us focus instead on a more practical, more attainable
peace, based not on a sudden revolution in human nature but
on a gradual evolution in human institutions - on a series
of concrete actions and effective agreements which are in the
interest of all concerned.
And is not peace, in the last analysis, basically a matter
of human rights - the right to live out our lives without fear
of devastation, the right to breathe air as nature provided it,
the right of future generations to a healthy existence?
John F. Kennedy***
Within the world community exists a vacuum of inter-
national law with regard to the commission of ultimate inter-
national crime - politicide. Politicide - a crime against world
peace - consists of the planning, preparation, initiation, or wag-
ing of a war of aggression; or a war in violation of interna-
tional treaties, agreements or assurances; or participation in a
common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of
the aforementioned.
*LL.B., J.D.; Member Illinois Bar; Congressional Nominee for the 1972
Nobel Peace Prize. Former visiting Associate Professor, Yale Law
School; Chairman, World Habeas Corpus Committee, World Peace
Through Law Center; former Consul, Ecuador; former Consul General,
Guatemala; former Special Counsel to the Attorney General of Illinois;
and, author of numerous law journal articles and several books, includ-
ing WORLD HABEAS CORPUS and I, Tim LAWYER.
**JOHN BAPTIST ALBERDI, THE CRIME OF WA 26, 35 (1913).
***JOHN F. KENNEDY, Toward a Strategy of Peace, in WORLD PERSPEC-
TIVES ON INTERNATIONAL POLrrics 79, 85 (W. Clemons, Jr. ed. 1965).
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The vacuum of international law in regard to politicide
presents one of the most neglected areas of judicial protection
for universal human rights and an area which possesses the
potential to make the greatest contribution to world peace
through the rule of law. The crime of politicide has existed
since men first discovered the need to live in tribal organi-
zations for collective security and the protection of their terri-
tory. A historical analysis of politicide would necessarily
include an evaluation of the acts of Alexander the Great, Julius
Caesar, Napoleon and Hitler.1 These men are but a few of the
many who could be accused of politicide. Turning to more con-
temporary events, the conflicts in the Middle East, those be-
tween India and Pakistan, and the United States' involvement
in Asia emphasize the need for and potential benefit of an in-
ternational court to determine whether in fact the crime of
politicide has been committed.
In the particular instance of United States' involvement in
Southeast Asia, the role of such a court would be valuable. The
United States, as a world power purporting to stand for an
established legal system as well as for the ideals of democracy,
has a vital interest in the promotion of a world legal order.
The intensity of the debate between legal scholars as well
as the serious nature of the divisions between them, point
towards the potential usefulness of an international court of
criminal justice.2 In this instance adjudication by an appro-
priate international tribunal as to who is legally right could
make a valuable contribution to world public order.
The Necessity of an International Court of Criminal Justice
The necessity for the development of a working legal
system in the field of international criminal justice is demon-
strated by the contemporary prevalence of the crime of politi-
cide. The lawlessness evidenced by warfare can be curtailed
by an international tribunal.3
In 1947, the United Nation's General Assembly created the
International Law Commission to draft a code of international
law; specifically, to draft the principles of international law
governing war crimes, including the possibility of defining of-
fenses against the peace and security of mankind. The Commis-
sion began with a draft of the Declaration of the Rights and
1 For an excellent historical analysis of this concept, see C. BRINTON,
J. CHRISTOPHER & R. WOLFF, 1 A HISTORY OF CIVILIZATION 14 (1963).
2 For an example of the divergent views being expressed, see I, II THE
VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAw (R. Falk ed. 1969).
3 J. ALBERDI, THE CRIME OF WAR 45 (1913).
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Duties of States which included the right to political independ-
ence, to govern the state's territory and to use force in self-
defense.4
The Commission has prepared a draft of a Code of Arbitral
Procedures,5 and another for the international laws of nation-
ality and statelessness. It has made studies on the possibility
of setting up an International Criminal Court to try people ac-
cused of international crimes such as genocide. There is much
difference of opinion among member states, however, not only
as to what acts would amount to aggression, but also as to
whether it is wise to prepare a list of them. Some members
fear that an aggressor, if provided with an exact list, would find
means of committing politicide not specifically included, and
thereby render such a classification impotent.
In considering the possibility of preserving peace through
law, lawyers naturally focus their thinking on judicial organs.
In a sense, the creation of effective judicial organs to settle
international disputes is more simple than the establishment
of legislative or executive institutions. Even states that are
most reluctant to restrict their normally uncontrolled right to
determine their international obligations or to participate in
the creation of any international force greater than their own
may be willing to yield to some extent to judicial organs whose
impact is necessarily restricted to the particular case under
consideration. The world wide support for World Habeas Corpus
and Regional International Courts of Habeas Corpus validates
this view.7
The readiness to seek a court decision in a particular case
unfortunately cannot always be extrapolated into a willingness
to agree a priori to accept such decisions in all cases. Thus at
present the submission of a particular dispute almost always
requires the ad hoc consent of all states concerned, including
that of the putative aggressor (i.e., the potential defendant).
However, the incentive for nations to accept such decisions
a priori would be increased by the creation of an institution
such as an International Court of Criminal Justice composed of
4 Amado, (Twenty-fifth) Formulation of the Principles Recognized in the
Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tri-
bunal, [1949] Y. B. IN'T'L L. COMM'N 183, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER. A
(1956).
5 Amado, (Sixth) Arbitral Procedure, [1949] Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 50,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER. A (1956).
6 Amado, (Fifth) Law of Nationality, [1949] Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 45,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER. A (1956).
7 Kutner, World Habeas Corpus, Human Rights and World Commu-
nity, 17 DEPAUL L. REv. 9-10 (1967).
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members which are least prejudiced by their national alle-
giances. The benefits as well as the necessity of such a manda-
tory legal system must be made apparent to the "peace-loving"
members of the United Nations who shall be contributing to
the formation of this judicial system.
A mandatory permanent legal system would avoid the
inherent inequities which surrounded the Nuremberg Tribunal.
The Tribunal was established for the sole purpose of trying
the war criminals of the Axis countries; the charter removed
from the jurisdiction of the Tribunal Allied war criminals,
who were to be tried by the military courts of their own gov-
ernments. Hence, the Tribunal was not an international court
established to try international crimes, but an Allied court
established to try Nazis. In a definite sense it was a victor's
judicial vengeance and a most dangerous ex post facto
precedent.
Further, in formulating a mandatory legal system, enforce-
ment should not be considered a part of the judicial process.
When a national court enforces a decree it does so in its ad-
ministrative rather than its judicial capacity. Where suits are
instituted against the state or its autonomous subdivisions, en-
forcement is undertaken not by the judicial body that rendered
the decision but by separate legislative or administrative pro-
ceedings. The only function of the court is to determine the
abstract question of the merits of the particular case. This
principle should apply to both arbitral and judicial proceedings
between states appearing before international tribunals.
While a national court acts for and in the name of the
sovereign state, this concept is entirely absent in the idea of
an international tribunal. The distinguishing feature of an in-
ternational tribunal is that its decision would be purely declara-
tory. The enforcement process is political in nature ond could
neither be undertaken nor directed by the international
tribunal.
Under the United Nations Charter enforcement might be
undertaken by the Security Council. Where a state refuses to
adhere to a determination of the tribunal it would be subjected
to the censure of public opinion. Enforcement might be under-
taken by the appropriate regional organization or by applica-
tion of sanctions pursuant to the United Nations Charter. States
committed to the principle of world public order could induce a
recalcitrant state to comply.
The problem in the prevention of the crime of politicide
POLITICIDE
is to inscribe these rules on the public conscience so that a
perpetual external enforcement of them would be unnecessary.
Cases should be referred to such a tribunal with caution. The
proposed criminal tribunal would be but one mechanism for
the resolution of conflict. The resolution of a particular con-
flict may be best achieved through negotiation and mediation
rather than through submission to a tribunal to determine which
cause is just. Indeed, in some instances the finding that one
party is criminal may actually create a psychological barrier to
conflict resolution. However, where a party commits or threat-
ens to commit an act of aggression and refuses to seek a peace-
ful accommodation of an issue, referral to a criminal tribunal
would become imperative.
Conclusion
If a person is incapable of a minimum degree of peaceful
coexistence his welfare will be harmed by the loss of his
neighbor's cooperation and the ensuing disorder. Peaceful
coexistence is the product of respect for individual human
dignity or what has been labeled Inalienable Rights.
Although man may analytically know what is needed for
his coexistence with other men he has not yet been able to
implement that knowledge. Most societies of civilized men
have discovered the necessity of establishing rules of conduct
enforceable by punitive sanctions. "An eye for an eye, a tooth
for a tooth" is a Mosaic principle which was found necessary
to implement the rules of human conduct expressed in Ham-
murabi's Ccde. Its degree of harshness has lessened but
slightly as a functional sanction throughout the ages.
Men have always sought a way to live together with
respect for the individual.8 The fact that institutions of various
kinds have failed to eliminate degradations of human beings9
cannot overshadow the fact that many others have fostered
an invaluable contribution to social order and human rights.
Those societies with successful legal institutions expound a
legal system responsive to its sense of justice and cognizant
of the unique quality of each human being. They use their
legal institutions for the preservation of the rights of each
member of the community through the utilization of a well
sanctioned body of law.
Yet, while each man is entitled to his inalienable rights
he also inherits inalienable obligations. Unless each person
8 Id. at 4.
9 Id.
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observes his duty to respect and protect the inalienable rights
of others, peaceful coexistence is made impossible. Therefore,
man's need to recognize his interdependence is as necessary
as his need to recognize his uniqueness.
World peace like community peace requires that men live
together in mutual tolerance, submitting their disputes to a
just and peaceful settlement. The world community must
recognize that the interdependence of nations represents a
higher level of human relations. While each nation has its
inalienable rights as a sovereign it must also recognize its
obligations.
Dag Hammarskjold, the late Secretary-General of the
United Nations, commented extensively on the need for devel-
opment of a working international legal system.
Between sovereign nations conflicts arise to a large extent
in a political context. But the substance of the disputes is all so
often in fact a- question of law. While it is natural that the con-
flicts tend to be treated in forms adequate to political problems,
it is also true that they could be resolved on a basis of law
much more frequently than is now the case. If the position of
the judiciary inside the international constitutional systems so
far is weak, in practice, this may be explained primarily by
the fact that it often seems most safe for a sovereign state to
define a conflict as a matter for political reconciliation. The
system of international law is still fairly undeveloped and there
are wide margins of uncertainty. Why, one may ask, run the
risk of a possibly less favorable outcome reached on the basis
of law instead of a more advantageous one that might be
achieved by skillful negotiation and under the pressure of poli-
tical arguments? Why? Is not the reason obvious? First of all,
is it not in the interest of sound development to restrict as
much as possible the arena where strength is an argument and
to put as much as possible under the rule of law? But there is
a further consideration. If we regret the undeveloped state of
international law, should we not use all possibilities to develop
an international common law by submitting our conflicts to juris-
diction wherever that is possible? I apologize for having gone
into these matters so ably and with such competence covered
here by Judge Hackworth. I have done so only because it ap-
pears to me on the basis of daily experience that the world of
order and justice for which we are striving will never be unless
we are willing to give it the broadest possible and the firmest
possible foundation in law.' o
World War II witnessed politicide on an international
scale; politicide resulted in the death of 14 million soldiers
and 40 million civilians. These statistics should convince all
nations of the existence of the crime of politicide and of the
necessity for developing a legal system to control it.
lD. HAMMARSKJOLD, SERVANTS OF PEACE 96-7 (1963).
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The development of such a legal system depends on there
being an acceleration in the evolution of the national insti-
tutions which have proven to be successful in promoting the
coexistence of men into an international institution which is
capable of the same result. All men must recognize that their
interdependence in the world community is similar to their
interdependence in a national community. The dynamic admin-
istration of a comprehensive body of international law, rec-
ognizing the existence of politicide, and recognizing the im-
portance of protecting human interests, is man's best hope
of achieving world peace.
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MONEY, MONOPOLY AND THE
CONTEMPORARY WORLD ORDER
BENJAMIN T. HOPKINS*
Whatever else they have accomplished, President Nixon's
dramatic policy moves last August have stimulated a lot of re-
thinking about political-economic trends in the contemporary
world. In my case, the result has been accelerated change in
my views about the relative importance of the questions of
government economic policy which face the inhabitants of
spaceship Earth, about the possible answers to these questions
and about the characteristics of the social decision-making
processes that will generate the answers. In these terms, this
"comment" sketches a comprehensive but tentative hypothesis
about current developments. A key feature of the hypothesis
is the importance it attaches to monetary and financial arrange-
ments as determinants of the world political-economic order.
IMPORTANT ECONOMIC POLICY QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
Government exchange rate policies
The question of what national governments should do about
exchange rates among important international monetary assets,
including gold, was raised by President Nixon's unilateral de-
cision in August to close the American gold window. Like the
British decision to "go off gold" in 1931, President Nixon's
decision followed a long period of commitment, in practice as
well as theory, to the principle of governmental exchange rate
"pegging" via open-market operations involving gold and
currencies.
I am convinced that national governments will not in the
foreseeable future refrain from buying and selling large quan-
tities of gold and other international monetary assets for the
purpose of influencing market exchange rates and expectations.
The wealth position of too many important "private" interests
(which government officials choose or feel obliged to serve)
are affected by these rates. In particular, the governments of
major non-U.S. trading nations will continue to intervene in
foreign-exchange markets for the purpose of dampening short-
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Iowa. B.A., LL.B., Yale
University.
@1972 Benjamin T. Hopkins.
64 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY VOL. 2
run fluctuations in the prices of their currencies with respect
to other major currencies. But they will not try to eliminate
short-run fluctuations entirely, and I believe they will permit
"average" or "central" exchange rates to "crawl" (whether or
not this is officially announced), especially if the alternative is
endless hikes in central bank dollar holdings. Similarly, the
U.S. Government will peg the dollar price of gold only so long
as this is convenient; when it becomes even slightly incon-
venient, the gold window will close or the price will change.
Such a pattern of behavior by important foreign govern-
ments will very much enhance the attractiveness of the dollar
to foreigners for use in domestic as well as international trans-
actions, and also for precautionary and speculative purposes.
This is because the stability of the dollar's real purchasing
power (stemming initially from the breadth, depth and "open-
ness" of the American marketplace plus the existing world-wide
popularity of the dollar) Will rise relative to the other major
currencies, insofar as their exchange rate against the dollar
becomes more changeable.
Government reserves and the intergovernmental financing of
payments deficits
The question of what international monetary assets national
governments should hold and use for exchange-rate pegging
operations or other purposes was technically raised when the
American gold window closed, but was quickly put to rest when
it became apparent that the primary purpose of this move was
to free-up the price of the dollar in terms of other major cur-
rencies, not to demonitize gold. A unilateral decision by the
U.S. to demonetize its still enormous gold stock and to "go off
gold" permanently would indeed go a long way toward elimi-
nating the monetary role of gold in both governmental and
private international transactions. But it would probably not
be sufficient for this purpose and, in any event, it is not a neces-
sary conditon for dollar pre-eminence around the world. Indeed,
the threat of such action, directed against governments which
(foolishly) are committed to the monetary role of gold, is far
more useful than the action itself to those who manage the
dollar - namely, the President, Congress, the Federal Reserve
Board, and important commercial bankers. Thus, I believe that
the monetary role of gold insisted on by some governments
will persist but will hence forth serve mainly to amuse (per-
haps to enrich) private speculators and to strengthen the
political-economic hand of the U.S. Government.
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The needs of governments for international monetary re-
serves will be met by a combination of gold, dollars, and Spe-
cial Drawing Rights. Since the U.S. will not undertake to peg
the dollar to anything but gold - and even that, if it becomes
inconvenient- it needs no other reserves than the ten billion in
gold which it already holds. Non-U.S. governments must, for
the most part, choose between dollars and SDR's. From the U.S.
point of view it matters little which is chosen since the U.S.
Government and American bankers will be the largest -creditors
and beneficiaries via seignorage and control. Nor do I antici-
pate much disagreement concerning the aggregate quantities of
dollar-SDR reserves held by non-U.S. governments. For the U.S.
has much to gain and little to lose by financing the deficits and
the dollar accumulations of other countries. The cost is limited
to the bank ledger entries involved, plus slower short-run
growth in consumption and investment at home (due to trade
surplus) - a small price to pay for huge seignorage gains and
a financial stranglehold on foreign countries, especially when
foreign investment is rapidly becoming as American as apple
pie.
Thus the "international liquidity" of non-U.S. countries will
be adjustable by them in accordance with their own pref-
erences, and questions concerning liquidity will cease to hold
the center-stage position which they have occupied for the last
ten years.
Government restrictions on international capital transactions
The question of what restrictions governments should im-
pose on international capital-fund transactions is also more
likely to be decided without turmoil in the future than it has
been in the past. Wider and more flexible "crawling bands"
for exchange rates seem likely to reduce the volume of short-
term capital flows that have caused so much distress among
national monetary officials in recent years. Those which re-
main will be regulated along with long-term capital flows as
minimally as possible. In order to cash in on the benefits of
world-wide dollar hegemony, the U.S. Government is almost
certain to remove the few restrictions it now imposes on inter-
national dollar capital flows. Other countries which do not
follow suit will, to that extent, suffer exclusion from the bene-
fits of the huge and growing volume of world trade and invest-
ment conducted with dollars.
Thus crawling bands, coupled with the economic induce-
ments of growing dollar hegemony around the world, favor the
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minimization of governmental restrictions on international
capital movements involving dollars. Such minimization will,
in turn, enormously increase the attractiveness of the dollar
and the political economic power of those who manage it.
Government restrictions on international trade
The question of what restrictions governments should im-
pose on international transactions involving real goods and
services is also destined for smoother disposition and therefore
less attention than it has previously received. The reason is
analogous to one of the reasons which suggest the lowering of
restrictions on international capital movements: countries which
choose to engage in a trade war with the United States will lose
out economically while others prosper. Only if non-U.S. coun-
tries engage in collective bargaining and if the U.S. overreaches
- only then will trade restrictions become an important issue.
The first of these contingencies is farfetched for the simple
reason that there are too many non-U.S. countries with ancient
traditions of rivalry and double-cross. Moreover, the many in-
fluential Europeans who are getting rich from U.S.-European
trade are not likely to permit their governments to engage in
a trade war with the U.S. In the unlikely event that the mem-
bers of an expanded European Economic Community can agree
on a strong anti-U.S. position, the U.S. can threaten increased
trade with Japan, Eastern Europe, Russia, and Latin America,
not to mention Africa and China.
Government monetary and fiscal policies
The question of whether and, if so, how governments
should employ monetary and fiscal policies for balance-of-pay-
ments or other international purposes will become more alive
than it has been, although I believe that some of the answers
are foreordained.
Parochial monetary policies have recently been blamed for
international economic difficulties. Added to such disfavor is
the increasing impotence of (non-U.S.) monetary policies in a
dollar-dominated world. Non-dollar money stocks and interest
rates will continue to become both less important than their
dollar counterparts and more helplessly tied thereto. This will
cause much agony among non-U.S. officials who are thoroughly
addicted to monetary sovereignty, even though they have al-
ready lost most of it in practice. Kicking the habit will not be
easy, but it will happen simply because the drug will become
more and more scarce.
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With the gradual demise of (non-U.S.) monetary policy as
a governmental policy instrument, fiscal policy will receive
much more attention and stir more controversy than it has
in the past. Governments will increasingly rely on special pat-
terns of expenditure and taxation for international as well as
domestic purposes. Border tax adjustments and discriminatory
investment tax credits, for example, will become more popular
and more controversial.
U.S. monetary policy, of course, will be supremely
important.
The United States balance of payments
The question of what the United States and other govern-
ments should do about the U.S. balance of payments and in
particular, its currently large "deficits", has effectively been
removed from international debate by President Nixon's uni-
lateral moves and all of the developments which I have dis-
cussed above. So long as the U.S. economy remains richly
productive, open to outsiders, and relatively inflation-free the
U.S. has no reason to worry about its "overall deficit", however
defined and measured. Occasional dissatisfaction with the struc-
ture (composition) of trade or capital flows may call for minor
changes in government policy, but this is quite a different mat-
ter from sweeping changes in monetary, fiscal, commercial, or
exchange control policies in response to the fact that many
more dollars are being transferred by Americans to foreigners
than vice versa. For a world of dollar supremacy, this fact is
to be welcomed as the source of additional seignorage and
influence!
The "burden of adjustment" will be on foreign govern-
ments, whether they like it or not and, for reasons already
indicated, they will almost certainly resort to exchange rate
flexibility as their primary instrument of adjustment. This will
further strengthen the dollar, as argued above.
Government regulation of the "Eurodollar" market
However much European governments may wish to regu-
late the Eurodollar market (out of existence!) neither they nor
their influential banker and industrialist constituents will be
willing or able to do so. For the Eurodollar market exists pre-
cisely because the dollar not only facilitates but is necessary to
current levels of business profit in today's international econ-
omy. it is a subsystem in the world-wide pattern or matrix of
dollar-financed trade and investment.
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Economic policies of non-U.S. countries toward each other
Because there is so little that non-U.S. governments can
profitably do about American policies except make the best
of them, the most critical questions of economic policy for them
will be how to regulate economic transactions among them-
selves - in plainer language, how to conduct themselves so as
to maximize their respective shares of whatever is not gobbled
up by the American monolith - and how to obtain special
favors from those who control it. These will also be important
questions for the United States government, if only because the
joys and profits of empire can only be reaped under conditions
of general tranquility. Thus the future role of the U.S. as
arbiter-patron will be crucial to it as well as to other
governments.
Economic policies toward less-developed countries
The scramble around Goliath's feet has special importance
for the "developing" or "less-developed" countries. For unless
they very much improve their bargaining positions and skills,
they are likely to lose ground relative to western European
governments, Japan, and Canada. This would provide excellent
opportunities for sphere-of-influence expansion and rivalry by
Russia and China. Thus the question of what economic policies
the industrialized western countries (especially the United
States) should adopt with respect to the less developed coun-
tries assumes great importance. This importance is enormously
increased by the continuing fact that the vast bulk and the most,
rapidly growing portions of the world's population resides in
less-developed countries, in a state of unmitigated squalor and
misery.
Economic policies regarding the use of
irreplaceable resources: pollution
Insofar as the U.S. dominated international economy con-
tinues to expand output with currently popular technologies,
there is a high and increasing likelihood that human life -
perhaps all life - will become impossible by the end of this
century. It hardly needs stating that this raises the most im-
portant of all questions about government economic policies:
what should governments do about the immiment prospect of
ecological disaster?
Summary
It seems likely then, that familiar questions of government
economic policy concerning exchange rates, international liquid-
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ity, trade restrictions, capital flow restrictions, the U.S. balance
of payments, and the Eurodollar market - have rather suddenly
become less important as a result of President Nixon's decision
to use and exploit the international political-economic muscle
of the United States. This muscle results from a combination
of pre-eminence in resource control, economic output, tech-
nology, managerial and financial know-how, lending capacity,
and monetary importance -not to mention military power. In
short, it results from a monopoly position in all the essential
ingredients of political-economic power, a combination which
far exceeds even the wildest dreams of nineteenth century
Britain.
New relative importance attaches, under these conditions,
to questions concerning government budgets, U.S. monetary
policy, economic relations among non-U.S. countries, less-
developed countries, population growth, and pollution.
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RELEVANT DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES:
CONSTITUTIVE MATTERS
Now we come to a series of questions which may have more
inherent interest for lawyers and less for economists, as com-
pared with the foregoing.
Who will participate in or influence the decisions which
will emerge, as a matter of history, to answer the questions of
government economic policy discussed above - especially the
questions whose answers are not largely foreordained by over-
whelming political-economic realities?
Which of these participants will perform each of the various
decision-making activities - informing, recommending, prescrib-
ing, invoking, applying, and sanctioning?
Following what procedures?
Applying what sanctions?
The answers to these questions will vary to some extent
with the economic policy question involved. For example, the
large, varied, and mobile currency holdings of the big multi-
national corporations make them key participants in decision-
making about foreign exchange rates, whether governments like
it or not. When it comes to questions about reserves and
liquidity, on the other hand, central bankers will play the domi-
nant role. I will not attempt to make such distinctions here,
however. Instead, I will generalize without reference to par-
ticular policy questions, leaving the reader to make appropriate
qualifications.
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Central bankers will play a much more modest role than
they did before August, 1971. Finance ministers and heads of
state will dominate center-stage - as they have done since
August. The International Monetary Fund and the General
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs will, more than ever, function
and appear as a thin disguise for American dominion over the
world economy; they will in fact serve little purpose and may
well be discarded. The Group of Ten, or an even more exclusive
inner circle of major governments - dominated by the U.S. -
will prescribe, apply, and enforce the international law of gov-
ernment economic policy, following the procedures of traditional
diplomacy instead of procedures like those used in the Inter-
national Monetary Fund. Such procedures will be less formal,
more secret, and less richly recorded than those which were
followed prior to August, 1971. The "inner" group will prob-
ably include Britain, Germany, France, and Japan - in addition
to the U.S.. "Non-member" countries will of course be able to
inform, recommend, and invoke- but probably with less effect
than in the IMF or GATT contexts. This is especially true for
the less-developed countries which will be left with even less
of an authoritative role in international economic lawmaking
than they previously enjoyed as in the Fund and the GATT.
The few hundred largest multinational banks and indus-
trial firms, most of them American, will increasingly (though
privately) coordinate their decision-making and lobbying in
such a way as to become legislature-court-policeman for the
whole world, rivaling the major governments and thoroughly
dominating the lesser ones.
Inside the U.S. - the locus of awesome international politi-
cal-economic clout - there may develop an acute struggle be-
tween the Federal Reserve, now primary bank of issue for the
world, and the White House, which has charge of all but the
monetary instruments of government economic policy. (I as-
sume little or no interference by Congress.) Very strong pres-
sures will develop, I believe, for the subordination of Federal
Reserve policies to the White House world economic master
plan. In addition, it is likely that important conflicts about
international economic matters will develop from time to time
among various multinational industries, between American
labor unions and multinational management, or between groups
of multinational firms and the federal government.
Concluding observations
All signs points to the grandest and final flowering of
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American empire during the next ten to twenty years. Giant
American multinational industrial and banking firms, collabo-
rating with the U.S. government and two or three others, will
make decisions that will shape the near and long-term destiny
of the human species. Those who see the United States today
entering a period of political-economic decline fail to under-
stand, in my opinion, the importance of monopoly in human
affairs and the organizing potency of the social institution we
call money. Only general nuclear war, new forms of pestilence,
ecological disaster, escalating domestic strife, or hyper-inflation
of the dollar could prevent the increasing American pre-
eminence I foresee. Of these I believe that ecological disaster
is the most likely.
An absolutely crucial device for communication and sanc-
tioning in this enormously complex and highly centralized
social system is MONEY- in particular, the American dollar,
which has emerged as the basic unit of account, medium of
exchange, and store of value in the world economy. This makes
the Federal Reserve Board central banker for the world, and it
makes the "soundness" of the dollar the most important of all
the U.S. government's political-economic objectives. For the
whole system is likely to fall if the dollar is badly managed-
e.g., if U.S. inflation gets out of hand.
The moral of the story is that when one tribe gets much
bigger and richer than all the others and when it uses the
money device shrewdly, it can dominate the world and do any-
thing it wants to do within reason, all the while strengthening
its position without relying primarly on military force. The
other tribes, at least so long as they remain relatively ununi-
fied, have no choice but to search, beg, or fight among them-
selves for crumbs from the giant's meal. It's the company town
writ large: everyone is compelled by the lack of alternatives to
sell and buy in large quantities at the largest store in town.
I believe that somewhere in the White House files there is
a confidential study with conclusions much the same as mine.
I believe that President Nixon agrees with these conclusions,
has acted on them, and will continue to do so, with the object
of realizing the fullest possibilities of American empire-
probably without regard to the impact on masses of under-
privileged peoples at home and abroad. The question I raise,
then, is: who will benefit and who will suffer from this flower-
ing of American empire? To what end do we facilitate profit-
able international trade and investment by our huge multi-
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national corporations with a skillfully contrived and managed
monetary and financial system?
The most urgent task for lawyers, economists, business
executives, union leaders and others who more or less share
my view of current developments is to use their knowledge of
the relevant decision processes to increase the probability that
important decision-makers around the world will switch their
attention from old, familiar concerns such as exchange rates
and international liquidity to the really important issues of the
day such as pollution, poverty, and population, and then come
up with life-sustaining decisions.
COLLECTIVE LEGITIMIZATION IN
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
CONCEPT AND PRACTICE*
THoMAs L. BREwER**
The author defines collective legitimization as an act by
which legitimacy is attributed to national policy and
other "objects" by multilateral organizations. He de-
cribes the role of various organizations including the
United Nations in this process, and concludes that col-
lective legitimization will be used increasingly by
nations attempting to gain national and international
credibility. ED.
International organizations are no exception to the tend-
ency of institutions to perform functions not originally intended
for them. Thus, as Inis Claude has pointed out, the United Na-
tions and other international organizations have come to be re-
garded and used as agents for the legitimization of national
status, policies and actions.1
Although various social scientists since Max Weber have
given considerable attention to the role of legitimacy in na-
tional political systems, they have devoted little thought to its
role in the international system.2 And while such eminent
international relations specialists as Claude, Ernst Haas, and
Stanley Hoffman have given some thought to the nature and
role of legitimacy in international affairs, the total scholarly
output remains meager.3
* The author is indebted to Jerome Slater and Terry Nardin for criticisms
of an earlier draft and to Richard Johnson for an opportunity to read
his unpublished manuscript on the concept of legitimacy.
** Dr. Brewer is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Eastern Michi-
gan University. He received an M.A. from Yale University in 1964 and
a Ph.D. from the State University cf Buffalo in 1971.
1 I. CLAUDE, THE CHANGING UNITED NATIONS, ch. 4 (1967) [hereinafter cited
as CLAUDE]. Though the present article has been stimulated by Claude's
analysis, it seeks to extend our understanding of the concept and prac-
tice of collective legitimization beyond his pioneering work.
2 See D. EASTON, A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL LIFE (1965) [herein-
after cited as EASTON]; S. LiPSET, POLITICAL MEN (1963); and M. WEBER,
THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION (T. Parsons ed.
1947).
3 CLAUDE, supra note 1; E. HAAS, BEYOND THE NATION-STATE (1964); and
Hoffmann, Sisyphus and the Avalanche: The United Nations, Egypt, and
Hungary, 9 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 446-69 (1957). See also A.
Bargman, Collective Legitimization and Disarmament; J. Cefkin, Inter-
national Legitimization and Southern Africa: Principles and Practice;
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The importance of collective legitimization as a function of
international organizations suggests that more conceptual and
theoretical analysis is needed. This paper hopefully makes
some contributions in this area. More specifically, the purposes
of this paper are first, to define and develop the concept of
collective legitimization in order to render it more useful in the
analysis of international organizations, and second, to suggest
some tentative answers to the following questions. What is the
potential of international organizations for collective legitimiza-
tion, and what are the determinants of the potential? How have
international organizations been used by members to legitimize
their status and behavior? What are the salient trends and of
what significance are they? What are the consequences of the
use of international organizations for collective legitimization?
I have asserted that collective legitimization is an important
phenomenon in international relations. Legitimacy, of both
the establishment and the policies of a nation, is considered as a
necessary political goal by national leaders. Indeed, it has been
suggested that "politics is not merely a struggle for power,
but also a contest over legitimacy, a contest in which the con-
firmation or denial, the confirmation or revocation of legitimacy
is an important stake".4 Of equal importance is the fact that
legitimacy is a significant resource in the pursuit of power.5
Moreover, collective legitimization is a relatively efficient
process in this pursuit, for by gaining support based on legiti-
macy a nation can conserve other diplomatic resources. 6 In re-
viewing a study of British policy in the U.N., Ernst Haas has
observed:
British leaders painfully learned that in a world made inter-
dependent by the ideological, military, and economic clamor
which does not respect national frontiers, unilateral action en-
tails even more painful consequences than deference to unpalat-
able organizational decisions.7
and J. Slater, The Limits of Legitimization in International Organiza-
tion: The Case of the OAS, Sept. 3-7, 1968 (papers presented at the
1968 American Political Science Association Convention in Washington,
D.C.). A major recent addition to the literature on collective legitimiza-
tion, which appeared shortly before this manuscript went to the printer,
is R. RIGGS, U.S./U.N.: FOREIGN POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZA-
TION (1971). One of its central concerns is American utilization of the
U.N. for legitimization purposes.
4 CLAUDE, supra note 1, at 75-6.
5 Id.
G On the efficiency of legitimacy as a basis for compliance in national
political systems, see EASTON, supra note 2, at 278; and Merelman,
Learning and Legitimacy, 60 AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REvIEw 548-
49 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Merelman].
7 Haas, The Comparative Study of the United Nations, 20 WORLD POLITICS
321 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Haas].
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While collective legitimization is thus important from the
vantage point of the defenders of the interests of nation-states,
it is equally important from that of supporters of international
organizations. As will be discussed more fully below, the use of
international organizations as agents of collective legitimization
has had and will continue to have an impact on the structure
and function of international organizations. Such use has facili-
tated the proliferation of organizations and organizational sub-
divisions, as in the cases of the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development and the U.N. Special Committee on
Colonial Independence; and there is evidence that such use of
the U.N. has rendered it less effective in performing certain
functions.8
DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF COLLECTIVE LEGIIVIZATION
Definitions
Collective legitimization can be defined as an act by which
legitimacy is attributed to national policy and other "objects"
by multilateral organizations.9 Three key terms in the defini-
tion can be briefly elaborated. First, the term "multi-lateral
bodies" has been used to include the activities of ad hoc con-
ferences as well as international organizaitons, although the
discussion of the paper will be limited to the legitimization
activities of international organizations. 10 Second, an "act" of
multilateral bodies can include not only the deployment of
troops and the inauguration of programs and projects but also
the passing of resolutions and all other activities that convey
legitimacy. Third, "objects" refer to the phenomena being
legitimized; these include national actions, attitudes and status.
To satisfy the crux of the definitional problem, a general
definition of legitimacy based on those proposed by two politi-
cal scientists specializing in fields other than international re-
lations will be used. David Easton refers to legitimacy as a
... conviction on the part of the [person] that it is right and
proper for him to accept and obey the authorities and to abide
by the requirements of the regime ... In some vague or ex-
8 See infra at 87.
9Claude defines collective legitimization as "politically significant ap-
proval and disapproval of the claims, policies, and actions of states".
CLAUDE, supra note 1, at 73. But this definition ignores the question
of the ground on which approval and disapproval are based. Though
at another point he does consider the principles on which legitimacy is
bazed, the discussion does not seem to treat the subject adequately, as
I shall indicate below. Id. at 77-87.
10 CLAUDE, supra note 1, at 86, suggests the Bandung Conference of 1955 as
an example of an ad hoc conference designed for collective legitimiza-
tion purposes, in this case for the anti-colonialism movement. It should
be noted that countries also try to legitimitize their actions and status
by unilateral and bilateral actionc.
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plicit way he sees these objects as conforming to his own sense
of what is right and proper in the political sphere."
Richard Merelman refers to "political legitimacy" as "... the
quality of 'oughtness' that is perceived by the public to inhere
in a political regime which is viewed as morally proper for
a society". 12
Although one can accept the essence of these two defini-
tions, both are too specific for our purposes in two respects.
First, they specify the regime and the authorities as the objects
being legitimized; but in international relations the objects are
defined more broadly, also including national actions and atti-
tudes. Second, these two definitions by implication are limited
to legitimization of objects in the eyes of the domestic popula-
tions; again, in international relations there are also foreign
publics and governments for whom objects are legitimate. In
view of these two restrictions inherent in the above definitions,
they cannot be accepted intact for our purposes. However, by
modifying these two definitions, we can define legitimacy as a
quality of "oughtness", of being right and proper, that is attrib-
uted to some political object. The "legitimacy" becomes mean-
ingful for both national and international politics.
Principles of Legitimacy
This notion of right and proper raises the complex prob-
lem of what can be called the principles of legitimacy.13 Ac-
cording to Claude, legitimization always consists of a political
component which is predominant, and usually contains moral
and legal components. 14 But a concept defined in this way has
rather limited analytic utility since the nature and interrela-
tionships of its components- political, moral, and legal- are
unspecified.
I, therefore, propose to limit the concept to those attributed
characteristics that are based on moral considerations; thus, to
be perceived as right and proper on moral grounds is a neces-
sary and sufficient condition for a political object to be legiti-
mate. In most cases, moral grounds encompass both political
and legal components of legitimization in that a nation's politics
and laws are usually based on its perception of morality.
Particular acts of collective legitimization based on moral
grounds may nevertheless be expressed in legal terms. In some
11 EASTON, supra note 2, at 278.
12 Merelman, supra note 6, at 584.
13 I am accepting the terminology of CLAUDE, supra note 1.
14 Id. at 79-80.
COLLECTIVE LEGITIMIZATION
cases international law is so obviously grounded on considera-
tions of morality that it may be invoked as a legitimizing prin-
ciple. Hence, various provisions of the U.N. Charter may be in-
voked as principles of legitimization. This is not to say that all
Charter provisions are necessarily legitimizing principles, or
even that Charter provisions themselves are necessarily con-
sidered legitimate. Furthermore, the legitimacy of Charter pro-
visions may, with a change in moral outlook of the member
states, vary over time. For example, as Rupert Emerson has
pointed out, the Charter provision that trustee countries assure
that trust territories be peaceful1 5 was superceded by the wide-
spread attribution of illegitimacy to the entire trusteeship sys-
tem because the mere existence of trust territory status came
to be considered a threat to the peace.' 6 This particular change
is of course only part of the more general trend in the increas-
ing acceptance of anticolonialism as the dominant legitimizing
principle in U.N. activities.
A discussion of the collective legitimization of the de-
colonization process allows us to illustrate several additional
points about the evolution and use of principles of collective
legitimization. First, anticolonialism was itself legitimized by
prior formulations of what constituted legitimate behavior in
the international system. Specially, the Declaration on the
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 17
was collectively legitimized by explicit reference to "the pur-
poses and principles of the Charter" and to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. Second, this newly legitimized
principle as enunciated in the Declaration on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples was in turn
invoked to attribute illegitimacy to the continued practice of
colonialism in several particular instances, and was used to
attribute legitimacy to specific acts, such as the Indian attack
on Goa in 1961. The case of Goa and the International Court of
Justice ruling on South West Africa illustrate a third point
about principles of legitimacy: they may come into conflict
with international law. For instance, the International Court
of Justice ruling prompted the observation that the Court's
decision "can be expected to stimulate many states to respond
15U.N. CHARTER art. 76.
16Emerson, Colonialism, Political Development, and the U.N., in THE
UNITED NATIONS IN THE BALANCE 120-39 (N. Padelford & L. Goodrich eds.
1965) [hereinafter cited as Emerson].
17 G.A. Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc A/4684 (1960).
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that the South African position, while possibly legal, is cer-
tainly not legitimate".'8
Objects and Targets
Such a discussion of colonialism suggests that legitimacy
and illegitimacy are attributed by collective action to a variety
of phenomena or "objects". Such objects may be organized into
two types: actions and status. Actions include rather specific
acts, such as the Indian attack on Goa and the American inter-
vention in Korea in 1950, and also more long-term practices such
as colonialism. The status of nation states as sovereign mem-
bers of the international system is often an object of collec-
tive legitimization,' 9 as is the status of regimes, authorities and
indviduals.20 The Congo case may be used for illustrative pur-
poses. At stake in that episode was the status of a united Congo
as a legitimate nation state in the international system, the
status of the Leopoldville government as the legitimiate re-
gime and Kasavubu as a legitimate authority.
21
There are, moreover, a variety of "targets" of collective
legitimization represented by those people in whose view ob-
jects are being legitimized. Targets of legitimization include
not only domestic publics but also foreign publics. Government
and segments of publics may also be considered as targets.
22
The Legitimizing Capacity of Organizations
The United Nations is the most conspicuous example of an
international organization that has been utilized as an agency
for attempts to legitimize national actions and status. However,
certain regional organizations have also been used for collec-
tive legitimization. In considering the potential of various
organizations for achieving this function, several questions come
to mind. Do international organizations have an inherent
capacity to legitimize objects? Are there differences in the
capacities of regional organizations as compared with the U.N.?
Do legitimizing capacities vary over time? Implicit in all of
18 CLAUDE, supra note 1, at 85-6.
19 See the discussion of U.N. membership, infra at 82. For discussion
of the ICJ opinion denying legitimacy or legality see Gordon, 1 DENVER
J. INT'L L. & POLICY 65 (1971).
20 1 am following the terminology of David Easton; regime refers to "the
general matrix cf regularized expectations within the limits of which
political actions are usually considered authoritative", and authorities
to occupants of authoritative roles. EASTON, supra note 2, at 194, 212.
21 See, e.g., E. LEFEVER, CRISIS IN THE CONGO (1965). Note that it has been
stated that American action and U.N. support in Korea was legitimitized
in Japan only in the view of neutralist and pacifist groups.
22 See STUDY GROUP OF THE JAPANESE ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,
JAPAN AND THE UNITED NATIONS (1958), reviewed, Haas, 53 AMERICAN
POLITCAL SCIENCE REVIEW 205, 210 (1959).
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these questions is the problem of the determinants of the legiti-
mizing capacity of international organizations. The following
discussion will be organized around a set of factors that de-
termine the legitimizing capacity.
The first determinent of such a capacity is the target; both
the variance from country to country of the perceived poten-
tial of an institution's legitimizing capabilities and the changing
of each country's attitudes toward the institution over time
must be recognized. In some countries the U.N. may be widely
accepted as an agent for the granting, withholding and with-
drawing of legitimacy; in other countries its legitimizing poten-
tial may be quite limited. However, the range of activities for
which a given international organization has legitimizing capa-
bilities will very among countries. While one country may con-
sider the U.N. to have a legitimizing capability over a wide
range of activities, another country may consider the U.N.'s
capability to be limited to a narrow range of activities.
The perceived legitimizing capability of an international
organization for a given country, then, may vary over time.
For instance, in reviewing the limited evidence available on
attitudes toward the U.N. in several countries as of 1960, Haas
observed:
On colonial, race policy, and national self-determination ques-
tions for example, attitude, expectation, and satisfaction patterns
evolved in opposite directions. In early years, Egypt and India
regarded the Charter as a pro-status quo conspiracy designed to
perpetuate the white man's injustice; in recent years, both coun-
tries have come to expect more and more successful anti-colonial
action from the U.N.
He adds that the attitude of developed states had followed a
similar pattern.2 3
Another determinant of the legitimizing capacity of an in-
ternational organization is the scope of the membership. Other
factors being equal, the larger the membership the greater the
legitimizing capacity. The supposition here is that the larger
the membership of an organization, the more its actions will be
perceived as based on widespread moral consensus. Two impli-
cations follow from this general postulate. First, the general
tendency for the membership of international organizations to
increase, leads to an increased legitimizing capacity. The legiti-
mizing capacity of the U.N. since the large increase in member-
ship following the 1955 "package deal" has been significantly
greater than before that arangement. Similiarly, an increase in
23 Id.
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the size of the Organization of American States by the entry
of the newly independent Caribbean countries has increased
the legitimizing capacity of that organization.
A second implication is that universal organizations have an
inherently greater legitimizing capacity than regional organiza-
tions because the latter are more likely to be dominated by a
single member. The legitimizing capacity of an organization
varies directly with the degree of dispersion of influence within
the organization. The Organization of American States and the
Warsaw Treaty Organization both have rather limited legiti-
mizing capabilities because they are perceived to be dominated
by single countries.
Within organizations the legitimizing capacity varies with
the function being performed. More specifically, the collective
security function of the U.N. has apparently fallen into dis-
repute while economic assistance and decolonization have ac-
quired increased legitimacy.2 4 There is evidence that the U.N.
support of the American intervention in Korea is responsible
for the decline of legitimacy attributed to the collective security
function.25
The nature of the principles of legitimization that are in-
voked provides an additional determinant of legitimizing capac-
ity. Actually, the significance of this factor is in turn dependent
on the composition of the organization and the manner in which
it is used for legitimization purposes. To be specific, in its
early years the U.N. could be used as an agent of collective
legitimization by the West in the Cold War because the illegiti-
macy of aggression could be invoked as a principle of legiti-
macy and because there was a Western majority dominated
by the United States. More recently the U.N. has been used
as an agent of collective legitimization by the new Afro-Asian
majority to legitimize de-colonization and economic assistance.
Thus in both eras in the United Nations, parties could success-
fully muster majority votes and invoke firmly grounded and
widely accepted principles of legitimacy.
The experience in the Organization of American States has
been somewhat different. For in that organization the United
States has attempted to invoke the legitimizing principle of na-
tional sovereignty (or non-intervention), a widely accepted
24 Haas, supra note 7, at 311.
25 Id. at 215. We can safely ignore the fact that the Korean action was
not a collective security action in the most meaningful sense of that
term. See I. CLAUDE, POWER AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS ch. 5 (1962);
A. WOLFERS, COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND THE WAR IN KOREA, IN DISCORD
AND COLLABORATION ch. 11 (1962).
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legtimizing principle, as a justification for its support of stabil-
ity. But stability is not a particularly compelling principle, espe-
cially among Latin American publics.2 Such a strategy can be-
come quite transparent, with the result that the utility of the
O.A.S. as a legitimizing organization is somewhat limited.
If the composition of the organizing is such that the ulti-
mate object of legitimization is not based on the moral con-
siderations of the members, the collective legitimization capacity
of the organization will be limited. For this reason, in the case
of the O.A.S., the strategy of collective action and acquiescence
to impute legitimacy to the American policy of national stability
has failed.27
The capacity of the O.A.S. for collective legitimization is
also limited by the final factor in our list of determinants
which is the manner in which international organizations and
principles of legitimization are utilized. Two characteristics of
the American use of the O.A.S. have served to diminish what
little potential for legitimization it may have had: (1) the United
States has overused the O.A.S. for collective legitimization pur-
poses; and (2) the United States has used the O.A.S. for very
little else.28 For both of these reasons, the O.A.S. has come to
be widely regarded in Latin America as no more than an or-
ganization for transparent attempts by the United States to
legitimize its actions. The O.A.S. has been described by Fidel
Castro as the State Department's "Ministry for Colonies". 29
One commentator has suggested that a similar fate may be
in store for the United Nations: "[T]he legitimacy of U.N. prin-
ciples is endangered by their being invoked hypocritically in
26See J. SLATER, THE OAS AND UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY (1967)
[hereinafter cited as SLATER], especially the Introduction and Conclusion.
During the 1961-63 period the United States temporarily emphasized
the illegitimacy of dictatorial regimes.
27 It should be noted that my position here is at odds with that of Slater
and of Fox. Slater asserts that "the primary function of the O.A.S. has
been to legitimize the predominant role of the United States in the set-
tlement of most hemisphere conflicts, thus avoiding potential opposition
in the United States, in Latin America, and in the rest of the world".
Id. at 97. See also id. at 206-09, 279. The view of Fox is that the O.A.S.
has "served to ... legitimate and make more respectable the dominant
position of the United States in the Western Hemisphere". W. Fox & A.
Fox, NATO AND THE RANGE OF AMERICAN CHOICE 54 (1967). Such a
view depends on a more encompassing definition of collective legitimiza-
tion than the one I have suggested. On the other hand their interpreta-
tion surely implies that American policy-makers attempt to legitimize
their policies through the O.A.S.; and I fully agree with such an
implication.
28 SLATER, supra note 26.
29 This has happened in spite of U.S. attention. Id. at 273. To the neces-
sity of avoiding the appearance of an O.A.S. dominated by the U.S. see
id. at 274.
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excessively public debates" 0  The lesson for national policy-
makers interested in exploiting the legitimizing potential of
international organizations is that excessive and hypocritical
use of organizations for such purposes will be counterproduc-
tive in the long run; policy-makers will substantially reduce or
even eliminate altogether the very capability they are trying
to utilize.
Use of Collective Legitimization
Several ways in which national policy-makers have in fact
used this potential of international organizations have been
mentioned. But it is instructive to reorder some of these points
and discuss them in a different light.
In the United Nations and to a lesser extent in regional
organizations the pursuit of collective legitimization has para-
lelled the two dominant conflicts in the post-war international
system: the East-West struggle in the Cold War and the North-
South conflict over colonialism and economic development.
31
The Cold War protagonists have used a variety of U.N.
actions in an effort to achieve collective legitimization. In the
case of Korea the United States sought to legitimize a foreign
policy by U.N. sponsored military action and by a U.N. resolu-
tion labeling China an aggressor. There was also a struggle
for legitimization by the U.N. in an attempt by the United
States to attribute illegitimacy to the Peking government. By
invoking the Charter provision of Article 4, that the U.N. mem-
bers must be peace-loving, and thereby withholding Chinese
membership in the U.N., the U.S. hoped to achieve this end.32
In general, however, the granting and withholding of member-
ship in the U.N. has not been as potent an instrument for collec-
tive legitimization as it might have been. There are two reasons
for this: (1) the membership has not been limited to peace
loving states and, therefore, granting membership does not give
a state the moral stamp of approval that it is peace loving; and
30 Haas, supra note 7, at 312. Richard Van Wagenen reaches the opposite
conclusion: ". . . citing U.N. principles might be more of a justification
than a true motive for something which a member government wants
to do, seeking legitimization from the U.N. in the same way that bat-
tling troops seek the legitimization of God for their cause. Yet the mere
fact that the blessing is sought would tend to build up the legitimacy
of the blesser". See R, Van Wagenen. The Concept of Community and
the Future of the United Nations, in THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE BALANCE
461 (N. Padelford & L. Goodrich eds. 1965).
31 On the dominance of these two conflicts in the U.N., and in inter-
national relations generally, see H. ALKER, JR. & B. RUSSETT, WORLD
POLITICS IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY (1965); and J. STOESSINGER, THE
MIGHT OF NATIONS (1963). The former study, however, also presents
evidence of other quite salient conflicts in the U.N.
32 See, e.g., the latest U.S. statement, reported in 8 U.N. MONTHLY
CHRONICLE 34 (Nov., 1971).
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(2) the membership issue was for a long time highly politicized
by the Cold War and the withholding of membership did not
attribute illegitimacy to a nation. Nevertheless the granting of
membership is considered an instrument for bestowing at least
some legitimacy. Accordingly, West Germany is willing to forego
U.N. membership to avoid having East Germany enjoy the
legitimizing effect of membership.
Cold War struggles for collective legitimization have also
been fought over resolutions, as in the case of the Soviet at-
tempt in the Security Council to label the U.S. U-2 flights "acts
of aggression" 3  More recently, there has been a battle over
the wording of a report from the Commission on Human Rights
to the Economic and Social Council. In this case, the Soviet
representative successfully proposed the deletion of a paragraph
containing the American charge that the Soviet Union was sup-
pressing free speech.34
It has been in realm of North-South relations, though, that
the U.N. has been most prominently utilized as an agent for
collective legitimization, especially in recent years. The U.N.
actions reflect the demands of its new members- Afro-Asian
states, excolonial-and developing states-which now constitute
a majority. These demands are for independence, unity, non-
intervention, modernization, and the recognition of the equal
status for non-whites.3 5 The U.N. capacity for legitimization
has been used for all of these objectives with varying success:
(1) The U.N. has played a role in legitimizing the establish-
ment of the newly independent countries by adopting the Dec-
claration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Coun-
tries and Peoples, and, more generally, recognizing, with ap-
proval, self-determination and anti-colonialism. This created a
general climate of opinion that attributed illegitimacy to con-
tinued colonialism. Rupert Emerson has suggested that "The
case of Goa is a peculiarly striking illustration of the proposi-
tion, generally accepted by the U.N. majority, that all colonial-
ism is illegitimate and that the use of force to overthrow it is
therefore justified".3 6
Assessing the degree and significance of legitimacy and
illegitimacy bestowed by the U.N. in specific cases is very dif-
33The resolution was defeated. See J. STOESSINGER, THE UNITED NATIONS
AND THE SUPERPOWERS 15 (1965).
34 N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 1968, at 6, col. 3.
35 Id. at 5-6.
36 Emerson, supra note 16, at 136. [For a more recent article by Emerson
dealing with self-determination and touching on the legitimizing func-
tion of the U.N. see Emerson, Self-Determination, 65 Am. J. INT'L L.
459 (1971). Ed.]
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ficult. In the case of Algeria, even though the General Assem-
bly refused to pass several resolutions calling for Algerian self-
determination from 1956 to 1959 there was probably some legiti-
mizing effect. These resolutions were sponsored by large num-
bers of Asian and African countries3 7 and were much debated.
Thus one observer has concluded that "the annual Assembly
debates [gave] a vital international recognition and 'legiti-
macy' to the National Front of Liberation", and without this
factor Franco-Algerian negotiations would have occurred even
later .3 In other cases such as Indonesia the legitimizing role of
the U.N. has been negligible. During the period of the Indo-
nesian struggle for independence from the Netherlands, the
General Assembly resolutions did not call for independence or
self-determination but rather merely called for negotiations be-
tween the two parties.3 1
(2) As to the unity of the newly independent countries
the U.N.'s role has been only indirect with the exception of the
Congo. The U.N. has bestowed legitimacy to unification only in
the sense that by providing observation teams for plebiscites
it has assured that an appropriate self-determination procedure
has been properly executed. It has thereby given some legiti-
macy to the results no matter what they might be. Thus both
sections of British Togoland were united with the Gold Coast,
even though a plebiscite observed by the U.N. in the South
gave a majority vote to continuation under the trusteeship
system while the North gave a majority vote to union with the
Gold Coast. On the other hand, the U.N. has in a similar way
indirectly legitimized disunity, as in the case of the plebiscite
that separated Ruanda and Urundi.
(3) The newly independent countries including the coun-
tries of Latin America have used the U.N. to try to legitimize
economic assistance. Accordingly, the 1960's were declared the
Decade for Development, and the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) was established to gain
special consideration for the developing countries in interna-
tional trade and tariff policies. Thus far, the movement for in-
creased economic assistance has not received the same degree
of morally based support as anti-colonialism.40 It seems likely,
37 Twenty-two countries in the 12th session. P. JACOB & A. ATHERTON,
THE DYNAMICS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 663 (1965) [hereinafter
cited as JACOB].
38 Johnson, Helping to Build New Stutes, in THE UNITED STATES AND THE
UNITED NATIONS 3 (F. Wilcox & J. Haviland eds. 1961).
" JACOB, supra note 37, ch. 20.
40L. PEARSON, PARTNERS IN DEVELOPMENT (1969).
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however, that this issue will be increasingly the focus of legiti.-
mization attempts in the U.N. in coming years. The developing
countries can be expected to base demands for economic assist-
ance on the need to right the past wrongs of political and
economic colonialism.4
1
(4) Finally, the Afro-Asian countries have employed the
U.N. to legitimize their demands for racial equality. The most
prominent proclamation in this regard was the Declaration on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, which
was passed by the General Assembly in 1963.42 At this time
there were several other resolutions dealing with race relations,
but these were directed specifically at the Union of South
Africa. For ihstance, between August, 1963, and June, 1964, the
General Assembly adopted two resolutions and the Security
Council four resolutions condemning the practice of apartheid. 43
In regional organizations, as opposed to legitimization by
the U.N., the pattern has not been so clear. The use of these
organizations has varied as in the case of the U.N. As discussed
above, the United States has tried to use the O.A.S. to legiti-
mize American policy in Latin America. Regional organizations
may also be used to justify both unpopular actions and un-
popular inactions. Thus it has been suggested that the "com-
mitment to multilateral (O.A.S.) action on hemispheric prob-
lems has enabled governments to resist emotional demands for
the unilateral 'solution' of problems for which no acceptable
solutions are immediately obtainable".44 In particular, American
policy-makers tried to use the O.A.S. to "bury" the Cuban prob-
lem and legitimize inaction in the face of strong domestic public
demands for action.45 More recently, by way of contrast, Ameri-
can policy-makers have tried to use SEATO membership to
legitimize action in Southeast Asia; they have invoked the
SEATO treaty as "concrete" evidence of a legal and moral com-
mitment to take action.
Another regional organization, the Organization of African
Unity (O.A.U.), is noteworthy because of its apparent non-use
for collective legitimization purposes during its infancy. This
was so, partially because it was competing for support with
other regional African groups, and had very little claim to be
41 Declaration of Lima, UNCTAD Doc. No. MM/77/l/ll (1971).
42 G.A. Res. 1904, 18 U.N. GAOR Supp. 15, at 35, U.N. Doc. A/5515 (1963).
43 See Stevens, Issues Before the Nineteenth General Assembly, 550 IN-
TERNATIONAL CONCILIATION 546-55 (Nov., 1964).
44 SLATER, supra note 26, at 269.
45 Id.
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an authoritative agent of legitimization. The conflict among the
O.A.U. and the two smaller organizations, the Union Africaine
et Malgache and the Union of African States, reduced much of
its legitimizing potential. 4 More recently the O.A.U. has taken
steps in a direction that could lead to a significant role for it as
an agent of collective legitimization in Africa. The steps were
to intervene in the 1963 Algerian-Moroccan border conflict and
to play a minor role in the settlement of the dispute,47 and its
decision to back the federal government of Nigeria during its
civil war. 48 It seems likely that the O.A.U. will be used as a
collective legitimization agent in future African disputes.
The Consequences
The consequences of the function of collective legitimiza-
tion include both the facilitation of change in the international
system and the maintenance of stability. Although assessing the
impact of the U.N. on the decolonization process is an "iffy"
problem in the sense that one can only speculate about what
the situation would have been if the U.N. had not been active
in this realm, it nevertheless seems reasonable to agree that
"the U.N. was operating in an atmosphere of mounting anti-
colonialism which it certainly did not create but to which it
equally certainly contributed". 49  It made its contribution
through the acts of collective legitimization.
While the United Nations has, therefore, been a contribut-
ing factor in this revolutionary change in the international
system, at the same time it has been a stabilizing factor in the
national politics of the newly independent countries. While
being somewhat speculative, it seems reasonable to suppose
that regimes and authorities in these countries have been the
objects of at least some collective legitimization from the U.N.
46 See I. WALLERSTEIN, AFRICA: THE POLICS OF UNITY (1967); and Wal-
lerstein, The Early Years of the OAU, 20 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
774-87 (1966).
47See Wild, The Organization of African Unity and the Algerian-Mo-
roccan Border Conflict, 20 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 18-36 (1966).
48Resolutions against the Union of South Africa, and its racist policies
have continued. For material on four recent resolutions in this area
calling for (1) the continuation of measures and activities to combat
racial discrimination; (2) urging ratification of the 1966 International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination;(3) reaffirming that apartheid was a crime against humanity and con-
demning countries for encouraging and inciting South Africa in per-
sisting with these policies; and (4) recommending a draft convention
on apartheid see 8 U.N. Monthly Chronicle, Dec. 1971, at 128-33. The
Organization for African Unity has also recently reiterated its stand
against South African policies in the Resolution on Apartheid and
Racial Discrimination, G.A. Res. 242, 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. , at
U.N. Doc. CM/Res. 242/S/10272 (1971).
49 Emerson, supra note 16, at 126.
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in the eyes of their domestic publics. There has been a con-
tribution to stability at least to the extent that leading the anti-
colonial drive to independence and gaining admission to the
U.N. have enabled them to enjoy the benefits of collective
legitimization. As Seymour Lipset has asserted, stability "de-
pends not only on the system's efficiency in modernization, but
also upon the effectiveness and legitimacy of the political
system".50
Another consequence of the use of international organiza-
tions for collective legitimization is the impact on the structure
and the function themselves, as we have seen above. First,
there has been been a proliferation of agencies and subagencies.
One of the most prominent and active of these has been the
Special Committee established by the 15th session of the Gen-
eral Assembly to facilitate the implementation of the Declara-
tion on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples. The composition of that committee has been such that
a militantly anti-colonial majority has been able to use it as a
forum for strongly-worded condemnations of continuing colonial
practices -oftentimes in the form of reports on particular
situations.
A second consequence for the organizations has been a de-
cline in the capacity to perform certain functions. In the case of
the United Nations the collective security function has fallen
into disrepute; and in the case of the Organization of American
States, the capacity to perform the collective legitimization
function itself has been reduced. Indeed, in the case of the
O.A.S. it may well be that the organization is generally less
effective because it has been utilized so frequenly for collective
legitimization purposes.
Finally, and most significantly, the use of international or-
ganizations as agents of collective legitimization both reflects
and promotes a trend in international relations to rely increas-
ingly on non-coercive forms of influence. Collective legitimiza-
tion is one such way to gain support for policies.
This is not to say that legitimacy is as important in inter-
national politics in this respect as it is in domestic politics.
While legitimacy may be the most important source of support
of outputs in domestic political systems, it is still only a minor
5OLipset, Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development
and Political Legitimacy, 53 AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW 69-
105 (1959). On the "crisis of legitimacy", see S. LIPSET, THE FIRST NEW
NATION (1963); and POLITICAL PARTIES AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT (J.
LaPalombara & M. Weiner eds. 1966).
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source of support in the international system.51 Nor does legiti-
macy play precisely the same role in domestic and interna-
tional systems. In domestic systems, it is a basis for accepting
specific outputs as binding.52 In the international system, how-
ever, it plays this role only to the very limited extent that
there are outputs of international organizations that require
compliance. But most attempts to gain the collective legitimiza-
tion of international organizations do not seek a prescription
that will be followed by compliance or non-compliance. Rather,
collective legitimization is sought as a means to gain rather dif-
fuse support and to enchance one's own image in the world or
to denigrate another's.
The significance of the potential for a strategy of coercive
action in international relations is growing. Stanley Hoffman
has asserted that: "International politics in the past was often
an arena of coercion without persuasion; it is tending to become
an arena of persuasion, more or less coercive". 53 Continued and
increased reliance on collective legitimization can be expected
as one method in the attempt to persuade and to shape
perceptions.
51 EASTON, supra note 2, at 278, 284.
52 Id. at 278.
53 Hoffmann, Perception, Reality, and the Franco-American Conflict, 21
JOURNAL OF INTERNATONAL AFFAIRS 58-9 (1967).
MODEL STATUTE: INTERNATIONAL
DRAINAGE BASIN POLLUTION CONTROL
ROBERT ISRAEL AND ROBERT ZUPKUS*
This article reviews briefly the attempts which have
been made to control pollution of international rivers
and then posits an ideal commission designed to
remedy the weaknesses of previous commissions. ED.
There can no longer be any doubt that environmental
pollution presents a serious threat to the well-being of man-
kind. Because of rapid and widespread dispersal of pollutants
the problem is shared by all nations, and now endangers people
everywhere. This is particularly true of marine pollution. The
sea is the common heritage of all. Regardless of distance from
the ocean, all people must ultimately depend upon it as a
source of food and natural resources, and as the key factor
in the natural process of recycling earthly wastes. Just as
universally, the nations of the world have been contributing
to the upset of this balance. Deterioration of the sea is the
by-product of a number of human enterprises. No single
source of pollution, however, is of greater consequence than
river discharge.
Rivers carry a variety of man made pollutants to the sea,
the most harmful of which are municipal, industrial, agricul-
tural, and mining wastes. Although the technology is presently
available to curtail much of this river pollution, its imple-
mentation has been remarkably retarded.1 Improper river
management thus is mostly to blame for the serious deteriora-
tion of the oceans. 2 The proper establishment of river man-
agement schemes poses no insurmountable obstacle to the
goal of pollution abatement. Just as the scientific expertise
is available to reduce river pollution, the theoretical and ad-
*The authors are senior students at the University of Denver College
of Law. Mr. Zupkus received an AB Degree from the University of
Illinois in 1969, and Mr. Israel received an AB Degree from Franklin
and Marshall College in 1969.
** Letters within parentheses refer to the Comments.
1 Addendum, Report of the Secretary-General, River Discharge and
Marine Pollution, E/C.7/2 Add. 8 (1971).
2Id.
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ministrative base now exists to implement sound river control.
Unfortunately, international rivers have never been a source
of enduring international accord. Traditionally, the sphere
has been governed by political and economic expediency
rather than by common sense. This is particularly true in the
case of international rivers where the usual political and
economic complications are intensified.
To be sure, the international community has attempted
to deal with the pollution of its rivers. A number of treaties
have been devised in an effort to end international river pol-
lution. As early as 1909, the United States and Canada entered
into a treaty which contained provisions to decrease the pol-
lution of their common waters.3 Germany made treaties with
Denmark in 1922 and Belgium in 1929 which expressly out-
lawed contamination of international waters.4 Furthermore,
the most recent theories of international river management
have evolved into philosophies which are committed to the
elimination of water pollution.
Two of these doctrines are known as territorial integrity
and equitable apportionment. They developed from the
medieval notion of territorial sovereignty, one implication of
which was that a country deal freely with the waters which
flowed across its boundaries. Succinctly stated, territorial in-
tegrity encompasses both the negative principle of "not caus-
ing injury by artifically altering the natural conditions of the
[river's] flow" and the positive principle that the "most
practical and beneficial uses for the lower and upper riparians
. . . [are] to be taken into consideration." 5 Under this doc-
trine, prior mutual consent of all affected riparians who might
be affected is required before the basic character of the water
may be altered by any fellow riparian.
A more recent philosophy, equitable apportionment, is
grounded in natural law.6 Its basic premise is that the "water
source of a river is the common and inalienable property of
all countries watered by it." 7 Technical methods and benefits
surrounding international river use should transcend tradi-
tional political boundaries and be shared by all riparians on
3 Lester, River Pollution in International Law, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 842-43
(1963) [hereinafter cited as Lester]; Erichsen-Brown, Legal Implication
of Boundary Water Pollution, 17 BUFFALO L. REv. 65 (1968) [herein-
after cited as Erichsen-Brown].
4 Lester at 841.
5 F. BERBER, RIVERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 15 (1959).
6 Id. at 22, 24.
7 Id. at 24.
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a reasonable basis.8 Unfortunately, the effect that these doc-
trines or the various treaties on the subject have had upon
pollution control is minimal.
The greatest shortcoming of both territorial integrity and
most anti-pollution treaties is that they tend to deal with pol-
lution on a fragmented basis. Territorial integrity is limited
in that it rests on the presumption that an international river
is a divisible objectY While riparians must respect the rights
of co-riparians, they are still free to use a river as they wish
and reap the benefits on an individual basis. This arrangement
discourages cooperation among nations for large scale projects
such as resource management and pollution control. Further,
fractionated river use reduces pollution control to a cloak
and dagger affair. It becomes a game of detecting and prov-
ing violations of riparian rights. These same limitations apply
to treaties concerning pollution control. Too often such trea-
ties are between only a few nations along a particular inter-
national water way. Consequently, river management and
pollution control for an entire river system is thwarted and
the program becomes inefficient and ineffective. The problem
is further complicated by enforcement procedures.
Whether operating under treaty or merely the general
philosophy of territorial integrity, both the violator and the
violated can easily abuse a pollution control program. The
Lake Lanoux incident between France and Spain demonstrates
some of the shortcomings of both treaty and territorial in-
tegrity. France had plans to temporarily divert large quanti-
ties of water from Lake Lanoux, the waters of which even-
tually flow into Spain. Although neither the character nor
the total flow of the water entering Spain would have been
altered, Spain invoked the doctrine of territorial integrity and
held up the project for forty years. The sole cause of the
hold-up appears to have been Spain's national vanity and
her desire to assert authority in international affairs.'0 A
similarly unfortunate result would have been reached even if
Spain had asserted her rights under a formal treaty guar-
anteeing a continued and clean flow of water.
8 Van Aistyne, The Justiciability of International River Disputes: A
Study in the Case Method, 48 DuKE L. REv. 337 (1964) [hereinafter cited
as Van Alstyne].
9 Shapiro-Libai, Development of International River Basins: Regulation
of Riparian Competition, 45 INDIANA L. J. 28 (1969) [hereinafter cited
as Shapiro-Libail.1oVan Alstyne at 314; Goldie, International Law and the Development of
International River Basins 4 U. BmT. COLUMB. L. REv. 772 (1963);
Shapiro-Libai at 31-2.
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Environmental relief is handicapped by further limita-
tions inherent in territorial integrity and treaty agreements.
The individualistic nature of both these methods presupposes
a state versus state contest. As a result, only those interests
which a government is willing to defend will be protected.
Only a state may champion the cause of an injured citizen.
Should political considerations prevent a government from
pursuing an action in an international matter, then private
citizens or corporations would have no legal recourse." With
the multitude of other international pressures upon a nation
besides pollution abatement, many major environmental prob-
lems will not be adequately voiced.
Should an environmental matter reach an international
forum, there are still other problems which would preclude
effective pollution control on international rivers. Treaties
and territorial integrity by their very nature need judicial
decisions and arbitrational awards to give them effect. This
situation is unfortunate because such a process lacks the flex-
ibility which is necessary for the adequate regulation of inter-
national rivers.12 The unorganized rulings originating from
these tribunals cannot be forged into a unified and workable
program which could respond to the complexities of inter-
national river use. The inherent delay associated with the
judicial process is little inducement to entrust it with the
management of the complex and rapidly shifting situations
which comprise international river use.13 Additionally, while
international tribunals may be able to apply a uniform water
pollution program and attach proper liabilities, there exists
little authority to compel payment of compensatory damages.
14
Of all the possibilities currently existing to control pollu-
tion, the doctrine of equitable apportionment possesses the
greatest potential for effective river management. Besides re-
quiring the sharing of all river benefits by all riparians, the doc-
trine treats an entire river basin as a single unit. As a result,
many more nations take part in the management of a particu-
lar river system and cooperation is on a broader basis and
goes deeper than usual under the doctrine of territorial in-
tegrity or under bilateral treaties. Enforcement of a program
is necessarily less disruptive because cooperation is rewarded
by the sharing of benefits. Nonetheless, the doctrine is still
11 Erichsen-Brown at 69.
12 Lester at 848.
13 Shapiro-Libai at 214.
14 Id.; Lester at 848; Erichsen-Brown at 68.
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too imperfect to be the best method for pollution control on
international rivers.
Several international bodies do engage in river manage-
ment based upon equitable apportionment. These operate with
some measure of success, but none have managed to perform
their work without either high social costs or an extremely
favorable political and economic climate. The favorable con-
ditions needed to establish a successful international river
management agency rarely occur in nature. Without a coop-
erative atmosphere, such undertakings cannot achieve the
efficiency and effectiveness necessary to adequately control
river use.15 This is especially true for water pollution control
because of its costs and technical requirements. An examina-
tion of existing river management schemes illustrates these
problems.
One of the most successful programs is on the Columbia
River. Canada and the United States designed an agreement
for the exploitation of the river's electricity generating poten-
tial. Although the resources were equitably apportioned, the
work completed under the treaty resulted in a loss of between
$250 million and $375 million.1" The United States, for a variety
of political reasons, absorbed the entire loss. This generous
gesture, however, will not often be repeated, even for pollu-
tion control. Few international rivers have riparians inclined
to make large expenditures solely in the name of their fellow
man. Furthermore, commitments of this nature are notoriously
inflexible.l' Their continued success depends upon the per-
petuation of the diplomatic climate in which they were made.
Without a broader base of interests, such river arrangements
will collapse with the slightest shift of the diplomatic winds.
The most famous scheme of river management and pollu-
tion control is Germany's Genossenschaften. Membership in
the Genossenschaften is mandatory for all river users. Over
the years sophisticated procedures have evolved for assessing
the cost of river use to its users. The effect has been the
apportionment of the Rhine system to meet a variety of
human needs while at the same time reducing water pollution
to a relatively small cost.' 8 The recommendation has been
15 Kenworthy, Joint Development of International Waters, 54 Am. J. INT'L
L. 602 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Kenworthy].
16 J. KRUTILLA, THE COLUMBIA WATER TREATY 195 (1967).
17 Id. at 202.
18 A. KNESSE & B. BOWER, MANAGING WATER QUALITY: ECONOMICS, TECH-
NOLOGY, INSTITUTIONS 238-40, 287 (1968) [hereinafter cited as KNESSE &
BowER].
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made that the idea be expanded to include international boun-
daries in the regulation of the Rhine system. Indeed, all na-
tions along the Rhine have pledged their cooperation in ending
pollution of the river. They have further pledged one percent
of their gross national product to finance the operation. There
are, however, several flaws in this scheme.
In the first place, the Genossenschaften has not done as
much as is possible to end river and marine pollution. The
plan operates in the Ruhr district, one of the most industrial-
ized areas of the world. Water quality there had actually
become so critical that it became a matter of survival. Effort
had to be expended to at least prevent further pollution. Yet,
since the members of the Genossenschaften are not only the
water users but also the water pollutors, their primary aim
is to achieve human survival at the lowest cost and not neces-
sarily to purify the Rhine. As a result, the Genossenschaften
has not required uniform purity of the various rivers in the
Rhine basin. Some rivers are kept clean for drinking and
recreation. Other rivers are little more than open sewers.19
Both types of water find their way to the sea.
The other main problem with Genossenschaften is in the
manner in which it assesses costs. Regardless of the termi-
nology used, the program essentially levies a use tax on the
industrialist, with the heavy pollutor bearing the brunt of the
tax. This restricts his operations without regard for the soci-
etal need for his product and even if his consumers are will-
ing to pay more for the product.20 At the same time, this tax
eventually leads to a misallocation of resources. Bearing lower
taxes, less essential goods will carry a lower price and will
be purchased more frequently than their usefulness would
dictate. Alternatively, the idea of giving tax breaks to pollu-
tors who regulate themselves would only be sponsoring a
costly and inefficient means of control.
21
Added to these economic problems would be the diplo-
matic difficulties encountered in collecting taxes. In tight
international markets few nations would allow a tax penalty
on their production costs which the goods of other nations
do not bear. The Genossenschaften idea is still not a totally
effective pollution plan. An example of the missing features
is found in a study of the Mekong River experience.
1") Wheeler, International Multipurpose Water Resources Development in
the Lower Mekong Basin, 45 WASH. U. L. REv. 42 (1970).
2
o KNESSE & BOWER at 173.
21 Id. at 178.
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Started twelve years ago, the Mekong Committee regu-
lates six cooperating riparians on the Mekong River. Despite
diverse political and cultural backgrounds of the member
nations this joint commission has gradually assumed more
powers. 22 The duties of the agency now include the coordina-
tion of research, the recruiting of financial and technical aid,
the establishment of water use criteria and the supervision
of construction projects. The trend is directly opposite from
the normal international river agency development which
normally finds authority gravitating back to the national
level.23
The key to the success on the Mekong was undoubtedly
due to the lack of pre-existing development on the river at
the time the commission was formed.2 4 Coupled with full
support from the United Nations and funding from a variety
of international organizations, the Mekong River Commission
really encountered no opposition. 25 The economic advantages
of cooperation far outweighed any political differences and
overcame any opposition from established economic circles. 20
Countries must be convinced that pollution control is for
their own benefit. The advantages attaching to pollution con-
trol must not be merely indirect or aesthetic. Further, the
entire process must be sheltered from international political
instability. In short, the advantages to a country participating
in pollution control must be in dollars and cents. The controls
must also operate somewhat spontaneously, with as little
governmental involvement as possible. Current methods for
river management and pollution control simply do not have
this flexibility. Keeping the limitation of present schemes in
mind, the following is a proposed plan for international river
management, emphasizing pollution control. It is to be admin-
istered by a commission, here unnamed.
STAGE I
Section A: Purpose
1. This commission is established to protect the public
health and welfare, enhance the quality of the water and serve
the purposes of this Act; taking into consideration things con-
nected in any reasonable way with use and value of water for
22Shapiro-Libai at 205-08.
2 3 Kenworthy at 598.
24 Shapiro-Libai at 210.
25 Id. at 205, 209.
26 Id. at 212.
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public water supplies, propagation of fish and wildlife, recrea-
tional purposes and agricultural, industrial and other legitimate
uses. (a)**
Section B: Membership, purpose, staff and funding
1. The commission shall be made up of one director from
each of the member nations and shall have tenure for life. They
shall be chosen for their ability to carry out this Act. Their
actions shall be motivated by the guiding principle that their
highest call is the improvement and management of the water
resources of the entire area and shall not be advocates for any
one respective region at the expense of the overall purpose.
2. Members of the commission have power to hire staff,
acquire or build facilities, or to do whatever else they deem
necessary to carry out the purpose of this Act.
3. This commission shall be funded initially by one-half
of one percent of the gross national product of each member
state and thereafter by user fees as provided for in STAGE IV. (b)
Comments
(a) The goals and powers of this plan are set forth in very
broad language. This, hopefully, will allow the commission to
adjust the framework of the act to any unforeseen situation
that may arise in carrying out the purpose of this act. Knesse
states that the broadness and generality of the Genossenschaften
(regional water management commission for the Ruhr River
Basin), is one of the contributing factors to its success. "This
has left the staff and the members comparatively free to adapt
to changing conditions and to develop procedures and concepts
in line with experience." 27
(b) The presently implemented plan on the Rhine River
utilizes one percent of the gross national product of all border-
ing states for pollution control.
STAGE II
Section A: Water resource and pollution abatement study
1. The commission will make a study of the resources of
the area projected water uses, and water classification proposals,
taking into consideration:
a. type and amount of demand for water use; (a)
b. stream flow conditions, utilization and the quality
standards to be observed. (b) & (c)
27 A. KNESSE, ECONOMICS OF REGIONAL MANAGEMENT OF WATER QUALITY
162 [hereinafter cited as KNESSE].
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2. The commission will then proceed to formulate an abate-
ment scheme by determining the most economic abatement
processes (d), taking into consideration:
a. recreational and aesthetic values;
b. construction of treatment plants;
c. in-plant treatment plans; (e)
d. amortization schedule. (f)
3. After all of the above, costs for financing implementation
shall be apportioned to each polluter. (g)
4. A reasonable estimation of benefits and allocation of
costs shall be made. (h)
Comments
(a) The principle that quality standards should be fixed
in terms of utilization will be followed, always keeping in mind
environmental values. Litwin addresses himself to the great
multiplicity of needs that accompany realistic water use for
water courses.
High quality water is required for drinking, unpolluted water
for swimming, non-poisonous water with an acceptable min-
eral content for agriculture, and water for industry which
must often fulfill technical requirements. In our modern com-
munity and industrial life, the waters of any country must
serve as a source of protein food, transportation for commerce,
aquatic recreation, sources of vital domestic water supplies,
irrigation for crnps, water for agriculture and animals, power
for industry, a necessary raw material for industry and as a
means of transporting from municipalities and industries their
wastes and liquid products.28
(b) Water resources will be administered according to
international drainage basins. An international drainage basin
is defined for the purposes of this act as waters bound by water-
shed extremities of the systems of waters, including surface,
subsurface and underground waters, all of which flow toward
a common terminus.
(c) If at all practical, water courses will be classified ac-
cording to their utilization and the quality standards to be
observed. Litwin states that
Classification . . . offers serious advantages. It enables the
composition of the waters in their present state and their pos-
sible uses to be known, the cause of pollution to be discovered,
and protective measures to be prepared and their order of
application determined.29
28 J. LITWIN, CONTROL OF RIVER POLLUTION 12 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
LiTWIN].
29 LrrwIN at 30.
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The commission will be better able to understand the relation-
ships between the standards of quality of the receiving media
and the characteristics of the effluents. Through this system of
classification, the commission will be able to make discharges
from their sewage treatment plants more suitable to the char-
acteristics of the receiving medium.
Water classification will have a practical relationship to
the use made for the water and the economics that will be
derived from upgrading or stabilization of water quality.
(d) All other economic considerations will be considered
when developing a water treatment plan. The Genossenschaften
viewed waste disposal supply problems as one system character,
rather than solely as a matter of individual treatment. The com-
mission in planning treatment facilities will also look at the
problem in these terms. Scale of economics will be considered,
perhaps linking towns or domestic or industrial users, or even
entire watersheds as the Genossenschaften has done on the
Emscher. Variables such as alternative sites, scales of devlop-
ment at each site, combinations of alternative sites and scales,
etc., will also be taken into consideration."
(e) This provision for determining the most suitable abate-
ment scheme will have to be read in conjunction with STAGE III,
Section A2, providing for the opportunity of industry already
established at the time of implementation, to choose between
in-plant or out-plant sewage treatment, and STAGE V, Section A2,
which requires industry to abide by licensing requirements.
(f) A situation such as an odorous discharge near a water
supply intake or heavily populated area (or a situation where the
cost of regulating pollution from an industry is so costly that the
commission deems it in the best interests of the plan to allow the
polluting activity).
(g) The commission will apportion the costs of individual
pollution by utilizing the method developed by the Genossen-
schaften for determining aggregate dilution requirements.
Knesse stated that
(1) There is estimated first an amount of water necessary
to dilute a given amount of materials subject to sedimen-
tation (no distinction made between organic and inorganic
material) in order that they might not be destructive to
fish life under conditions of the area. An amount of dilu-
tion water required by such material in a given effluent
is then computed on that basis.
30 Hearings Before a Special Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the
Senate Comm. on Public Works, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 940-45 (1965)
(remarks of A. Knesse, Director of Water Resource Program, Resources
for the Future, Inc.).
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(2) An analogous calculation is made for materials subject to
biochemical degration (and which, therefore exert oxy-
gen demand) but which are not subject to sedimentation.
(3) The amount of dilution required under specific conditions
in order that toxical material in the effluent not kill fish
is computed by direct experimentation.
(4) Certain side calculations having to do with water deple-
tion, heat in effluent, etc., are made. The derived dilution
requirements are added together for the effluent and
form a basis for comparison with all other effluents. In
principle, costs are distributed in accordance with the
proportion of aggregate dilution requirements accounted
for by the specific effluent. 31
Preservation of fish life might be only one consideration
the commission will use to determine the water quality of a
given stretch of the streams. The Genossenschaften index will
be used to determine the proportionate share a particular pol-
luter will be required to pay out of the total cost of pollution
abatement for the entire river basin.
This method of first determining an overall cost plan and
then allocating cost incurred by individual polluters, allows the
commission to retain a certain flexibility. If the commission
finds that because of increased quantity of pollution, a larger
scale of operation is required, costs are simply assessed on the
proportionate share method. If the quality or quantity of in-
dividual pollutants increases, the commission simply recom-
putes tle polluter's proportionate share and readjusts assessed
costs.
Clarence Tarzwell commented on the type of effluent
standard suggested by the Federal conference. The scheme was
based on a standard effluent concentration for all polluters
based on a given quality desired for the stream. An interesting
consequence was that pollution could be increased simply by
increasing the quantity of water used by polluters so that the
amount of material disposed of could be increased but effluent
content would be maintained; also a longer period for the
plant's operation (a night shift, for instance) which would
again allow more polluting with the same a standard concentra-
tion.32 The above problem would not arise under our plan. The
cost to an individual polluter would be determined on the basis
of actual polluting material produced rather than merely re-
quiring that a polluter maintain a certain effluent standard
that can easily be circumvented.
31 Id.
32 C. Tarzwell, Water Quality Requirements for Aquatic Life, in NATIONAL
SYMPOSIUM ON QUALITY STANDARDS FOR NATURAL WATERS 190-92 (U.
Mich. School of Pub. Health 1966).
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Another problem Tarzwell mentioned would be in setting
standards which, taken together, will produce precisely the
desired water quality. This would seem to leave no room for
entry of new industries, or expansion by existing ones. If the
commission were to readjust standards for effluents in a situa-
tion like this, instead of the difference being readjusted
through a price mechanism each polluter would have to re-
adjust his particular pollution control operation.33
(h) This particular provision is very crucial to the effec-
tiveness of the plan. Any viable plan for an international
waterway must not only be viable from an economic stand-
point, but must also be politically expedient. In the absence
of a complete centralization of decision making, inducements
through economic and political incentives are necessary. The
first hurdle that must be overcome in managing water quality
of an international river is to make it desirable for every coun-
try involved to be a party to the plan.
This desirability factor will be maximized by balancing the
costs and benefits of the plan in the following manner:
(1) Payments to the previously established polluters will be
made by the amount of their required proportionate share
of the total pollution abatement scheme.
Additional costs of pollution from new or expanding
polluting activities after the year the plan is implemented
will have to be assumed by the party adding the pollut-
ants. The additional costs will be apportioned by the con-
tinually re-evaluated Genossenschaften index. (This plan
will not be a license to pollute and this comment should
assure downstream users that they will no longer have to
assume the cost of others' pollution). The initial costs of
abatement will be divided disproportionately for a num-
of reasons: a. because they have traditionally carried the
cost under previously existing conditions; and b. because
the political consequences of requiring existing polluters
in upper riparian countries might be too much of a lia-
bility, while industrial or municipal polluters not yet in
existence cannot as successfully assert opposition to the
act.
(2) Costs to the water users will be computed by the total
amount of the abatement scheme reduced by one-half
percent of the gross national product of all countries party
to the plan divided by the amount of water used by the
party.34
(3) Some of the benefits to downstream users will be the ad-
vantages of their water supply being improved in the
33 Id. See also KNESSE, ch. 7.
34 This figure is subject to revision and will be computed by its relation-
ships with benefits to the public from recreational advantages of im-
proved quality, the aesthetic values enjoyed by the public, and other
benefits enjoyed by the public that cannot accurately be quantified.
MODEL STATUTE
most efficient and economical manner under the circum-
stances.
Another benefit is that over the long term, water use
cost will decrease after the year of implementation. The
Act will achieve this result by fixing the total cost of the
abatement scheme at the time the plan is implemented.
Thus, with increasing as well as expanded use, the aver-
age cost of a unit of water will decrease. For instance; if
the total cost of the plan the year it is implemented is X,
and if there is only one user Y, the cost of the water for
Y will be:
X- % of gross national product
Y
The next year, if his neighbor Z uses a unit of water, the
cost to Y will only be:
X- % of gross national product
Y plus Z
STAGE III
Section A: Feedback
1. The commission will inform polluters of the amount
and type of their pollutants; the treatment proposed by the
commission and the payments that will be made.
2. Within sixty days, the commission will receive from the
polluters their plans either to comply with the treatment plans
of the commission, or to seek an alternative course. (a)
3. The commission will notify users of their plans to tax
users.
4. Information shall be made available to the public of any
and all plans specifying standards to which polluters will be
held, proposed treatment, payments to polluters, tax placed on
users, proposed construction of any and all treatment plants
and any other communication deemed by the public to be of
interest. (b)
Section B: Plans adjustment
After the above mentioned provision is provided for, plans
will be adjusted accordingly; and any or all provisions of this
stage shall be repeated if plans are changed substantially.
Comments
(a) It is not intended that the commission will make
extensive studies of industrial processing to the point that they
unnecessarily intrude into the ongoing management of the in-
dustries. This would be politically unsound. The commission
will determine the pollution payment without an intensive
study into the internal processing of the industry. If the in-
dustry is able to abate the pollution more efficiently, they
1972
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should be so encouraged. They will, of course, be held to the
maximum standard of abatement and be paid the maximum
payment by the commission.
Joseph Sax states that industries are very reluctant to have
the government control in-plant operations, even though process
or product changes are often the more efficient. It is probably
politically not feasible and practically unworkable to expect the
commission to be able to determine the most economical treat-
ment of pollutants in this respect. Also, plant operators know
their operation best and are best situated to determine what,
if any, process adjustments or product change are most effi-
cient. The most the commission can reasonably be expected
to do is to plan for the most efficient treatment of pollutants
through waste recovery and through process alterations gen-
erally recognized as feasible in the industry.35
The commission might want to limit excess payments from
more efficient abatement techniques developed by industry,
to research costs and reasonable profits. The commission could
alter the payments made to polluters after research costs and
reasonable profits accrued. This comment will only apply to
industries established before the date of the implementation
of the act. All industries after that time will have to comply
with any design requirements that the commission deems neces-
sary in order to secure a license to operate as provided in
STAGE V, Section A2.
The interested party provision is necessary in the interests
of fairness, as well as to facilitate the formulation of the best
possible plan. Also, if parties are not guaranteed the oppor-
tunity to assert their right to be heard through the system, it
is possible they may attack and possibily disrupt the process
by means of noncooperation, active opposition, or private
litigation.
The interested party provision also serves another function.
Josef Litwin mentioned that one of the drawbacks of a broadly
outlined plan such as ours is that administrative regulations
and enforcement are never effectively implmented. STAGE III,
Section A4 will put the burden on public interests groups to
police the commission's activities, making sure that the policy
of the act is being adhered to.
Donald Carmichael discusses how to effectuate the mechan-
ism for interested party input. Public hearings should be re-
quired prior to the issuance of final orders and prior to the
35 J. SAX, WATER LAW PLANNING AND POLICY 417 (1968).
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approval of final plans on building and implementation. Pub-
lication of notice and mailing of notice to all parties proposed
to be regulated or known to be interested should be required. 36.
Following the initial public hearings, copies of the order
or decision issued should be served by mail on all parties regu-
lated and on all parties who have entered an appearance at the
hearing. The number of parties wishing to preserve their status
as interested parties throughout the enforcement and regula-
tory procedure, could then realistically be limited by requiring
that such parties perform further affirmative actions, such as
completing, having notarized and returning within a limited
time an affidavit on which they would identify themselves
and the nature of their interest as to one or more of the regula-
tion charges or regulated polluters. A small fee might be
charged by the department for registration by such interested
parties. They should, thereafter, be notified of final orders
and final approval of plans and further steps in the regulatory
process, such as plan submission of new or expanding municipal
works or industries, and approvals and petition for order
modifications. Public hearings concerning such regulatory steps
could be provided upon request of a given number or percent-
age of interested parties and objections noted in the official
record when there was no public hearing. Rules would further
have to be provided for excusably tardy intervention by
properly interested parties. All hearings and communications
by the commission should be of public record.
Finally, commission orders and decisions would be review-
able by the courts if jurisdiction could be asserted under the
law of the national's own country. All ordinary civil law
remedies will be available. While there would ordinarily be
substantial evidence to support the agency's decision, what the
reviewing court would really be asked to decide is, whether
the commission has made best possible decision in view of the
treatment alternatives available, their costs and efficiencies;
whether the purpose of the act is not being fulfilled by the
actions of the commission and any other grievance which could
reasonably be argued to violate the principle of fairness and
equity.
36 Carmichael, Forty Years of Water Pollution Control in Wisconsin; A
Case Study, 1968 WIs. L. REV. 350.
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STAGE IV
Section A: Completion of plans, collection of user fees,
enforcement
1. Plans shall be completed and construction will begin
with all due haste. Also, industrial redesign and product
changes shall be made with all due haste. The commission shall
have the power to set a time limit for implementation and to
penalize for non-compliance.
2. All regulations and orders will be enforced at the earli-
est time the commission deems feasible.
3. User fees shall be collected and pollution payments
made.
4. It shall be made a criminal as well as a civil offense to
violate any regulation of the commission.
STAGE V
Section A: Persons dumping after passage of this act
1. After final passage of the act, any person who dumps
directly or indirectly any substance into the waters of the river
basin shall notify the commission of such activity. (a) The
commission shall issue such orders and regulations as they
deem necessary to carry out the purpose of this act within
thirty days and agreement to these orders and regulations will
be necessary conditions precedent to starting any polluting
activity. (b)
Should an enterprise break conditions of the license, they
shall:
a. lose all entitlements to compensation as if the con-
cession were withdrawn or closed,
b. possibly be liable in damages,
c. be liable in penalties.
2. The commission will be notified by industries which
are likely to pollute the waters of the river basins of plans as
to location and design of such activity and industries may not
begin construction until the commission has given its approval.
The commission shall have the authority to suggest the most
efficient design of such a polluter and a suitable location, from
the standpoint of the purposes of the act. If these suggestions
are not adhered to the potential polluter will assume the full
weight of the additional burden placed upon the commission.
3. The commission will also receive petitions for modifica-
tions of previously authorized operations.
MODEL STATUTE
4. This section will be subject to STAGE III, Section B.
5. Violations of this section might also be adjudged a
criminal offense.
Section B: Estimate of land use planning section
The commission will either establish its own land use plan-
ning commission, or if there is one already existing, will work
in conjunction with it; but the commission will have final
authority on the use of land directly or indirectly affecting
the hydrologic unit. (c)
Section C: Ongoing function of the commission
The commission will continue to carry on a study of pol-
lution treatment and effects and will utilize any work done
in this area; such findings will be continually utilized in a
constant re-evaluation of plans and regulations in a continuing
effort to carry out the purpose of this act. (d)
Comments
(a) These provisions should apply not only to overflow,
outflow, discharge, and direct or indirect dumping of sub-
stances, but more generally, to any activity liable to cause or
increase pollution by altering the physical, chemical, biological,
or bacteriological characteristic of the water.3 7
This subsection is meant to include additional polluting
after the passage of this act.
(b) Through ongoing experimentation and research, the
commission will become expert in industrial design as it affects
pollution. If new industry does not follow the suggestions of
the commission it will be charged for any additional ineffi-
ciencies. Location of a polluting activity is another element to
be considered in the overall abatement plan. The location
should take into consideration accessibility to existing treat-
ment facilities, possible scales of economy, ability of the stream
to assimilate waste, etc.38 Again, additional costs to the plan
because of an unfavorable location will be an additional factor
in assessing the costs of polluting to the new industry or
municipal developer.
(c) A coordinated effort between land users and the water
pollution commission is necessary in cases where the use has
a direct affect on water pollution, as in irrigation, releases of
reservoirs, land development and mining.3 9
37 LrrwIN at 25.
38 KNESSE at 187.
39 Id. at 202.
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(d) The need for re-evaluation as well as the necessity
for immediate action is apparent:
Since new products and new waste are constantly appearing,
this work will never be completed, but must go on, we be-
lieve, as long as this nation exists.
We can not wait until we have all the answers before we
suggest water quality requirements for desired water uses,
for there would then be little left to protect. It is imperative
that we use the knowledge we now have, drawing upon our
experiences and judgment to develop uniform water quality
standards. If we will do this, we will make a very good begin-
ning and will go a long way toward preserving our aquatic
resources .... 40
40 Tarzwell, supra note 32, at 90.
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FIFTEEN MEN ON A POWDER KEG: A HISTORY
OF THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL
Andrew Boyd. New York: Stein and Day, 1971.
pp. xvi, 383. Index. $8.95.
"The Security Council is no Everest; but it is there."'
With these words the author, who is no stranger to the oper-
ations of the United Nations, closes his study. Such a pro-
nouncement is particularly telling at a period in the Council's
history in which it was repeatedly deadlocked by a series of
Soviet vetoes cast against draft resolutions designed to halt
the Indian-Pakistani war. Once again the Council revealed
its chronic inability to resolve the underlying issues which
caused the conflict. Even more important, from the present
standpoint, was its failure to achieve agreement on a resolu-
tion calling for a cease-fire and the withdrawal of armed
personnel. Although the General Assembly considered the
issue under the 1950 "Uniting for Peace" Resolution- and over-
whelmingly adopted a proposal which called for the imme-
diate cessation of hostilities and for the withdrawal of armed
forces,2 India ignored the Assembly's recommendation and
war continued until the new state of Bangladesh was formed.
Surely such lessons will not be lost on the members of
the international community. Israel as a small state, for ex-
ample, having had considerable experience with the United
Nations including its peace-keeping forces is not likely to
overlook the manner in which the incident was handled. The
United States has belatedly come to realize the overall shift
in the balance of power between Suez and the Bay of Bengal.
To redress this disadvantage Washington has decided to estab-
lish a naval presence in the Indian Ocean; it concluded an
executive agreement with Bahrain for a permanent naval sta-
tion on that island in the Persian Gulf; built a communica-
tions station on the British island of Diego Garcia in the
middle of the Indian Ocean; agreed to resume the shipment
1 A. BOYD, FIFTEEN MEN ON A POWDER KEG: A HISTORY OF THE U.N.
SEcuRMr COUNC,, at 369 (1971) [hereinafter cited as BOYD].
2 G.A. Res. 2793, 26 U.N. GAOR Supp ........ at ........, U.N. Doc. A/Res/
2793 (1971).
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of Phantom jets to Israel; and reportedly offered to help defray
the expenses of British military bases on Malta.
Such are the political facts of life, and action or inaction
on the part of the Security Council is merely a manifestation
of political reality. Inevitably the question must be posed
whether a resolution approved over the objections of one of
the super-powers in a veto-free Council would be more con-
ducive to the cause of peace than one which fails of adop-
tion because of the negative vote of such a member. It is in
this light that the author examines the history of the Council
during its first quarter-century.
While not analyzing the entire range of the Council's
activities, the book's ten chapters deal with the more vivid
episodes and often describe them in a colorful and humorous
fashion. Indeed, at times some of the terminology seems to be
misplaced. For example, Ambassador Hans Tabor of Den-
mark, the "Councilman"-the term employed by Mr. Boyd to
describe a permanent representative-who presided over the
Security Council during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, is called
"a new boy" in the Council.3 And some of the similes are
unfortunate. Thus Secretary-General Thant's attempts to raise
funds for UNFICYP are likened to those of a "Buddhist monk
with a begging bowl".4 But such comments are of minor
import and do not detract from the value of the book.
More serious are certain of the factual and legal lapses
which are found within its pages. The claim, for instance,
that the Soviet Union "has not contestdd the legality"5 of
proposals of the Council which were passed with the partici-
pation of the Republic of China is not borne out by the facts.
As early as 1950, the then Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the USSR, Andrei A. Gromyko, stated that the resolutions
of June 27 and July 7, 1950 which recommended assistance to
Korea and established the Unified Command, were not prop-
erly adopted and had "no legal force" because they received
six votes, the seventh being that of the "Kuomintang repre-
sentative Mr. Tingfu F. Tsiang who has not legal right to
represent China". 6 The statement that the United States Sen-
ate "ratifies" treaties is an only too common discrepancy, as
3 BOYD, supra note 1, at 209.
4 Id. at 289.
5 Id. at 12.
6 See 5 U.N. SCOR, Supp. June-Aug. 1950, at 29-30, U.N. Doc. S/1517
(1950); 5 U.N. SCOR, Supp. June-Aug. 1950, at 77-8, U.N. Doc. S/1596/
Rev. 1 (1950). See also 5 U.N. SCOR, Supp. June-Aug. 1950, at 69,
U.N. Doc. S/1579 (1950) and the statement of Ambassador Y. Malik in
5 U.N. SCOR, 480th meeting 15-6, 20 (1950).
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is the interchange of "naval blockade" with "naval quaran-
tine" in referring to the action during the Cuban missile crisis.
Certain other observations are unclear. Among these is
the initial failure to distinguish between provisions for financ-
ing ONUC and UNFICYP, although in fairness it should be
noted that the manner in which the Cyprus operation is fi-
nanced is ultimately clarified. Still other views are quite
controversial. In the strong defense of the Secretary-General's
withdrawal of UNEF in 1967, the position is taken that the
invitation of the host state to station peace-keeping forces
within its territory necessitates continuous consent. It is
argued that if attempts are made "to keep the force there
against the hosts' will"7 it is highly unlikely that a state will
ever again permit such units in its territory. Politically speak-
ing, however, is it realistic to expect the formation and ac-
ceptance of a future peace-keeping force such as UNEF in an
area as volatile as the Middle-East, if it is constantly at the
mercy of its hosts? Juridically is it not far sounder to suggest
that a state by accepting the forces has legally agreed to
curtail its sovereignty and limit its freedom of action with
regard to them? Thus the units do not perform their mission
at the sufferance of the host country. And under the doctrine
of estoppel, consent once given cannot be withdrawn arbi-
trarily---allegans contraria non audiendus est.
In spite of these shortcomings this is a useful study. Even
though there are certain instances of sarcasm, it is basically
a volume which is in favor of the world organization at a
time in which strong criticism has been directed at the United
Nations. It is basically an attempt to show that with all its
shortcomings the Security Council has functioned quite well.
Whether discussing the Middle-East, the Congo, Cyprus, Rho-
desia, the Pueblo, Czechoslovakia, or Northern Ireland the
author repeatedly indicates that, given the circumstances, the
Council did its best in each of these instances.
Above all the reader is constantly reminded, explicitly
and implicitly, that the Council merely mirrors the interna-
tional picture and that its movements result from this reflec-
tion, not from the organ qua organ. This is even more vividly
detailed in the changed positions which members have
adopted with the passage of time and in this regard the ad-
mission of new states and the enlargement of the Council are
cases in point. To be sure, the volume is not on par with those
7 BoYD, supra note 1, at 197.
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of Bailey, Rosenne, or Sharp on the different bodies of the
United Nations. Still, it is certainly worthy of attention on the
part of those who are interested in the operations of the
world organization.
Guenter Weissberg*
* Professor Weissberg received his J.D. & Ph.D. from Columbia Uni-
versity and is a member of the New York Bar. A well-known inter-
national legal consultant, he is Professor of Political Science at Colby
College and is currently Visiting Scholar at Columbia, University.
WORD POLITICS: VERBAL STRATEGY
AMONG THE SUPERPOWERS
THOMAS M. FRANCK AND EDWARD WEMBAND. Oxford University
Press. 1971 xiii, 176 pp. $5.95.
It is universally acknowledged that given the decentralized
structure of the international community, international law is,
in large measure, prescribed, invoked, applied and appraised by
state departments and foreign offices. States, which are still the
primary actors in the international arena, employ various
strategies - ideological, diplomatic, economic, and military - to
pursue their objectives and in doing so, they transmit signals
to other actors, signals which ought to be carefully watched
and read, for it is these signals which create mutual expecta-
tions and invariably set the parameters of acceptable and un-
acceptable state behavior.
Traditionally, state conduct has been the focus of most
scholarly investigation so as to predict future state behavior,
for a state's past conduct has been considered to be a fairly
accurate measure of what might be a state's likely response
in a similar future situation. Also, policymakers seem to keep
a close watch on what their allies and adversaries do. State
utterances, on the other hand, have not been the subject of close
scrutiny by the scholar. Professors Franck and Weisband con-
tend that even the policymakers, at least those in Washington,
do not seem to be overly concerned with what expectations they
might inadvertently create by their pronouncements.'
How important are these utterances, compared with what
states do, in anticipating their future moves or the moves of
the states at which these utterances, are directed, or in affecting
their internal structures and values or in transforming the in-
ternational system? The current debates on the "credibility
gap" between the U.S. government and the citizenry in the
context of the Vietnam war, the U.S.-Soviet "missile gap",
U.S. defense spending for national security, the India-Pakistan
war and the ITT case have recently stirred interest in state
utterances. However, Professors Franck and Weisband deserve
credit for having undertaken this pioneering study to demon-
1 T. FRANCK & E. WEISBAND, WORD POLMICS: VERBAL STRATEGY AMONG THE
SUPERPOWERS (1971) [hereinafter cited as FRANCK & WEISBAND].
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strate that words, principles and doctrines are as important
in world politics as is military strategy.
The authors assert that when a superpower engages in
verbal strategy, that is when it attempts to explain its conduct
to the world by relying on a set of principles, it thereby affects
the international system in general and limits the options avail-
able to the state in future specific confrontations with other
states.2 Specifically, when the conduct is explained by princi-
ples inconsistent with those previously applied in similar situa-
tions, the result is that: (1) the system is transformed insofar
as the expectation is created that the other superpower in the
future may invoke the same principles; 3 (2) the superpower's
world image is tarnished;4 and (3) the superpower's strategic
credibility is reduced, i.e., deterrence may no longer be credible
because "[n] ot only what we do, but what we say we are doing
creates a psychological expectation by the other side that it will
not be prevented from acting in accordance with the same
principles".'
The authors examine in detail the U.S. verbal behavior
between 1954 and 1965 in three regional crisis situations: Guate-
mala, Cuba and the Dominican Republic. Based upon their
investigation, they show that the explanations and rationaliza-
tions advanced by the U.S. of its conduct during these crises
anticipated the Brezhnev doctrine6 , which the Soviet Union
enunciated following its invasion of Czechoslovakia in August,
1968. They conclude that: "The cumulative effect of the U.S.
pronouncements is to appear to authorize the Soviet Union to
do exactly what it did to Czechoslovakia in 1968". 7 Thus, the
Johnson and Brezhnev doctrines are "virtually identical".8
The authors discuss the politics of the Czechoslovakian in-
vasion9 and argue that the Soviets might have been deterred
from directly invading Czechoslovakia "had there been an
added cost, namely, a convincing uncertainty about the risk of a
U.S. military reaction".'0 There was no cause for such uncer-
2 Id. at 119.
3Id. at viii, 6.
4 Id.
6 Id. at 7.
6 On the legal aspects of the Brezhnev doctrine, see generally Ramundo,
Czechoslovakia and the Law of Peaceful Coexistence: Legal Character-
ization in the Soviet National Interest, 22 STANFORD L. REV. 963 (1970);
Goodman, The Invasion of Czechoslovakia, 4 INT'L LAW. 42 (1969);
infra note 28.
7 FRANCK & WEISBAND at 8.
8 Id. at 6.
9 Id. at 11-32.
lo Id. at 32.
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tainty, for the Russians were able to point out that in Czecho-
slovakia "they were merely applying the very principles of
conduct the United States had evolved in relation to Latin
America"."
The authors outline the principles of the Brezhnev doctrine
as follows: 12 (1) a nation-member of a regional or ideological
community cannot withdraw or be withdrawn from that com-
munity's jurisdiction; (2) the community could impose certain
standards of behavior on its members pertaining to domestic
and foreign policy; (3) the community determines whether a
member of the community is complying with the set standards;
(4) a member found derelict in its compliance with the set
standards may be forced by the community to alter its policies
-i.e., if the the community action requires the use of military
force, it will be termed collective self-defense against the en-
croachment of an alien ideology, and not aggression; (5) spe-
cifically, any socio-economic or political doctrine or system at
variance from the one established by the community will be
considered alien, in response to which the community may
use force as a collective self-defense measure; and (6) under
the treaty of the community, community members may invade
the territory of a state at the invitation of any persons desig-
nated by the community as "loyalist" leaders, even though they
do not constitute the legally recognized government even by
the community members.
The authors show how these six principles were all de-
rived from the prior verbal behavior of the United States in
justifying its interventionist policies in Latin America. In 1954,
during the Guatemalan crisis, the United States had success-
fully blocked any United Nations action, thus signalling the
Soviet Union that the United States would not tolerate any
interference, even that of the United Nations, in the Western
Hemisphere, a region that the United States considered exclu-
sively within its sphere of influence. 13 The authors outline the
principles which the United States relied upon to justify the
Cuban quarantine, to demand the removal of Soviet missiles
during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962,14 and to show that
while "the precise circumstances of the Cuban missile crisis
and the Czechoslovakian crisis of 1968 are, of course, different,
the entire verbal conceptualization of the American and O.A.S.
11 Id.
12 Id. at 39-40.
13 See generally id. at 49-55.
14 Id. at 63-68.
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positions during the missile crisis unmistakably makes the prin-
ciples of the Brezhnev Doctrine seem more reciprocal than
innovative".1
Since the United States did not use its armed forces in the
territory of either Guatemala or Cuba, the sixth principle
outlined in the Brezhnev doctrine finds no parallel in the U.S.
or O.A.S. verbal strategy used in those crises. But the authors
find a fitting parallel to that principle in the Johnson doctrine,
enunciated during the 1965 Dominican Crisis.16 The now famous
doctrine that "American nations cannot, must not, and will not
permit the establishment of another Communist government
in the Western Hemisphere",17 was invoked to justify the pres-
ence of American troops in the Dominican Republic. This doc-
trine of "unlimited superpower supremacy in its region . .
proved very convenient to Soviet strategists in 1968",18 for the
Soviets merely echoed the propositions advanced by the United
States during the Dominican Crisis,'9 and "with the help of the
words, concepts, and principles of the prior U.S. foreign policy
pronouncements", had little or no difficulty in rationalizing the
invasion of Czechoslovakia. The Dominican and Czechoslo-
vakian actions were justified by the U.S. and Soviet Union re-
spectively by invoking their right and duty to raise self-defense
measures against alien-influenced invasion, in accordance with
the norms and expectations established by the respective re-
gional pacts, and as humanitarian rescue operations.
The authors do not assert that the U.S. action in the Do-
minican Republic was "the operative cause of the Soviet sup-
pression of Czechoslovakia", 20 for they recognize that there are
many intervening variables. However, what they do skillfully
and convincingly accomplish is prove their contention that
there was an almost indistinguishable invocation of concepts
and norms by the U.S. and the Soviet Union to rationalize inter-
ventions into their respective regions, which have in reality
been transformed into super power ghettoes.
Forcefully arguing that it is a false dichotomy to distin-
guish between words and acts in terms of their impact intern-
'5 Id. at 69.
1'See generally id. at 70-95. See also this reviewer's analysis of the
Dominican crisis in Nanda, United States Action in the 1965 Dominican
Crisis: Impact on World Order, 43 DENVER L. J. 439 (1966); and Part II,
44 DENVER L. J. 225 (1967).
17 FRANCK & WEISBAND at 79.
18 Id. at 94-95.
1, See generally id. at 96-113.
20 Id. at viii.
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ally, or on other actors and the international system in gen-
eral,21 the authors assert that:
it ought to have been recognized that when President Johnson
explained our invasion of the Dominican Republic in terms of
a doctrine of limited sovereignty and regional self-defense
against an alien ideology he in effect offered the Soviets the
right to depose any regime in Eastern Europe that appeared to
threatened socialist orthodoxy. In August 1968 the "offer" was
accepted. Strategically it means little to argue-however true
-that we did not intend this systemic consequence. We knew,
and the Russians knew that we knew, that the Brezhnev Doc-
trine was the reciprocal of the Johnson Doctrine. Estoppel in
such circumstances is not merely a legal but also a systemic
and strategic concept.22
The authors contend that the U.S. verbal strategy in the
Guatemalan, Cuban and Dominican crises seems to endorse a
static balance of power which they find not to be in the U.S.
national interest, "if we believe liberty better than totalitarian-
ism to be the dynamic force". 23 They fear that if the U.S. con-
tinues its policy of "regional repression", it "would almost cer-
tainly create social and political conflicts at home that could
end only in the restoration of democratic ideals to our foreign
policy or else in a domestic regime as authoritarian as any we
might impose on the hemisphere". 24 They predict: "If we were
to subscribe to the principle of a two-ghetto system, we would
be further blurring the line between U.S. democracy and Soviet
communism. ...25
The last chapter 26 is a study of the current developments,
especially the recently pronounced Nixon doctrine which would
purportedly shift the emphasis from the verbal strategy of
hostility to that of cooperation. The authors suggest that per-
haps Nixon's pronouncements on the election of President
Allende in Chile and on the leftist course of action adopted by
the revolutionary junta of Peru offer a promise for the future,
recognizing the right of small states in the hemisphere to pur-
sue diverse economic policies. This is qualified by the caution-
ary stand that these states not serve as a base for a foreign
state or for the subversion of other Latin American states. The
Soviet Union seems to be following a reciprocal pattern by
permitting Romania, Yugoslavia and Albania to follow their
own roads to socialism.
21 See generally id. at 114-36.
22 Id. at 129.
23 Id. at 112.
24 Id. at 116.
25 Id. at 115.
26 Id. at 137-69.
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Thus the authors suggest that perhaps an effort is already
under way to modify the Johnson-Brezhnev principles which
where responsible for creating 9uperghettoes. However, in order
to succeed in laying the foundation for a different kind of
world order, based on cooperation instead of hostility, efforts
will have to be made to bring about changes on several levels,
for instance; in climate, images, concrete conduct and systemic
norms of conduct. The authors conclude with this succinct
observation: "We are at the crossroads. If they and we so
choose, the Soviet Union and the United States can now move
from the dual-ghetto patterns of subsystem interaction to a
new norm that safeguards the superpowers' justified, essential
strategic interests, while yet permitting much greater expres-
sion of the national individuality of smaller states within each
superpower's region".2 7
The book should interest and benefit students of inter-
national law and relations as much as those who are policy-
makers, politicans and statesmen. Those of use who have fol-
lowed the earlier works by Professors Franck and Weisband on
the subject, especially their articles: The Johnson and Brezhnev
Doctrines: The Law You Make May Be Your Own 28 and The
Role of Reciprocity and Equivalence in Systemic Superpower
Interaction,'2 and that of Professor Franck, Who Killed Article
2 (4) ?3(1 had hoped and anticipated that the authors would bring
this material together into a handy volume, which, fortunately,
they have done. In fact, the authors have gone beyond the
already printed material. They have not only added new mate-
rial but new insights as well, especially in the last chapter
and in their analysis of the prior case studies.
One could perhaps quibble over the fact that since the
bipolar system is giving way to a multipolar system, since the
future of Sino-Soviet relations is unpredictable, and since
many more major middle powers as well are likely to have
their impact on the nature of the future international system,
the concept of superpower-ghettoes might already have become
outmoded. But still the fact remains that the verbal strategy
of nation states, both big and small, needs to be carefully
formulated, for it does affect the nature of the international
system and its shape to be. The authors have given ample
proof that since the United States had "never learned to listen
27 Id. at 169.
28 22 STANFORD L. REV. 979 (1970).
2 3 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POLITICS 263 (1970).
30 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 809 (1970).
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to itself as if it were the enemy speaking",31 it and the world
order have suffered in the long run. Their recommendations
are indeed invaluable, and if followed would form the founda-
tion for a desirable world public order.
Ved P. Nanda*
*Professor, College of Law, University of Denver. Director, Interna-
tional Legal Studies Program.
31 FRANCK & WEISBAND at 8.
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THE UNITm STATES AND CHINA. John King Fairbank, third edi-
tion. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971. xvi, 500 pp.
$9.95.
This work, often considered classic and now in its third
edition, redefines our understanding of Asian realities and of
the United States' aggressiveness. THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA
questions the U.S. policy of containment in the Asian context.
Is it possible that the U.S. did not understand China? History
is bringing in the verdict now. To co-exist and even to survive,
the U.S. will have to re-examine itself with regard to the real
Asia and our own very doubtful benevolence. Edwin 0. Reisch-
auer claims in his introduction that no one has written with
more clarity or perception about China.
The format is essentially that of a text outlining what the
U.S. knows of China and what recently has resulted from its
policy. The style is formal, and the order and classification of
happenings are helpfully headlined. As a source of material
the generous section for suggested readings offers a wealth of
citations for one interested in pursuing areas in depth.
PEACE WITH CHINA? U.S. DECISIONS FOR ASIA. Earl C. Ravenal,
editor. New York: Liveright, 1971. x, 248 pp. $7.50.
This book is a symposium of the views of eighteen experts
who represent one of two groups: the radical critic or the gov-
ernment servant. Former members of the Kennedy and John-
son administrations examine the foreign policies and their
resultant implications which still determine U.S. policy today.
The debate between the critics of our Asian policy and those
instrumental in forming that policy often becomes heated.
The question is raised of whether a tolerant concession to the
real needs of all people is evolving rather than the continued
effort to impress this nation's principles on the rest of the
world.
The style is informal and the format allows each partici-
pant to present his views, which are responded to by other
participants. This gives the reader a stimulating and informa-
tive variety of perspectives. For the researcher or scholar there
are few references to which one might look for further informa-
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tion. The materials presented, however, are in themselves
perceptive analyses.
A NEW LOOK AT RED CHINA. Joseph Newman, directing editor.
Washington, D.C.: Books by U.S. News & World Report, 1971.
317 pp. $2.95.
This book written by the staff of the U.S. News & World
Report serves as an informative and enjoyable document on
the recent emergence of China from behind the Great Wall.
From Stalin's death to the present the delicate winds of world
politics are traced in reference to China. The most striking
aspect of the book is the analysis of the diplomacy between the
U.S., China and the U.S.S.R. which gives the reader an idea of
the realities underlying sensitive and complex foreign relations.
The authors remained true to their aim throughout the book
when they cautioned that the work was not to have been a
detailed study but rather a guide to only some of the major
factors and issues which have come into play. The views ;of
various journalists and government officials point towards a
means of reaching sound conclusions about open societies as
well as the greatest closed society in modern history. The
colorful and informal style allows the reader who is less
familiar with the subject a chance to enjoy the fascinating
strategies normally hidden behind elusive diplomatic language.
THE GROWTH OF WoRLD LAW. Percy E. Corbett. Princeton, New
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1971. 205 pp. $7.50.
In a comprehensive summary of the trend in international
organization, Professor Corbett, a distinguished author and
scholar, traces the development of legal institutions from inter-
national law to a law which transcends states and acknowledges
the rights of the individual and humanity as a whole. In his an-
alysis he surveys the integrative processes which are responsi-
ble for this transition to supra-nationalism, and specifically dis-
cusses such agreements as the Geneva Conference of 1958 on
the Law of the Sea, the 1969 Conference in Vienna on the Law
of Treaties, the IBRD Convention of 1965, and the United
Nations and regional organizations, such as the Organization
of American States, and the Organization of African Unity;
and the polemics of international propaganda. The text covers
in the form of an historical exposition what is happening in the
world community, and assesses optimistically, but at the same
time realistically, prospects for the growth of world law.
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EYEwmTNEss IN GREECE. John A. Katris. New York, New Critics
Press, E.P. Dutton and Co., Inc., 1971, 317 pp. $9.95.
The exciting drama of the recent military takeover in
Greece comes alive through the eyes of an on the spot observer,
Greek journalist John A. Katris. Mr. Katris has served as
political editor and editor in chief of a number of major Greek
newspapers during the past two decades. From the vastly pub-
licized assassination of Greek M.P. Gregory Lambrakis (one of
the most celebrated accounts of which is the book "Z" by V.
Vassilikos) to the April 1967 night that NATO supplied tanks
advanced through Athens and marked the final phase of the
military take over, Mr. Katris' political novel dramatically
traces the death of democracy in the land of its birth. In addi-
tion to his eyewitness account of the events in Greece, the
author draws upon his many conversations with his personal
friend George Papandreou in compiling this chronical of politi-
cal upheaval. Of outstanding merit is the author's objective
presentation of the nature and extent of NATO, CIA and Penta-
gon involvement in the perpetration of this decade of corrup-
tion and terrorism, ending in military dictatorship. Mr. Katris
warns that the danger of such a military takeover threatens all
nations where the military is allowed to grow unchecked in
response to the threat of communism. Clarity and objectivity
are maintained in the author's writing as he presents a dramatic
and accurate account of the events, their causes, and their
significance.
SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY: THE MULTINATIONAL SPREAD OF U.S. ENTER-
PRISES. Raymond Vernon. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1971.
336 pp. $8.50.
This is the first of five volumes presenting the result of
Harvard's Multinational Enterprise Project which was started
in 1965 and funded by the Ford Foundation. It is a general
view of the variations of multinational corporation with par-
ticular emphasis on those based in the United States, describ-
ing their history, growth, composition, and impact. SovEREIGNTY
AT BAY is well documented with frequent tables and data from
the study it reports, and is easily read. The author concludes
that the regulation of the vast multinational enterprises be
assumed by an international organization in possession of "a
set of social yardsticks that are multinational in scope".
THE CLOSING CIRCLE. Barry Commoner. New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, Inc., 1971. 326 pp. $6.95.
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Although the environmental situation has been called a
"crisis", the roots of the problem were implanted long before
the present realization. Barry Commoner, biologist, ecologist
and educator, has devoted the large part of his career attempt-
ing to emphasize the critical balance between man and the
earth on which he lives. As a scientist, the polemics of the
ecology debate are patently clear to Mr. Commoner. THE CLos-
ING CIRCLE has the insight of scientific inquiry coupled with the
broad experience of the political and educational channels. In
short, it is a most readable work devoted to calmly informing
the public that it has only a few decades in which to build a
rational social-economic system for survival.
THE CLOSING CRCLE is the explanation of the interrelation-
ship of man and the physiological environment. Somehow such
scientific expositions always seem to lack the practical reality
needed for a concerted motivation to do something ... but this
is not the case here. The book starts by giving a very clear and
understandable analysis of the balance and then proceeds to
show thru actual case histories how this balance can be up-
set. Clear and concise case histories of the poisoning of the
air in Los Angeles, the earth in Illinois, and the water in Lake
Erie are representative of the problems. The results of some of
the unsettling problems such as plastics (Polyvinyl-chloride)
and atomic fallout (Strontium 90) will not be known until the
next generation.
Unquestionably, Mr. Commoner makes no attempt to find
a "scapegoat" in solving the ecological crisis. It is the basic
value system of each and every one of us which must change.
Allegiance to our present values contains the seeds of our own
destruction.
This book is a creative and nondoctrinaire approach to a
problem which deserves all the discussion that current authors
give to it. The goal of survival cannot be attained until the
enemy is thoroughly understood.
RISE To GLOBALISM: AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY SINCE 1938. Stephen
E. Ambrose. London: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 1971. 351
pp. $8.95.
"As she moved into the 1970's, America remained deter-
mined to hold the empire she had won, whatever the cost."
With these words the author summarizes the result of Ameri-
can foreign policy developments which occurred between 1938
and 1970. He views the tremendous growth of America, from
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the economic depression of the 1930's to its current position of
world dominence, as being caused by a revolution in attitudes,
policies and methods.
Mr. Ambrose analyzes the military, economic and political
events of the era by describing this revolution. He believes
that underlying the Second World War, the Korean Conflict,
and the Vietnam War there were developing American char-
acteristics of economic aggressiveness, racism, fear of com-
munism and national pride. To these characteristics he ascribes
the rise of American power, and they are the basis of his
analysis.
This refreshing historical perspective is a valuable contribu-
tion to the historical studies of this era. It is a fascinating nar-
rative, and those involved with international law will find
RISE To GLOBALISM a useful source towards understanding the
background of the present world situation.
STALIN: THE HISTORY OF A DICTATOR. H. Montgomery Hyde. New
York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1972. 679 pp. $12.95.
Mr. Hyde has written many historical biographies ranging
from Castlereagh to Oscar Wilde, and STALIN is treated with the
same exacting approach. The book is woven together with
many narratives and interviews to make a complete story of
Stalin, the man, and Stalin, the dictator. Even though the his-
tory of Stalin is well known there are few works which at-
tempt to trace the evolution from birth to grave of a famous
man.
Stalin's early years in Georgia are portrayed in the stark-
ness and hostility of Tsarist Russia. Even down to the fact that
Stalin had latent anxieties about his physical shortcomings, the
life of the dictator is relived. The absolute power is astounding
when one realizes his methods and his control. When reduced
to but a helpless dependent in his declining years, Stalin still
provoked fear and terror.
In the chapter entitled "The Deadly Pact", Hyde shows how
Stalin's only real match was Hitler. Even after the first Nazi
invasions of Russia, Stalin still sent supplies to Germany. In
fact, he was rendered helpless by the complete misunderstand-
ing of Hitler's designs. This mistake was never made again.
As Hyde explains, America was literally used to help build
the Russia of today. Stalin's paranoia is a thread which runs
throughout the book and the "Doctors' Plot" was only defeated
by the death of Stalin.
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Nikita Khruschev's memoirs are utilized to add evidence
that Stalin was indeed barbaric, but highly successful with this
use of force. STALIN is illustrated with maps, letters, pictures
and even criminal files. One cannot help but conclude that this
is one of the most thorough and complete works even written
about Stalin.
HOLOCAUST OR HEMISPHERIC Co-op: CROSS CuRRENTs IN LATIN
AMERICA. William 0. Douglas. New York: Random House, 1971.
215 pp. $5.95.
In Latin America, 80 per cent of the population is destitute,
10 per cent of the landowners control 90 per cent of the arable
land, and the population growth rate is one of highest in the
world.
Justice Douglas makes the suggestion that the United States
abandon the traditional role of hemispheric leader and work
with Latin America as a partner in a cooperative economy. He
discusses a series of innovative programs designed to deal with
indigenous Latin American institutions. The existing founda-
tions of Latin American culture must be taken into considera-
tion in any new plan, even though they may not coincide with
our "American" way of life and capitalistic economy. Justice
Douglas proposes a hemispheric co-op which would allow Latin
American nations to work together for their mutual gain while
allowing political and technological diversity.
HOLOCAUST OR HEMISPHERIC Co-op describes the animosity
shown toward the United States as a product of the South
American national's view of United States involvement as con-
descension and exploitation. The work covers such diverse
topics as the military and the elite, as well as current miscon-
ceptions of Latin American folklore. The book is incisive and
immensely realistic in its approach to proposals for significant
improvement in the quality of life for the impoverished of
Latin America.
